



坚持新世纪初西藏工作的指导思想不动摇

# News Review

Reports from Tibet, 2001

Policies and Development

Cadres

Religion

Education and Language


Propaganda

Security

Prisoners and Prisons

Tibet Information Network  
ཌཌཌཌཌཌཌཌཌཌཌཌ  
西藏信息网

No.  
30  
2002



**News Review**  
**Reports from Tibet 2001**

Tibet Information Network  
London

Copyright © October 2002  
Tibet Information Network  
All rights reserved

ISSN: 1355-5650

Printed in England  
Published by Tibet Information Network (TIN), October 2002

Front cover picture: ©Plumpyji/TIN



## **Tibet Information Network**

**Tibet Information Network (TIN)** is an independent news and research service that collects and distributes information about the current situation in Tibet. It was set up by Robert Barnett and Nicholas Howen in 1987. Based in London, with news-gathering centres in India and Nepal, TIN monitors political, social, economic, environmental, and human rights conditions in Tibet and then publishes the information worldwide in the form of regular news updates, briefing papers and specialist analytical reports. TIN's information comes from a variety of sources both inside and outside Tibet, from interviews with Tibetan refugees and from the monitoring of established Chinese, Tibetan and international media.

TIN's main objective is to provide a systematic, comprehensive and impartial news and information service for journalists, development agencies, human rights groups, governments, non-governmental and international organisations as well as academics and other interested parties.

In 1996 TIN was registered as a charity in the UK (No. 1057648) under the title "Tibet Information Network Trust" with the following stated aims:

- to advance the education of the public about Tibet and its people by undertaking, promoting and commissioning research into conditions and developments in and relating to Tibet
- to disseminate the results of such research to the general public, non-governmental organisations, inter-governmental organisations, governments, parliamentarians, the media and scholars in the United Kingdom and throughout the world.

Tibet Information Network,  
City Cloisters, 188-196 Old Street,  
London EC1V 9FR, UK  
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7814 9011  
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7814 9015  
e-mail: [tin@tibetinfo.net](mailto:tin@tibetinfo.net)  
Website: <http://www.tibetinfo.net>

TIN USA,  
PO Box 2270,  
Jackson, WY83001, USA  
Tel: (+1) 307 733 4670  
Fax: (+1) 307 739 2501  
e-mail: [tinusa@wyoming.com](mailto:tinusa@wyoming.com)

**The Tibet Information Network Trust is registered as a charity (No. 1057648) in the UK,  
as a limited company (No. 3226281) in England and Wales  
and as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit organisation in the USA.**

## Acknowledgements

The main work of compiling this *TIN News Review: Reports from Tibet 2001* was carried out at the Tibet Information Network (TIN) head-office in London, and informed and guided by the input of TIN's field teams and researchers in India and Nepal. Thanks to Tim Kangro and the other volunteers at TIN, who do not wish to be named, for their hard work and enthusiasm. Our thanks also to the colleagues and advisors who provided analysis and support throughout the year, but who cannot be named.

We are especially grateful to the following people for their extremely valuable contributions to TIN's news and research output: Steven Marshall, Tsering Shakya, Robert Barnett, Adam Koziel and Warren Smith. Much of our research would not have been possible without the 'Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) material' provided by the BBC Monitoring Service – our thanks to Suzanne Lidster and her colleagues at Caversham Park.

A huge vote of thanks is due to Jane Bartlett, who freely invested so much of her expertise, energy and time, and generously offered her project management skills in the final stages of this project.

The production of this and other TIN reports is dependent upon the many anonymous individuals who ensure that important documents are made available to us, often at considerable risk to themselves and their families, and that, despite the inherent difficulties and dangers, information about the situation on the ground continues to emerge from Tibet. Through their efforts and courage, they help build our understanding of the impact of development on the lives of ordinary people in Tibet. Although unable to publicly acknowledge them, our appreciation and respect goes out to all of those who provide us with such information.

In order to fund its work, TIN relies almost entirely on donations and grants from individuals, trusts and foundations, and selected government agencies. It will not accept any funds that might threaten its autonomy or require it to depart from its agreed mandate or programme of work. In this respect, TIN would like to express its deep gratitude for the financial support that has helped facilitate the extensive research behind this publication, including that from the Gere Foundation; Loel Guinness and the Kalpa Group; the Staples Trust; the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA); National Endowment for Democracy; the Barrow Cadbury Trust; the Lyndhurst Settlement; The American Himalayan Foundation; The Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust; the Department for International Development Co-operation, Finland; Schweizer Tibethilfe; The Philanthropic Trust and anonymous benefactors from the UK, France, the Netherlands and the USA.

# Contents

□ previously unpublished TIN analysis and source material

## Introduction

### 1. Policies and Development

9-38

- Official policies
  - Policies: 'Leap-over style development and long-term stability': 10
  - Initial reports on Fourth Tibet Work Forum 11
  - The Fourth Forum Speeches by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 13
  - National Autonomy Law revised to support Western Development policy 21
  - "Development is the infallible truth" - The Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Economic & Social Development of the TAR 23
- Infrastructure and urbanisation
  - "Mammoth transfer of resources": Tibet railway and gas pipeline and Dramatic transformation of Lhasa planned 26
- Official Press: Policies and Development 33

### 2. Cadres

39-48

- Deputy Party secretary Tenzin moved to Beijing 39
- Grass roots rural control stepped up with education of Chinese and Tibetan cadres 40
- "Summer grass, winter worm": Chinese cadres in Tibet 41
- Official Press: Cadres 46

### 3. Religion

49-68

- Repression at Serthar and Yachen
  - Expulsions of nuns and students threaten survival of important Tibetan Buddhist institute 50
  - Serthar teacher now in Chengdu; new information on expulsions of nuns at Buddhist institute 56
  - Demolition at the Yachen Buddhist institute in Payul 58
- Restrictions on religious practice
  - Lhasa authorities reinforce Dalai Lama birthday celebration ban 59
  - Anti-religion campaign targets Tibetan schoolchildren 61
- Karmapa and other reincarnations
  - Anniversary of Karmapa's escape; tension at monastery in Tibet 63
  - Child lama forced to leave monastery following Karmapa escape 64
  - "A great loss for Tibet's religion, culture and people": Obituary of Shardung Rinpoche 66
  - Deaths of 13 Tibetans in monastery collapse 66
- Official Press: Religion 67

### 4. Education and Language

69-74

- Increase in Chinese medium teaching in Tibetan schools 69
- Official Press: Education & Language 74

## KEY DOCUMENTS

- Extracts from the TAR Tenth Five-Year Plan 25
- • Examination questionnaire for specialist technical personnel 41
- • Wall poster signed by Payul People's Government re "steady improvement and maintenance at Tromthar Yachen Monastery" 58
- • Public Notice of Lhasa Government regarding "the illegal activities of Trunglha Yarso!" 60
- • Amendments to Chinese Criminal Law 95

## KEY SPEECHES

- Address by Zeng Qinghong to Chinese Cadres selected to work in Tibet, 4 July 2001 44
- Speech by Hu Jintao on building a high-quality contingent of cadres for Tibet, 19 July 2001 45


## TESTIMONIES/INTERVIEWS

- • 'Side jobs' for impoverished nomads 31
- Eyewitness accounts of demolition and expulsions at Serthar 53
- Serthar: "the best monastery to go to for nuns" 53
- • The ban on blessing cords 61
- • "I felt sad because I was a Tibetan, but my school was good" 72
- • "Generally in society Tibetan is not viewed highly" 72
- • "I have to encourage my children to study Chinese" 73
- • Student life: use of Tibetan language 73
- • Account from Qinghai nationalities college student 74

## 5. Propaganda

75-90


- Domestic Propaganda
  - "An important political responsibility": Anniversary of 17-Point Agreement in Tibet 76
  - The 17-Point Agreement - A Summary 77
  - Chinese Vice-President in Lhasa to mark anniversary of 'peaceful liberation' 78
  - 'National Day' commemoration highlights political duties of Tibetans 80
  - Jamming of foreign broadcasts stepped up in propaganda drive 82
- External Propaganda
  - Tibet official links China's Olympic bid to struggle against separatism 85
  - China to strengthen Tibet policy as Dalai Lama meets US President 86
  - Propaganda and the West: China's struggle to sway international opinion on the Tibet issue 87
  - "Tibet's March Towards Modernisation": A Summary of the White Paper issued by Information Office of the State Council 90



## 6. Security

91-102


- Domestic Security & 'Strike Hard'
  - Security clampdown for 10 March anniversary 92
  - Party Secretary emphasises 'stability' during visit of Tashilhunpo 93
  - Security in Lhasa during Hu Jintao's visit 94
  - Executions in Tibet during Strike Hard campaign 97
- Border Security
  - Security policies in Shigatse 99
  - New increase in deportations of Tibetans from Nepal 100
  - Decline in refugee numbers as China and Nepal tighten security on Tibetan border 101



## 7. Prisons & Prisoners

103-112

- Chadrel Rinpoche
  - New information on Chadrel Rinpoche prison term 103
- Deaths related to detention
  - Tibetan farmer dies in prison 104
  - Two Tibetans die at labour re-education camp 106
  - Death of nun after nine years in prison 107
  - Obituary of Namgyal Tashi 108
- Prisons
  - New reports on Ngaba prison 109
  - New details on Kardze detention centre, Ngaba prison layout 111



# Introduction

The direction of Beijing's policies for the development of Tibet became significantly clearer to observers during the year. From 25 to 27 June, the fourth in a series of central forums for work on Tibet was convened in Beijing. All seven members of China's Politburo Standing Committee attended the forum – indicating the fundamental importance accorded to Tibet by China's leadership.

While no policy documentation giving full details of the decisions taken has yet been made public, as far as TIN is aware, Xinhua reported at length on Chinese President Jiang Zemin's speech, which emphasised the importance of Party building and of continuing to prioritise the two 'major issues' of economic development and 'social stability'. Jiang also emphasised acceleration of economic growth in Tibet into "development by leaps and bounds", and stressed the importance of improving living standards for "the people of every nationality in Tibet".

Some finer detail was seen with publication of the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Tibet on 5 March 2001. Despite limited discussion and some criticism from well-placed Chinese economists, the development strategy formulated almost ten years ago – focusing on GDP growth and exploitation of natural resources for industrialisation and development – is apparently set to continue. The first of three developmental stages set out in the Plan promises "a comfortably well-off standard of living all round" by the year 2005, while by mid-century Tibet is to "take its place in the forefront of China's drive for the four modernisations". Preoccupations with economic development even dominate amendments made to China's Law on Regional National Autonomy on 28 February 2001. The amendments deal primarily with development of autonomous regions according to the Party's political and economic priorities and the further integration of these areas into the rest of China, rather than issues of autonomy and the rights and interests of 'minority nationality' peoples.

Urbanisation is a particular focus of the Five-Year Plan, and TIN reported in March 2001 that the Lhasa authorities are currently implementing ambitious plans to more than quadruple the area of urban Lhasa from its current 53 square kilometres to 282 square kilometres by 2015, and to increase the urban population by 30 per cent over the next four years. One major priority in the national Five-Year Plan (as well as that of the TAR) is the railway between Golmud and Lhasa: construction work commenced during the year, with a ceremony to mark the occasion held on 29 June simultaneously in Golmud and Lhasa. The project is set to receive 20 billion yuan (US\$2.4bn) in funding from the central government during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period alone (2001-2005)<sup>1</sup>. However, many Tibetans are known to be concerned that while there may be some short-term benefit for Tibetans in the construction of shops and restaurants for local people, the arrival of more Chinese people with education and skills as a result of the railway construction is likely to lead to increasing marginalisation of Tibetans in both urban and rural areas.

News emerged in 2001 of a conference on Tibetology and external propaganda work held on 12 June 2000, focusing on the need to improve and develop propaganda. A major element of the propaganda campaign is the promotion of the notion of economic progress in Tibetan areas due to Chinese policy – which also has the aim of attempting to attract both foreign and domestic investment. Externally, propaganda relating to Tibet has an additional aim: the 'Tibet issue' which continues to receive prominence in the international media is one of the main obstacles for China



"Construct a modern town become progressive citizens ('town-dwellers')". A banner across a street in Lhasa

© TIN



in its attempts to win international acceptance of its claims of progress in human rights. The contents of the speech given by Zhao Qizheng, Director of the Information Office of the State Council, at the June 2000 conference indicates that China now intends to co-opt Tibetologists in China to a greater extent in carrying out research that will promote the state's views, in the belief that foreigners will listen more readily to academics.

The 50th anniversary of the 'liberation' of Tibet and execution of the 17-Point Agreement, which took place during 2001, was used as a propaganda vehicle by the authorities. The importance of these events to the Chinese leadership (which uses them to give a legal backing to their claim that Tibetan areas are part of the PRC) was emphasised by the week long visit of Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, a former Party Secretary of the TAR, to the region in mid-July. Vice President Hu, the heir apparent to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, participated in celebrations to mark the anniversaries and presented the Tibetan people with the symbolic gift of a three-legged urn (described in the English-language Chinese press as a 'National Unity Precious Tripod') bearing an inscription by Jiang Zemin. However, particularly at the time of sensitive anniversaries, it was noteworthy that the authorities felt it necessary to implement strict security measures to prevent any expression of dissent. During Hu Jintao's visit to Lhasa, Tibetans selected to watch the celebrations were required to assemble and take their seats at 5am and for security reasons were not permitted to carry anything with them, while other Lhasa citizens were instructed by neighbourhood committees and officials to watch the events on television rather than going out onto the streets. At the time of the key political anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising on 10 March, stringent restrictions were put in place around key monasteries in and around Lhasa; a few days prior to the anniversary, former political prisoners and their relatives were required to attend a meeting in which they were warned not to participate in 'anti-state' activities.

News about political prisoners in Tibet continued to be difficult to obtain during 2001 due to the efforts of the Chinese authorities to prevent such information from reaching the outside world. TIN research indicates that political prisoners are now completing their sentences at a rate outstripping the pace at which other Tibetans are following them into prison. It seems that as an alternative to overt political protest in support of independence and the Dalai Lama, more Tibetans are focusing on projects that will help to preserve Tibetan culture and identity, in areas including education, culture, religion and small scale economic enterprise.<sup>2</sup>

Nonetheless, the Chinese authorities are continuing their efforts to control these areas and to eliminate any differences with official doctrine. In the key area of religious activity, an existing pattern of increasing official control continued during 2001, with the expulsion of large numbers of nuns and students and the demolition of their homes at two Tibetan Buddhist institutes in Kardze Tibetan autonomous prefecture, Sichuan province. In June and July 2001, many hundreds of Tibetan nuns, some monks and Chinese Buddhist scholars were forced to leave the Serthar Buddhist Institute (located in the valley of Larung Gar), one of the most important centres of Tibetan Buddhism remaining in the PRC. Work teams and security personnel were sent in to enforce the expulsions and to demolish hundreds of solid timber homes to ensure their residents did not return. Chinese official claims that reports of the demolitions and expulsions were 'ill-founded' were contradicted by photographs and video footage obtained by TIN. Reports received by TIN about the aftermath of the expulsions describe the psychological distress and trauma suffered by many nuns who had nowhere else to go. Meanwhile Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, the founder of the institute, was removed from the institute and held in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.<sup>3</sup> Several months later, work teams were sent into the Yachen Buddhist institute in Payul (Ch: Baiyu) county, which is also in Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, to enforce expulsions of monks and nuns and demolitions of their homes. ■



Poster campaign celebrating 50th Anniversary of the 'Peaceful Liberation'  
© TIN

<sup>2</sup> See *In the Interests of the State: Hostile Elements III - Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 1987-2001*, by Steven D. Marshall, published by TIN, June 2002

<sup>3</sup> At the time of going to press (August 2002) Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog was reported to have returned to the Institute, after an absence of one year. See TIN News Update 'Return of senior teacher Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog to Serthar Buddhist Institute', [www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/2002/2507.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/2002/2507.htm)

# 1 Policies and Development

Beijing has come up with a new concept over the past few years to describe its economic policies in China and Tibet in the 21st century, describing it as a 'leap-over' model of development, as opposed to merely 'accelerated development'. This development model was outlined during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, which was held in Beijing in June 2001, and which was of critical importance in setting Beijing's agenda for the development of Tibet. The limited reports published in the official press about the meeting outlined the crucial political linkage between development policy and China's notion of 'stability'.

The focus of the work forum, attended by all seven members of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee, was on *"propelling the economy from 'accelerated development' to a 'leap-over' model of development, with continued state investment and subsidy"*. Two other strategies – strengthening 'Party-building' in line with the China-wide drive to maintain and strengthen Party support and legitimacy, and bringing the social situation forward from 'basic' to 'long-term stability' – were given equal weight, within the broader context of assimilating Tibet further into the Chinese economic and cultural model.


China continued to present ongoing projects to 'develop' Tibetan regions in a positive light, but the fears of Tibetans about their future continued to filter through to TIN during 2001. The late Yulo Dawa Tsering, a well-known and respected scholar and former political prisoner described China's campaign to develop the western regions, including Tibet, as launching *"a period of emergency and darkness"* in a letter sent from Tibet. Tibetans in both urban and remote rural areas are known to share concerns that the influx of Chinese migrants into Tibetan areas will increase dramatically with the construction of the railway from Golmud in Qinghai to Lhasa, a major infrastructure project prioritised by Beijing.

The planned 1,118km railway will pass through some of the most forbidding high-altitude terrain in the world. Challenges faced by railway engineers include building on permanently frozen earth and coping with an altitude of more than 4,000 metres (ordinary locomotives can only exert 60 per cent of their full power at such a height). Despite these difficulties, the coming of the railway to central Tibet appears to be regarded almost as a *fait accompli* by the authorities – new road signs in Lhasa even feature a symbol for a railway crossing.

TIN reported in March 2001 that the Lhasa authorities are currently implementing ambitious plans to more than quadruple the area of urban Lhasa from its current 53 square kilometres to 282 square kilometres by 2015 and to

increase the urban population by 30 per cent over the next four years. Many Tibetans are known to be concerned that while there may be some short-term benefit for Tibetans in the construction of shops and restaurants for local people, the arrival of more Chinese people with education and skills as a result of the railway construction is likely to lead to the increasing marginalisation of Tibetans in both urban and rural areas.

The Golmud-Lhasa railway, which will open up the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to China's transportation network, is one of the key infrastructure projects prioritised by the Party, and President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji are said to have a personal interest in the project. According to the People's Daily, the railway and other large-scale infrastructure projects *"demonstrate the heroic spirit of the industrious and valiant Chinese people"* and will bring an *"unprecedented mammoth transfer of resources"* (People's Daily, 14 March 2001).



Commemorative stamp issued by the State Postal Bureau on 29 December 2001 includes a salutation to railway workers: "...This is a great advance in the history of world construction engineering... The Qinghai-Tibet railway cuts through path after path fraught with awe-inspiring dangers on the Roof of the World, and lays a steel artery of modernisation on the plateau of the Land of Snows..."

This interest at senior levels of the Party is likely to be one of the reasons why Beijing continues to suppress free debate regarding the merits or otherwise of these projects, not only among economists and intellectuals in Tibet, but also in China. Even so, some criticism of the economic and environmental costs of the railway project and of the policies underlying the Western Development Campaign has been expressed in various Chinese publications and by individuals in China. One Chinese economist, Hu Angang, has given several reasons as to why the challenges to western development are greater than the opportunities as follows: *"First, the policies of the Ninth Five-Year Plan cannot effectively curb the widening of regional disparities, which will continue to increase in the next five years; second, global economic restructuring weakens the comparative advantages of the western regions in agriculture, energy, raw materials, and so on; third, the formation of a pattern in which supply exceeds demand on the domestic market has weakened the west's relative advantages in resource exploitation; and fourth, after China joins the WTO, the opportunities will outweigh the challenges in the eastern regions, but the opposite will apply in the west."* A senior official in the TAR government reportedly referred to the emphasis on resource exploitation implicit in Western development policy and in the construction of the railway as 'disastrous'. The official indicated during a private conversation that the policies in place would not lead to real 'development' of the region.

The continuing lack of possibility for ordinary people to speak about the policies that affect their lives and livelihoods was highlighted during the visit of a group of journalists from the international media who were invited to Qinghai in August in order to witness the progress made by China in developing the region. The journalists were locked into a train carriage in order to prevent them interviewing Chinese migrants in other compartments, and official 'minders' prevented them from having any substantial contact with Tibetans living in areas they visited.

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced in 2001 that the central government was going to *"go one step further"* in its direct investment and in implementation of preferential policies in Tibet. He stressed at a meeting reported by Xinhua in June 2001 that the development targets proposed by the Party are not only necessary, they are also achievable. His comment indicated a level of awareness among senior Party figures of the existence of doubt among some cadres and intellectuals about the economic validity of major infrastructure projects planned as part of Western development. ■



Workers involved in infrastructure work as part of the 'Western Development Campaign' in Qinghai

© ICT

## Policies: 'Leap-over style development and long-term stability'

During the year, consistent information about the authorities' plans for development in Tibet emerged in various forms. Reports on the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, held in Beijing in late June 2001 and attended by all seven members of the Politburo's standing committee, indicated that the policies established in the early 1990s aimed at fast-track economic development, combined with harsh repression of internal dissent, are set to continue. The Tenth Five-Year Plan, published by the Tibet Daily on 9 June 2001, contains detailed information about the direction of state-led economic development during the years 2001-5, setting a target of annual growth of twelve per cent during that period. Also during this year, amendments were made to the Law on Regional National Autonomy. These amendments brought the law into line with national policies to accelerate economic development in the western regions of China, held to be essential for the resolution of 'China's nationality problem'. ■



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 27 JULY 2001 (EDITED)

## Initial reports on The Fourth Tibet Work Forum

Information has started to emerge in the Chinese official press in recent weeks on the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, which was held in Beijing on 25-27 June, and is of critical political significance in setting Beijing's policy on Tibet. Official reports on the Work Forum, which was attended by all seven members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee, focus on three key aspects of Tibet policy: strengthening 'Party-building' in line with the China-wide drive to maintain and strengthen Communist Party support and legitimacy; propelling the economy from 'accelerated development' to a 'leap-over' model of development, with continued state investment and subsidy; and bringing the social situation forward from 'basic' to 'long-term' stability. The direction of policies announced at the Forum appears to be towards further assimilation of Tibet into the wider Chinese economic and cultural model. Although full details have yet to emerge, the basic policy guidelines that have appeared in the Chinese press suggest a growing confidence in Beijing with regard to its Tibet policy. Attacks on the Dalai Lama, political and ideological education, accelerated economic development in line with the central campaign to develop the western regions of China and efforts to tighten control over culture and religion look set to continue in the 'new century of Tibet work'. Since early July, Party members and government workers in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) have been required to attend briefing meetings on the policies outlined at the Forum.

The First Tibet Work Forum was held in 1980 during the period of liberalisation following the Cultural Revolution, and the second in 1984. Both the First and Second Forums were influenced by Party moderates such as Hu Yaobang and set out relatively liberal policies for Tibet work. The Third Tibet Work Forum, held in 1994 following the large-scale demonstrations of the late 1980s, criticised previous Tibet policy for being too liberal and making too many concessions to Tibetan nationalists and effectively ruled out the possibility of any 'Tibetanised' form of development. Instead policies laid down at the Third Forum were directed at the integration of Tibet into the wider Chinese economic and cultural model. The Third Forum fully endorsed the policy of fast-track economic development and 'opening up', resulting in the movement of Chinese migrant workers and entrepreneurs into Tibet, and marked both an official end to moderate policies discriminating in favour of Tibetan culture and religion and to an increasing role for Tibetans in government and the economy.

The Fourth Tibet Work Forum provides a central mandate for the policies currently being implemented in Tibet, along with broad guidelines that TAR leaders and officials must follow in all future work and projects. Plans laid out in the TAR Tenth

Five-Year Plan and recent speeches by Tibet's leaders were already closely in accord with the Party line subsequently set out at the Beijing meeting. Unlike the Third Forum, which marked a major shift in policy from the First and Second Forums in response to events in Tibet, the Fourth Forum appears to endorse the general policies laid down at the Third Forum and to carry them forward. Development remains a priority and the Party line on Tibetan culture and religion continues to stress the need to increase control and to promote a 'Marxist outlook' on culture and religion. Jiang Zemin said at the Fourth Forum that it is important to "strengthen the administration of religious affairs, strike those who use religion to carry out splittist criminal activities, and vigorously lead Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialism" (Xinhua, 30 June 2001). The Dalai Lama remains the prime target for official attacks on 'splittism'.

## Political priorities

The two main strands of Beijing's Tibet policy will continue to be economic development and social stability, aimed at increasing central control by pursuing a policy of greater assimilation of Tibet into a 'unified' Chinese state. The planned economic development and modernisation will further integrate Tibet into the Chinese economy, while also providing greater cultural assimilation as a result of increasing migration and the importation of people, ideals and models from China. According to a former TAR Party official, now in exile, the authorities are also attempting to offer a 'carrot' to Tibetans. "The background to the economic policy is a new stage in the fight against the Dalai Lama and hostile western forces", the former official said. "The authorities aim to improve living standards to win the hearts of Tibetan people, so that they will not depend on the spiritual influence of the Dalai Lama".

It is openly acknowledged by the authorities that the economic development of Tibet is a political as well as an economic issue, and lies at the centre of attempts to maintain stability. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji both made the political priorities of developing Tibet's economy clear at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum. Zhu Rongji said: "The special supportive methods and policies adopted by the central government towards Tibet are not only in consideration of Tibet's particular difficulties. Looking at it from the perspective of protecting the unity of the nationalities, the unity of the motherland and state security, [these methods and policies] are the requirements of [Tibet's] situation and the needs of [China's] overall situation [Ch: shi xing shi de yao qiu, shi da ju de xu yao]".

A continued focus on 'Party-building' was stressed at the Fourth Forum, in line with a drive throughout China to continue to build up support and legitimacy for the Communist Party as economic development and social reform continue. In Tibet, official concern over corruption in the Party is overridden by political considerations. The role of Party members, who are officially required to be atheist and hold the 'correct' Party standpoint, is seen as crucial to the maintenance of 'stability'. Reports on the Forum show that official concerns continue to exist over continued religious belief and loyalty to the Dalai Lama among the ranks of cadres.

The Fourth Forum called for cadres to recognise the value of cultural exchange among nationalities and to oppose 'cultural separatism'. This indicates that the authorities continue to perceive not only Tibetan religion, but Tibetan culture in general, as a threat to stability and are concerned about the links between Tibetan cultural identity and nationalist identity. It also reflects the current Party attitude towards ethnic culture and distinctiveness as obstacles to 'development'. In order to achieve the Party's political and economic goals in Tibet, the authorities appear to see it as necessary to undermine Tibetans' loyalty to their religion and culture.

At the Fourth Forum, the Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) Li Peng emphasised that Tibet is the only region for which *"the central government has convened four specialist forums and mobilised the whole country in support"* (Tibet Daily, 6 July 2001). Although this is used to illustrate the 'benevolence' of the Party and of the Chinese nation towards Tibet, the attention afforded Tibet by the central authorities is largely a result of concerns over 'stability' and the strategic importance of the region. Beijing depicts Tibet as completely dependent on the central government and as such justifies central government control over the economy – despite Tibet's autonomous status – in addition to the political control that it exerts over the region. All major policy decisions are either made or approved by the central Party, while the regional Party committee is responsible only for implementation.

## 'Important tasks'

At a meeting held in Lhasa for senior Party members and cadres, Party Secretary Guo Jinlong defined the *"important tasks"* of the Fourth Tibet Work Forum as follows: *"Firmly grasping the great opportunities of implementing the large-scale Western Development strategy and the basic stability of Tibet's social situation, [we should] pay attention to Tibet's prosperous progress and long-term stability, concentrate our energy to resolve the major problems relating to Tibet's overall stability, strengthen Party building, promote Tibet's economy from accelerated development to a 'leap-over' model of development and promote Tibet's social situation from basic stability to long-term stability"* (Tibet Daily, 6 July 2001).

The phrase 'leap-over model' [Ch: *kua yue shi*] of development' has also been used in reference to the Western Development Campaign. In 1999, when the campaign was first being discussed, TAR Government Chairman Legchog made reference to "leap-over" development in his government work report, describing this model as one which *"exceeds the conventional [chao chang gu]"* (Tibet Daily, 12 June 2000). The former TAR official believes that the term is being used both to denote a further acceleration in Tibet's economic development and to promote the 'benevolence' of the central authorities in according Tibet a special status by providing the means for it to develop rapidly. *"Although Tibet is quite 'backward', the authorities are now stressing that there is going to be a big 'leap' in Tibet's development with the help of the centre and other provinces"*, the former official said.

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji set out general guidelines for development at the Fourth Forum which appear to be in line with the TAR Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) and recent development trends. They focused on the acceleration of infrastructure construction and 'bringing into play' Tibet's 'superior resources' and developing specialist industries and economies – this is likely to be a reference to industries such as Tibetan medicines and mining. Zhu Rongji also talked about strengthening the status of farming and animal husbandry as a foundation of the economy and the need to develop science, technology and education and improve Tibet's human resources capabilities. He made a specific mention of the need to speed up development of the tourism industry, reflecting the efforts over recent years to boost tourism, particularly targeting the domestic Chinese market. Zhu Rongji announced that the central government is going to *"go one step further"* in its direct investment and in implementation of preferential policies in Tibet. The state will invest in 117 construction projects, with a total investment of 31.2bn yuan (US\$3.8bn) while other Chinese provinces and municipalities will invest in 70 projects, with a total investment of 1.06bn yuan (People's Daily, 2 July 2001). He stressed at the meeting that the proposed development targets are not only necessary, they are also achievable (Xinhua, 29 June 2001). This indicates an official awareness of levels of doubt among some cadres and intellectuals about the economic validity of major infrastructure projects planned as part of western development.

The basic guidelines set out at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum show no evidence of a shift away from the government's current 'top-down' approach to Tibetan development. Reports received by TIN suggest that this approach frequently fails to address local economic needs and is a source of frustration and discontent among Tibetans. One of the greatest complaints of Tibetans is that they have no say in or control over this process, which they fear threatens the survival of Tibetan culture. ■

## OFFICIAL NEWS COVERAGE

## The Fourth Forum: Speeches by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji



'economic development' – new signs above souvenir shops, Lhasa 2001

© TIN

No formal documentation from the Fourth Forum for Work on Tibet has yet reached TIN. However, on 29 June, Xinhua published a lengthy report on the speeches made at that meeting by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, Politburo member Li Ruihuan and others, which provides some insight into the direction taken at the Forum. The section of the Xinhua report describing the speeches of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji is reproduced below.

As reported by Xinhua, Jiang's speech emphasised the acceleration of growth in the Tibetan economy into "*development by leaps and bounds*". Following the Third Forum in 1994, the policy of the central authorities on Tibet has focused on the "*two major issues*" of promoting economic growth and maintaining stability. Jiang's speech at the Fourth Forum, in what appears to be a new formulation, refers to the "*three safeguards*", that is, "*safeguarding accelerated economic growth and overall social progress in Tibet, safeguarding national safety and long-term stability in Tibet, and safeguarding constant improvements in the standard of living for the people of every nationality in Tibet*" – that is, with a new emphasis on improvements in the standard of living. Jiang also referred to the ongoing "*two major issues*" in Tibet work, that is, economic development and social stability, and said that for these to be properly resolved, party construction must be strengthened. Jiang subsequently refers to "*three major tasks*" (rather than the more usual two): "*speeding up economic growth, maintaining social stability, and strengthening party construction*". While strengthening grass roots work has been a common theme in official statements over the past few years, this high-profile reference signifies greater attention to party building and party work, in line with a China-wide drive to strengthen Communist Party support and legitimacy. (See also the section on Propaganda, page 78, in particular Hu Jintao's speech to cadres in Tibet on 19 July 2001.)

Zhu Rongji's speech, as reported, dealt with economic development. Zhu commented that weak infrastructure was the main factor constraining development; he emphasised the need to strengthen, consolidate and readjust farming and animal husbandry and also mentioned the importance of the tourist industry. He also stated that the Forum was introducing new preferential policies, but details were not given in the Xinhua report which is quoted on pages 14-16.



In his speech, Jiang Zemin pointed out that Tibet's liberalized reforms and modernized construction have enjoyed significant achievements since the Third Tibet Work Forum in 1994. The liberalized reforms continue to intensify, the rate of economic growth is accelerating, and the people's livelihood is constantly improving. The construction of a socialist spiritual civilization has seen remarkable results and society is progressing in an all-around way. Excellent Tibetan culture has been propagated, and historical and cultural remains have been protected. The nationwide support-forces for Tibet have expanded, and the state has invested in and constructed a series of fundamental key projects such as transportation, energy, communications, farming, and the animal husbandry industry, as well as other social undertakings. This has set up a good foundation for long-term development in Tibet. National unity has been further strengthened, socialist national relations marked by equality, unity and mutual aid have been consolidated and developed, and the bonding forces of the people of every nationality in the region towards the motherland have been further enhanced. Party construction is continuously strengthened, and integration of fighting forces within party organizations has been heightened. Tibet's economy is growing, society is progressing, the people are united, the situation is stable, border defence is consolidated, and the people live and work in peace and contentment. This is one of the best periods in the history of development and stability.

Jiang Zemin said that we can sum up the basic experience of our Tibet work in the following main areas: first, persist in making economic construction the focus, closely seizing upon the two major events of economic development and situational stability, and adhering to the guiding principles of the three safeguards which are safeguarding accelerated economic development and the overall social progress in Tibet, safeguarding national security and long-term stability in Tibet, and safeguarding a constantly improving standard of living for the people of every nationality in Tibet; second, persist in intensifying reforms, expanding the scale of opening up, and focusing the wisdom and the energy of the cadres and the masses of every nationality in the region on the key task of economic construction; third, persist in comprehensively carrying out the party's national and religious policies, making constant efforts to consolidate and develop socialist national relations marked by equality, unity, and mutual aid among the masses of every nationality in Tibet, and persist in developing a strong and patriotic united front; fourth, attach great importance to Tibet work by the entire party, enthusiastically support Tibet work nationwide, strengthen the bonding force of the people of every nationality in Tibet towards the motherland; fifth, further launch struggles against separatist activities of the Dalai Lama group and the infiltrating and destructive activities of international anti-China forces, and resolutely safeguard the stability of Tibet and the unification and safety of the motherland; sixth, continuously strengthen construction of the party, leading bodies and cadre troops, and provide solid political guarantees for Tibet's reforms, development, and stability. We must continuously put into practice the successful experiences, creatively unfold tasks, and make great efforts in creating a new situation for Tibet work.

Jiang Zemin pointed out that the next five to ten years will be an important period for the development of our country, and it will be an important period for speeding up development and safeguarding stability in Tibet. The guiding ideology of the Party Central Committee towards strengthening Tibet work is to regard Deng Xiaoping theory and the party's basic line as the guidance, persist in making economic construction the focus, closely seize upon the two major events which are economic development and situational stability, adhere to the three safeguards which are safeguarding accelerated economic growth and overall social progress in Tibet, safeguarding national safety and long-term stability in Tibet, and safeguarding constant improvements in the standard of living for the people of every nationality in Tibet. We must closely seize upon the excellent opportunity for strategic implementation of great western expansion and a stable social situation in Tibet, aim for prosperity, progress and long-term stability in Tibet, focus our energy on solving major issues concerning the overall development and stability of Tibet, promote Tibet's economy from one marked by accelerating progress to one marked by leaps and bounds development, and promote Tibet's social situation from one of basic stability to one of long-term stability. These are the major tasks for promotion of Tibet work in an all-round way in the new century. Jiang Zemin stressed that the development, stability and safety of Tibet is related to the strategic implementation of great western expansion, to national unity and social stability, to the unification and security of the motherland, and to our national image and international struggle. The party as a whole must focus on the overall work situation of the party and the state, strengthen political ideology and our sense of urgency, the big picture and responsibility, and thoroughly recognize the extreme importance of doing a good job in Tibet work. Jiang Zemin further pointed out that, in order to do a better job in Tibet work, we still need to resolve two major issues. The first issue is to accelerate development, and the tasks relating to economic and social development in Tibet remain arduous. The second issue is to promote stability. In order to properly resolve these two issues, we must strengthen party construction. For Tibet work in the new period, we must take new steps towards three major tasks which are speeding up economic growth, maintaining social stability, and strengthening party construction. We must achieve new progress with these tasks.

Jiang Zemin also emphasized that we must resolutely promote economic and social progress and make great efforts to realize development by leaps and bounds in Tibet. Speeding up economic development, promoting liberalized reforms, and improving the people's livelihood are the key tasks of Tibet work in the new period. Strategic regions and departments must adopt the new developmental strategy of introducing, disseminating and applying advanced, suitable technology in relation to the overall work situation of the party and the state with the support of the state and every locality, and they must focus energy on promoting development by

leaps and bounds. In a region like Tibet, we can and should adopt this kind of strategy. It has significance not only for the development and progress of Tibet, but also for modernized socialist construction throughout the nation. There will certainly be difficulties in the process of accomplishing development by leaps and bounds in Tibet, but there will also be many favourable conditions. In light of the constant improvements in overall strength, the state can assist with development of Tibet through various means, and the party Central Committee must continue to expand its support forces for Tibet. During 'the Tenth Five-Year Plan period', the state will continue to increase its outlays for Tibet and focus will be on infrastructure construction. The state will implement certain special support policies and accommodations in Tibet. Support for Tibet from the entire nation is an important strategic policy decision of the Party Central Committee. All relevant regions and departments must continue to attach great importance to and realistically do a good job of supporting Tibet work. Jiang Zemin said that the fundamental key for achieving accelerated growth in Tibet is reliance on the efforts and arduous striving of the vast number of cadres and masses in Tibet. We must further liberate thinking, renew ideas, persist in regarding development as the theme, structural readjustment as the base line, liberalized reforms and scientific and technological progress as the driving force, and improvement of the people's standard of living as the fundamental starting point, use creative thinking to resolve the prominent issues arising in the process of economic and social development in Tibet, and put into place good cycles in Tibet work. We must follow the demands for building a socialist market economy, stick with handling affairs according to objective economic patterns, integrate support from the state by giving full play to the role of market mechanisms, integrate national preferential policies by giving full play to resource advantages, continuously heighten the quality and results of economic growth, and step onto a new path with both higher rates of development and better results. While maintaining social stability, we must, at the same time, expand our forces for liberalized reforms, readjust economic structures, strengthen specialized industry, and carry out strategies to vitalize Tibet through scientific education and achieve sustainable progress. We must always regard improvement of the standard of living for the people of every nationality in the region as the strategic task and seize upon it closely and firmly. We must integrate the state's enormous outlays for Tibet with achievement of the basic interests of the people of every nationality in Tibet, expand poverty relief forces, increase employment opportunities in every possible way, and continuously improve the people's livelihood in urban and rural areas.

Jiang Zemin stressed that safeguarding stability and development in Tibet as well as the unification and security of the motherland is an important political task of Tibet work. We must adopt clear-cut, blow-for-blow stances, administer affairs based on our own initiatives, and consolidate foundations. We must persist in dealing with problems by looking into both root causes and symptoms, and attach importance to effecting permanent solutions. We must strengthen grass-roots and basic work, and improve work in the ideological field. We must heighten the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization and consolidate the ideological and cultural fronts to create a good ideological and cultural environment for long-term stability in Tibet. We must adhere to and improve regional national autonomy, carry out the party's national policy in an all-around way, and consolidate and develop socialist national relations marked by equality, unity and mutual aid. We must further strengthen education on party national policies and national unity, and improve social, economic and cultural exchanges between Tibet and the mainland. We must actively protect and develop the cultural resources of every nationality in Tibet, inherit and develop the excellent traditional cultures of every nationality in Tibet, and promote learning and drawing lessons from each other. We must disseminate new knowledge and establish new ideas, increase areas of commonality and socialist unity between ethnic groups so as to continuously consolidate great unity among every nationality. We must comprehensively and accurately carry out the party's religious policy, lawfully protect people's freedoms to hold religious beliefs and conduct regular religious activities, strengthen management on religious affairs, crack down on separatist, criminal activities in the name of religion, and positively guide Tibetan Buddhism to suit the needs of a socialist society.

Jiang Zemin stressed that adhering to and improving party leadership is the basic guarantee for doing a good job in Tibet work. In creating new prospects for Tibet work, we must follow the demands of the "three representations" [Ch: *san ge dai biao*; on the importance of the communist party in modernizing the nation – the party represents advanced production forces, advanced Chinese culture, and the basic interests of the people], further strengthen party construction, and, through construction of party organizations at all levels in Tibet, turn these organizations into the solid core and fighting force that is armed with Deng Xiaoping theory, that holds the same high plane as the Party Central Committee, that serves the masses of every nationality wholeheartedly, and that is able to weather various stormy experiences and lead the people of the whole region to accomplish development by leaps and bounds, and long-term stability in Tibet. We must attach great importance to organizational construction with an emphasis on the grass-roots levels, adopt practical measures, strengthen cadre troops at the grass-roots levels, pay attention to and care for the cadres at the grass-roots levels, and heighten the political and administrative quality of cadres at grass-roots levels. The Tibetan cadre troops are an army with a positive political stance, an assertive work style and constantly improved quality; they are a strong force that unites and leads the people of every nationality in Tibet in implementing the party's lines, principles and policies; they carry out the construction of socialist modernization; and they are troops that are fully trusted by the party and the people. The vast number of cadres, and leading cadres in particular, must penetrate the grass-roots levels and the masses, and must serve the people wholeheartedly. They must continue to embody "the old Tibetan spirit" of "being extremely arduous, full of fighting valour, patient, united, and contributory" so as to make new contributions for the prosperity and development of Tibet.

Zhu Rongji also delivered a speech at the meeting on how to accelerate economic development in Tibet. He said that we must deal with the issue of accelerating economic development in Tibet by upholding the high plane of the overall strategic situation, strengthen the sense of mission and responsibility, make joint efforts, and positively promote economic vitality and prosperity in Tibet. A weak infrastructure is the main factor restricting economic progress in Tibet. We must speed up construction of items such as railroads, highways, airports, electricity, communications, and water conservancy. We must thoroughly give full play to resource advantages, and form mainstream industries and specialized economies that both are in favour and that have outlets. We must consolidate and strengthen the fundamental position of the farming and animal husbandry industries, do a good job at comprehensive development for farming and animal husbandry industries by giving importance to readjusting farming and animal husbandry regions and economic structures, and increase farmer and herder incomes in every possible way. We must attach great importance to and realistically speed up the development of tourism. We must definitely regard tourism as a main industry in Tibet. We must earnestly carry out the strategy of vitalizing Tibet through scientific education, spare no effort to cultivate all sorts of skilled personnel, do our best to promote progress and creation in science and technology, and make great effort to adopt advanced and applicable technology so as to give better play to the role of modern science and technology in the progress of economic development.



Livestock carcasses on their way to market, Lhasa 2001

© Plumppji/TIN

Zhu Rongji also said that we must further expand both funding for construction of Tibet and forces for implementing preferential policies, and continuously strengthen support. Currently, there are 117 construction projects directly invested in by the state, with a total investment of 31.2bn yuan. Given the special conditions of Tibet, the state will assume primary responsibility for the cost of key construction projects in Tibet. Investment by the state and financial aid from the central government are primarily used for the construction of relevant facilities in farming and animal husbandry industries, infrastructure, scientific and technological education and political power at the grass-roots levels, as well as protection and construction of the ecological environment, all with stress on solving 'bottlenecks' and prominent difficulties restricting the development of Tibet. While the central government expands its direct investment, it must, at the same time, carry out special relief policies. As for preferential policies currently in effect, we must continue to implement them while applicable. Regarding those preferential policies in need of revision, we must continue to implement them after they have been revised. In this meeting, there are some new preferential policies being placed into effect. Furthermore, we must strengthen relief support. We have finalized 70 construction projects aided by various provinces and cities, with a total investment of 1.06bn yuan. The state has adopted measures for expanding input as well as implementing preferential policies and aid support which embody the central government's great emphasis on the development of Tibet, and which distill the people's deep feelings throughout the nation. We must definitely apply these inputs and policies fully and allow them to give full play to the results that they deserve. ■

(Translation: BBC Monitoring, 2 August 2001)



## EDITORIAL FEATURE

## National Autonomy Law revised to support Western Development policy

China has made significant revisions to its law on "national minorities" in order to bring it into line with new policies to accelerate economic development in the western regions of China, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas in the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan and Gansu. Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed an order to amend the 1984 Regional National Autonomy Law (hereafter 'Autonomy Law') at China's National People's Congress on 28 February, according to a Xinhua report. The revised Autonomy Law has 74 articles, while the original law had 67 articles; much remains unchanged, and some amendments are for the purpose of updating or consistency with other laws. However, there are extensive amendments that focus on the development of autonomous regions according to the Party's political and economic priorities, and the further integration of these areas into the rest of China.

## Design of the amendments

The 1984 Autonomy Law focused on the structure, administration and exercise of nationality autonomy, with at least the superficial purpose of taking into account the right of minority nationality populations to retain some control over their local affairs and protect local economic interests.<sup>2</sup> However, rather than dealing with issues of autonomy, the 2001 amendments focus largely on outlining the priorities of the central authorities regarding the control and economic development of 'autonomous' areas, in accordance with centralised plans.

Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, stated on 28 February (2001) that the amendments and additions to the 1984 Autonomy Law focus on "*the economic system and the support and help that State organs at higher levels offer to localities under ethnic autonomy*". Their aim is to solve "*some practical problems in the economic and social development in localities under ethnic autonomy, so as to accelerate the economic and social development in ethnic regions and promote nationality solidarity*" (Xinhua, 28 February). Article 62 of the amended law itself refers to the purpose of increased investment as "*to speed up economic development and social progress in national autonomous areas, so as to gradually reduce the gap with developed areas*".

In the wider context of Chinese policy-making, accelerating development and reducing the economic gap with

developed areas are aims of the campaign to develop the western regions of China, launched by Chinese President Jiang Zemin in June 1999. The Western Development Campaign has been specifically linked to implementation of the Autonomy Law by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. At the Forum on the Study, Propaganda and Implementation of the Regional Autonomy Law held in Beijing on 6 December 2001, Li Peng said, "*The decision by the Party Central Committee and State Council to pursue the strategy of the grand development of western China is a most real reflection of implementing the [revised] Regional National Autonomy Law*".

In June 2000, development of the western regions of China was linked explicitly to the resolution of 'China's nationality problem' by Li Dezhu, Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. In an article that appeared in the Party journal *Qishi* (Seeking Truth), Li Dezhu wrote that the acceleration of economic and social development of the western regions and "*the minority nationality regions in particular*" has "*extremely important significance*" in "*solving China's current nationality problems*". These 'nationality' or 'ethnic relations' problems refer to 'far-reaching' religious influence, 'deep-seated' traditional culture, and 'frequent disputes' over borders and resources (1 June 2000). In short, the 2001 amendments to the Autonomy Law form part of a greater policy shift, by which poorer, minority nationality regions are to be locked more securely into the People's Republic of China (PRC) by means of state-encouraged economic development.

The methods stipulated in the revised Autonomy Law to promote economic development include increasing state investment and subsidies, attempts to 'guide' and 'encourage' foreign and domestic investment and the prioritisation of resource exploitation and infrastructure projects, fitting closely with state plans for development of the western regions. The revisions will also facilitate the implementation of large-scale state projects in areas that cannot financially support them by promising central subsidies, bank loans and waivers of local investment obligations. At the grass-roots level, schools are to be set up to ensure that students can complete the compulsory stage of education, and there is to be increased funding for construction of county and village roads.

The wording of some of the amendments suggests that national, rather than strictly local, benefit has been the decisive factor in their design. For example, with regard to

2 The TAR (*Xizang Zizhiqu*) was set up by the Chinese government in 1965 and covers the area of Tibet west of the Yangtze river, which was previously under the jurisdiction of the 14th Dalai Lama's government and is often referred to as Central Tibet in English. After 1949, other Tibetan-inhabited areas were incorporated into the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan; Qinghai had already been established as a separate province for Mongols and Tibetans in imperial times. Where Tibetan communities were said to have 'compact inhabitancy' in these provinces, they were designated as autonomous Tibetan prefectures or counties.

resource exploitation and infrastructure, Chapter VI, Article 56 of the revised law reads: *"The state, according to the unified plan and to market requirements, should give priority to rational planning of natural resource exploitation projects and basic infrastructure construction projects."*<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the key national projects for the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005) in the western regions include large construction projects facilitating the transportation of resources from west to east. Furthermore, Tibetans make up such a small proportion of the Chinese domestic market (less than half of one per cent) that any economic reform in Tibetan areas based primarily on 'market demand' is likely to cater to the demands of the relatively rich and populous, but resource-poor, eastern regions of China rather than Tibetan needs and interests. Thus, the guiding factors appear to be the needs of the more developed and populous eastern coastal region of China and the policies devised at central government level. Local interests will not be a significant factor in decision-making.

## Changes and additions to the Autonomy Law

The preamble to the Autonomy Law now states that the system of national regional autonomy is a 'basic' or 'fundamental' (*jiben*) political system of the state. The 1984 law referred to it as *"an important political system of the state"*. The exact significance of this alteration is unclear, but would seem to imply that a still greater weight and importance is now being attributed to the system of regional national autonomy as part of the system of government. This is borne out by statements made by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to the Forum on the Study, Propaganda, and Implementation of the Regional National Autonomy Law, held in Beijing in December 2001. For example, Li Peng is reported as saying in his address that implementing regional national autonomy was the "most important current nationalities work", and emphasised its "extremely important significance" in consolidating and developing ethnic unity (Xinhua, 6 December, 2001).

## Central control and investment

Extensive additions have been made to the Autonomy Law's sixth and final chapter. Originally headed *Leadership and Assistance from State Organs at Higher Levels*, it is now headed *The Responsibilities of State Organs at Higher Levels*. Chapter VI, Article 55 reads in part: *"State organs at higher levels shall (yingdang) assist and guide research into the formulation and implementation of economic development strategies in autonomous areas."* Essentially,

this would allow central government to nominate and control projects deemed necessary to fulfilling economic ends broader than those which local control might offer.

Once the state has nominated and prioritised projects in autonomous areas, amendments to funding systems facilitate faster implementation. In some instances, government organs at the local level have been required to match investments offered by the state for infrastructure construction. Article 56 of the amended law reads in part: *"...where national autonomous areas are required to find matching funds (peitao zijin), the state shall give consideration amounting to reduction or exemption regarding the matching funds in accordance with differing circumstances."* This would allow the state to bypass bureaucratic procedure or even resistance from the local levels of government, by simply meeting the full cost of the project itself.

Preferential loans from state banks are prioritised in the amended Autonomy Law as a source of funds for local contributions towards state projects. Article 57 states in part: *"Financial structures should give considerable support to national autonomous regions' fixed asset investment projects and enterprises that are consistent with state production policies..."* The TAR has enjoyed preferential policies in banking and finance since the Third Forum for Work on Tibet held in 1994, and it was decided at the *Conference on Banking in Tibet* held in Chengdu on 22-23 January 2002 to continue with these policies (Xinhua, 22 January 2002). Most notable among the preferential policies is that lending institutions in the TAR will continue to offer loans at a rate 2 per cent below the national interest rate of 5.31 per cent, with central government making up the difference.

The state is due to provide a total in subsidies and investment of 70bn yuan (US\$ 8.5bn) to the TAR during the period of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001 - 2005) (Xinhua, 27 November 2001). To facilitate the movement of such large sums of money, Article 62 of the amended Autonomy Law outlines three methods of funnelling subsidies into autonomous areas: *"General fiscal transfer payments"* are a normal element of the budgeting process by the state to fund routine activities such as administration; *"special purpose transfer payments"* may well refer to the mechanism for funding larger, one-off construction projects such as the Golmud-Lhasa railway and resource extraction; *"fiscal transfer payments as part of the preferential policy for ethnic minorities"* may apply to particular ongoing expenses such as education. As to the aims of increased investment, Article 62 states in part: *"By means of ordinary financial transfer payments, special project financial transfer payments, financial transfer payments under*

<sup>3</sup> Law of the PRC on Regional National Autonomy (2001). TIN's translation, cited here, was prepared with reference to the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet's translation of the 1984 law. (ICLT is now known as the Tibet Justice Center.)



*nationality beneficial policies and other methods stipulated by the State the income of national autonomous areas is to be increased, and used to speed up economic development and social progress in national autonomous areas so as to gradually reduce the gap with developed areas."* The language on speeding up development to reduce the gap with developed areas is almost identical to that used in material relating to the Western Development Campaign.

New Articles 56, 57 and 58 include new obligations on upper level state organs including provision of assistance in speeding up scientific and technological developments, guiding skilled personnel to national autonomous areas, encouraging banks and businesses to increase loans, and increasing the proportion of state and state bank investment in basic infrastructure projects. However, these are very general obligations and no specific targets are provided. Article 63, as before, obliges upper level state organs to support national autonomous areas in the use of resources and in development of their local industry and enterprise.

Amendments to the Autonomy Law also give the state a role in encouraging private investment, from enterprises both inside and outside the PRC. New Article 61 reads: *"The state is to guide and encourage enterprises from economically developed areas, on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit, to invest in national autonomous areas and to develop economic co-operation in many forms."* While it is not made clear how this is to be achieved, preferential policies including tax concessions have already been put in place to encourage enterprises and entrepreneurs. The state claims some success in guiding investment towards the western regions; Zeng Peiyan, Minister of the State Development and Planning Commission, told a press conference at the 9th National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing that foreign investors signed more investment agreements in western China than in eastern China in 2001 (Xinhua, 7 March 2001).

## Compensation for exploitation of natural resources

Some projects initiated by the state – for example large-scale mining projects – may have a serious impact on local environmental conditions and economic structures. The revised law stipulates in Article 65: *"The state is to adopt measures that give a certain level of compensation to national autonomous areas from which natural resources are exported"*. It is unclear whether the local authority will receive a percentage of revenues generated by state-run projects as a regular or one-off payment, or whether such compensation would be in the form of goods or services. New Article 66 also states in part: *"The state is to give a certain level of compensation for*

*contributions made by national autonomous areas to national ecological equilibrium and environmental protection."* The two clauses give no measure of how much 'a certain level' of compensation might be, nor to whom it might be paid and with what conditions, nor whether it would be sufficient to offer any real benefit to the local population. However, their inclusion denotes an acceptance – in principle at least – that areas should receive compensation for non-local exploitation of natural resources. The Chinese Constitution is silent on this point, although Article 118 of the Constitution states: *"In exploiting natural resources [which according to Article 9 are owned by the state] and building enterprises in the national autonomous areas, the state shall give due consideration to the interests of those areas."*

A current political issue is dealt with in Article 27, where an obligation to 'construct' grasslands and forests is added to the existing obligation to 'protect' them. Reclamation of land from grasslands and forests for cultivation is also forbidden, in addition to the existing prohibition on destruction. Severe flooding downstream on the Yangtze in 1999 in particular was widely held to have resulted in part from deforestation and erosion on the upper banks of the Yangtze river in the TAR and Tibetan areas of Qinghai, and the central government has since sought to take measures to halt deforestation and plant more trees. Recently, bans have been introduced on grazing and mining in river source areas, and large-scale afforestation plans have been announced.

## Education and education funding

Changes have been made to the provisions on the education system and its funding in national minority areas. Article 37 now states (in part) that local governments of autonomous areas are to set up *"public primary schools and secondary schools, mainly boarding schools and schools providing subsidies, in pastoral areas and underdeveloped, sparsely populated mountainous areas inhabited by minority nationalities, to guarantee that students can complete the compulsory stage of their education."* The preceding clause now requires autonomous area governments to spread nine-year compulsory education (previously, the law referred to 'compulsory primary' education). The cost is to be met by the local administration – however it is unlikely that local governments in poor areas will be able to afford this, and increasing taxation to pay for it would be very unpopular. The law does provide that where the local administration is 'experiencing difficulties', the upper level administration 'should' provide subsidies. In addition, according to new Article 71, the State 'shall increase' investment in education in national autonomous areas (though no parameters or other details for this are specified).

A further addition to Article 37 requires local governments to "train specialised personnel from among the national minority areas"; if implemented, this is likely to enhance the employment prospects of local people, whether with state-controlled projects or otherwise. New obligations are placed on people's governments and schools to assist minority students from households in economic difficulties to complete their education. The state is also now obliged by Article 71 to assist national autonomous areas in teacher training. It is also to organise and encourage teachers, evidently from eastern China, "to go to national autonomous areas and engage in educational work, and [to] give them appropriate preferential remuneration."

Further amendments to Article 37 bring forward the introduction of classes for the teaching of Chinese to the first year/senior grades of primary school (the previous wording specified introduction in the senior grades of primary school or in secondary schools). The classes are to popularise *putonghua*, the common 'national' (this adjective is new) speech, and to popularise 'standard Han characters' (this requirement is also new). An obligation has been added for governments at all levels to give financial support for minority language teaching materials and translating and editing publications.


## Family planning

Article 44 previously specified that local governments "shall, in the light of local conditions, work out measures for family planning." The amended law adds a stipulation that "National autonomous areas shall implement family planning and 'raise high quality offspring', in order to raise the quality of the population of all nationalities." Expression of these types of concerns here is indicative of a tightening-up of the less stringent birth control policies previously implemented among non-Han nationalities.

## Conclusion: Autonomy and the law

The Law on Regional National Autonomy is, as is all Chinese legislation, subject to the Chinese constitution, and it could not grant any rights or freedoms to national autonomous areas that would be inconsistent with the constitution. In addition, there may be practical impediments to the exercise of autonomy. One Tibetan former official now living in exile told TIN, "The law [...] bestows upon nationalities various regional autonomy rights and lays down principles by which to govern, but the autonomous governments have often been held back by senior administrative departments with their own administrative laws and regulations, so that in practice there has been no guarantee for autonomous rights."<sup>4</sup>

Nonetheless, the main focus of the 1984 law was positive in defining structure and administration, that is, the means through which regional nationality autonomy would be exercised. The changes that have now been made to the Law on Regional National Autonomy do not relate to the means of exercising of autonomy. Rather, the amendments serve largely to extend the scope for involvement and control through economic means by the central authorities. It appears that the system of regional national autonomy is viewed not as a means of defining the extent of delegation of powers and the protection of minority rights, but as a means of exercising central control and implementing centrally-defined policies in the outlying regions. At the Forum on the Study, Propaganda and Implementation of the Regional Autonomy Law, Li Peng said the revised law "...ensures the right of all minority ethnic groups to be the masters of their own fate [and to] independently develop their economic and social causes." The extent to which these amendments enshrine in law increased central involvement and control (particularly economic) in autonomous areas is in flat contradiction to his statement. ■



The new Public Security Bureau building under construction, Lhasa 2001

© Free Tibet Campaign

## EDITORIAL FEATURE

## “Development is the infallible truth”: The Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development for the Tibet Autonomous Region

*“Generally speaking, economic and social development in Tibet will be a three-step process, beginning with the dawn of the new century. First step: By 2005 Tibet’s gross regional product will be growing in excess of 12 per cent annually on the average and its per capita output will be among the highest in western China. A comfortably well-off standard of living will be achieved all around. The people’s living standard will have improved notably; absolute poverty will be largely eradicated and some people will have become affluent. During the second step, which will take us to the year 2010, an all-out effort will be made to raise the gross regional product to the middle of the nation’s range. The overall standard of national economic and social undertakings will have risen markedly as Tibet fully begins its bold advance from being comfortably well-off to being affluent. During the third step, Tibet will achieve the magnificent goal put forward by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, which is to take its place in the forefront of China’s drive for the four modernizations by the middle of the 21st century.” (From Part 1, Chapter 1, Guiding Thought and Development Objectives)*

The TAR Tenth Five-Year Plan, setting out targets for economic and social development in the region, was released on 9 June 2001 and covers the years 2001–5. This Plan is the first to be issued since the launch of the Western Development Campaign, and similar preoccupations and themes run through the two. The Plan specifically ties together Western Development with nationality issues, stating: *“Nationalities work in the new era centres on accelerating the development of minority-inhabited areas and achieving common wealth. We must channel the will and forces of the masses of all nationalities into the development of the western region and the acceleration of development”* (Chapter 18). In many respects, the Plan aims to continue the development strategy formulated almost ten years ago, focusing on growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and exploitation of natural resources for industrialisation and development. The existing twin-track policy of suppressing dissent at the same time as pursuing economic development is also set to continue; Chapters 18 and 19 deal exclusively with issues of national unity and the ‘anti-separatism struggle’.

This summary will comment briefly on the content of the Plan and on its differences from the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Below are reprinted in full sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 1,

*The Objectives and Tasks of Economic and Social Development, setting out the basic targets of the Plan.*

\* \* \* \* \*

In contrast to the ‘fast-track’ or ‘accelerated’ development previously espoused, the Tenth Five Year Plan advocates ‘leap-over style’ development (*kuayue shi*). This is consistent with the language used in pronouncements relating to the Fourth Forum on Tibet Work and to the Western Development campaign. The shift from ‘accelerated’ development to a ‘leap-over’ model of development in Tibet was announced by Party Secretary Guo Jinlong in a meeting held in Lhasa after the Fourth Forum, but the phrase ‘leap-over style’ had already been used by TAR government chairman Legchog with reference to the Western Development Campaign. In line with this shift, there has been an increase in the expected level of growth in the TAR during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, compared to that predicted in the ‘Long-Term Plan’ (1996–2010) appended to the Ninth Five-Year Plan and published in May 1996. The former sets an annual average growth target of 12 per cent, whereas the latter set a target of 10 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

The Plan’s underlying ambition is to lay foundations for regional GDP to reach the national average by 2010, a goal identical to that put forward in the ‘Long-Term Plan’. The main yardstick for the success of economic development thus still appears to be the level of increase in regional GDP. However, this approach is not without its critics. In an article published in *China Tibetology*,<sup>6</sup> noted Chinese economists Hu Angang and Wen Jun argue that this strategy is not capable of giving impetus to the modernisation and development of Tibet, and also that it would be difficult for the main group in society – pastoral herdsmen – to obtain any genuine benefits. They continue: *“The choice of road to modernisation should always be built upon the basic principle of ‘the wealth of the people at root, investment in the people’, to make the people who constitute the population’s absolute majority – the peasant farmers and herdsmen – the principal, direct and general beneficiaries.”*

It is, of course, open to argument whether the strategy currently adopted by the regional and national leadership is that which will in the end best benefit the absolute majority of the population. What is already clear is that

<sup>5</sup> ‘Outline of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and its Long-Term Target for 2010’, Part 1, Chapter 2: Main Tasks and Important Targets.

<sup>6</sup> ‘The problem of selecting the correct path for Tibetan modernisation (Part 1)’, *China Tibetology* 2001 vol 1, pp 3–26

major shifts are envisaged in the nature of the region's economy that will have significant impact on the lives of Tibetans. The Plan envisages a readjustment to the TAR's economic structures, with significantly stronger emphasis to be placed on secondary and tertiary industries, increased levels of urbanisation and strong encouragement of the consumer market. The Plan forecasts that the proportion of primary, secondary and tertiary industries<sup>7</sup> added value will stand at 23:25:52 respectively by the end of 2005, with regional GDP reaching 20.8bn yuan (US\$2.5bn) based on 2000 prices.

The main primary industries in the TAR are agriculture and animal husbandry (which occupy approximately 86 per cent of the population<sup>8</sup>). While the value of primary industry is planned to grow during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the proportion of people employed in that sector is predicted to fall by 11 percentage points, with tertiary industries absorbing seven per cent and secondary industries four per cent. The Plan states that efforts are to be made to "industrialise the management of agricultural and animal husbandry operations" and to "intensify the comprehensive development of agriculture and animal husbandry and stabilize and increase production capacity and returns in agriculture and animal husbandry"<sup>9</sup>.

By reforming the circulation system in agricultural and pastoral areas, the aim is to "speed up the building and nurturing of a market system... and [to] steer peasants and herders in the direction of the market, which should drive the strategic adjustment of the economic structure in agricultural and pastoral areas." The Plan also states: "We must vigorously develop the individual economy and private economy, steer peasants and herders in the direction of the secondary and tertiary industries as well as small towns, and stimulate the development of the

secondary and tertiary industries in agricultural and pastoral areas" (Part 3, Chapter 2). Combined with the target of increased urbanisation and emphasis on the use of science and technology to achieve "high-yield, high-quality and high-returns agriculture and animal husbandry", it may be that the authorities envisage a shift towards the larger-scale and towards greater industrialisation in these two primary industries, with a consequent reduction in the number of persons employed in them.

Envisaged development of mining, another labour-intensive industry, is likely to require a larger workforce. If development of other secondary or tertiary industries such as Tibetan medicine, beverage and 'green' foodstuffs and other processing industries takes place, this will also create more jobs. While some jobs may well go to Chinese migrant workers, it is likely that many will go to local Tibetans. In short, herders will have many incentives to abandon their traditional nomadic lifestyle and settle into newly built or expanded urban areas close to industrial centres.

The mining industry is prioritised for development during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, as it was during the Ninth. However, while the earlier Plan set very specific targets for prospecting and production in the mining industry, the Tenth Five-Year Plan is more cautious in tone. A section entitled *Developing the Mining Industry in Order of Priority* focuses on operation of market demand: "We must develop in order of priority mineral resources for which there is a market demand, which can be found in Tibet, and of which there is an acute shortage. Based on market demand and resource advantage... The market mechanism must be used in regard to the major development projects, including the Yulong copper mine, Zhabuye salt lake, and Jiamachikang copper mine." The section continues: "We

### Current and predicted outputs over the life of the Five-Year Plan (by industry type)

	2001			2005 (predicted)		
	Value (RMB)	Total %*	Workforce %**	Value (RMB)	Total %	Workforce %***
Primary Industry	3.746bn	27	74	4.784bn	23	63
Secondary Industry	3.149bn	23	6	5.2bn	25	10
Tertiary Industry	6.891bn	50	20	10.816bn	52	27
	<b>13.786bn</b>			<b>20.8bn</b>		

\* Xinhuanet 11 Jan 2001, TAR GDP Reaches 13.786bn yuan in 2001

\*\* 1998 figures, taken from 1999 TAR Yearbook

\*\*\* TAR 10th Five-Year Plan, Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 2, paragraph 3

7 China's definitions of primary, secondary and tertiary industry (set by the State Statistical Bureau in 1985) are as follows. Primary industry: agriculture (including forestry, animal husbandry, and the fishing industry). Secondary industry: industry (including extractive industries, manufacturing industry, running water, electricity, steam, hot water, gas) and the construction industry. Tertiary industry: all industries apart from those listed above as primary or secondary industries. Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2000, China Statistics Press, p. 493

8 According to figures to the end of 1999 given in China's Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2000, published by Ethnic Publishing House, p. 439

9 Part 2, Chapter 2: Strengthening Agriculture and Animal Husbandry as the Foundation, Developing Economies in Agricultural and Pastoral Areas.



*must attract foreigners and Chinese to purchase shares in these projects in the form of funds or technology and engage in co-operative ventures*"<sup>10</sup>. In fact, the Yulong copper mine was slated for development during the Ninth Five-Year Plan period and expected to be producing 20,000 tonnes of copper per annum by the year 2000. It appears that work has been delayed: the Tenth Five-Year Plan states with reference to all the major development projects "...we must spare no effort to complete pre-development work and to launch the first phase of these projects." On a more general note, it does seem that despite emphasis on 'market demand', the very existence of the Plan and repetition throughout of the phrase "we must" makes clear the extent of the state's role, even in stating what there is 'market demand' for.

Tourism, Tibetan medicine, beverage processing industries, agricultural and livestock processing industry and the handicrafts industry are also prioritised for development in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Most of these were already slated for development, although there have been shifts in emphasis. For example, while the Ninth Five-Year Plan in a section on Beverage Production focused on Lhasa Beer and mineral water, the envisaged Tibetan food industry has now widened in scope to include local edible mushrooms, Rhodiola and ginseng fruit, along with a "national-level green beverage production base". Indeed, throughout the Plan, there is an increased focus on making use of Tibet's particular strengths or, as the Plan states with reference to the tourism industry, "We must develop a niche mentality". Tourism itself is listed as a high priority in both Plans, while the Tenth Five-Year Plan puts increased emphasis on development of the domestic market, tightening regulation and standardising tourism management. Meanwhile, traditional Tibetan medicine (which was touched on only briefly in the Ninth Five-Year Plan) is dealt with in some detail. The section refers to "speeding up the improvement of the forms of traditional Tibetan medicines", quickening research into and development of new drugs, establishing the largest Tibetan medicinal materials base in China and creation of "the country's centre for the research, development, and production of Tibetan medicine" (Part 2, Chapter 4, section 2).

State investment in infrastructure including road, rail and power that has taken place since the Third Forum on Work in Tibet in 1994 is set to continue with the Western Development campaign and under the Tenth Five-Year Plan. However, the Plan itself sets out fewer specific, named targets for achievement than does the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Those it does include the renovation and expansion of Gongkar [Ch: Gongga] and Pomda [Ch:

Bangda] civilian airports, re-opening and renovation of Heping airport (a military airport) and preparatory work for four other airports, and a statement that no effort will be spared to ensure that the railway between Golmud and Lhasa is open to traffic within the Tenth Five-Year Plan period. (For more detail on the railway, see the news story on page 27) For roads, the focus appears to be on provincial roads and 'key economic highways', with overall emphasis on co-ordinated development of highway, air, rail and pipeline transportation to link all parts of the region, rather than on the roads at county-level and below that are of primary significance to many Tibetans.

The process of urbanisation is to be accelerated under the Tenth Five-Year Plan, with the aim of "reaching 19 per cent or so" (Chapter 7, *Intensifying Urbanisation and Raising the Level of Urbanisation*). (Note that the Ninth Five-Year Plan had set the target of about 20 per cent urbanisation by 2000 – this has evidently not been achieved.) The target is to be achieved by the development of small towns, prioritising county towns, along highways, border towns and others with 'fairly good' infrastructure, with creation of several urban systems. Lhasa is to be developed into "a modern mid-sized city with a rich ethnic feel". The Plan also states: "In developing small towns, we must be careful to stress their individual characteristics; the last thing we should do is to apply the same formula throughout. In particular, we must take pains to protect cultural relics and other cultural and natural scenery that have ethnic or local characteristics." (Part 2, Chapter 7)



Chinese tourists in Tibetan costume, Kumbum monastery, 2001

© TIN

<sup>10</sup> According to available information, there are currently no western companies directly involved in mining in the TAR. While foreign companies are not known to have reached the extraction stage of non-oil and gas mining projects in other Tibetan areas, there has been foreign investment in exploration and at least two foreign junior mining companies have entered into joint venture agreements with Chinese partners. In the oil and gas sector, Italian oil company Agip has signed a contract with China National Petroleum Corporation to become operator of the gas-fields in the Sebel Block of the Tsaidam Basin, Qinghai. For a comprehensive study of the mining industry in Tibet, see 'Mining Tibet: A study of mineral exploitation in Tibetan areas of the PRC', published by TIN, September 2002.

All of these proposed areas of development, from mining and tourism to communications infrastructure and urbanisation, are likely to have significant impact on Tibet's environment. While the Tenth Five-Year Plan includes a separate section on Sustainable Development (sub-headed "Intensifying Ecological Conservation and Environmental Protection and Development and Enhancing Sustainable Development Capacity"), in contrast to the Ninth Five-Year Plan, there are almost no specific target levels for pollution, waste production, reforestation or planting grass. Moreover, few specific projects are listed for the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, and the Plan mainly emphasises (at some length) general principles including the need to consider conservation issues alongside development issues and to carry out 'firm' implementation of state laws and policies on environmental protection. Specific emphases include implementation of forest protection measures in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, a State project, and implementation of environmental protection projects for the middle reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo [Ch: Yalu Zangbo], the valleys of Lhasa river, Nyangchu [Ch: Nianchu] river and Yalong river, the valleys of the 'Three Rivers' in eastern Tibet and the Niyang River valley, with regard to soil erosion. An afforestation project in Lhasa is also to be implemented, as are pollution control plans in urban areas.

The social aspects of development dealt with in this Plan are seen primarily in the context of serving economic development. With regard to education, the Plan envisages six-year education becoming universal and emphasises the promotion of nine-year compulsory education. In emphasising the importance of education, the Plan states: *"We must concentrate on solving the major issues we will encounter as we better adapt education to economic construction and social development so that it can better promote and serve economic construction and social development. We must concentrate on expediting the development of all types of education at all levels and improving the calibre of the whole population to provide the intellectual support needed to effect leap-style development in the region."* The Plan also states: *"We must... create the conditions for the full-fledged introduction of English instruction"*. This is more likely to be of significance and benefit for Chinese students in the region, who are frequently not required to learn Tibetan. Few young Tibetans, most of whom are already required to learn Tibetan and Chinese, could take on the English language in addition.

Both the Plan and propaganda for the Western Development campaign have a particular focus on science and technology. For example, one of the six major tasks listed for achievement during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period is to *"Implement the strategy of vitalizing Tibet through science and education... intensify the development of qualified personnel resources and S&T resources. Solve the striking problems in economic and social development with innovative S&T..."* (Chapter 1, Part 3) Without significant investment and rapid improvement in the education system, this need will have to be met through recruitment of qualified people into Tibet. Again, both the Plan and propaganda published regarding the Western Development Campaign mention the recruitment of qualified personnel from the east of China as an important priority. The Tenth Five-Year Plan states: *"With the market as the guide and in order to meet the needs of development, we must take strong measures to speed up the recruitment of specialists from outside that we can use. We don't care where they are from; our only concern is that they can be put to use."* There is also emphasis in the Tenth Five-Year Plan on development of service industries including information services, law, accounting and consulting; this is likely to bring about movement in of qualified personnel from outside Tibet. So far as local Tibetans are concerned, it seems clear that in the short term outsiders are far more likely to benefit from this aspect, as indeed many other aspects, of the development blueprint.

Overall, the content of the Tenth Five-Year Plan demonstrates that, despite references throughout to the market, the state is still heavily involved in defining and promoting the course of development that it desires in the TAR. Investment in transportation serves to provide closer practical links with the 'interior', while the continuing development of mining and power industries pursues the policy of resource extraction that is of more value to the recipient provinces in the east of China than it is to Tibetans. The promotion of the local market and circulation system and of science and technology as applied to agriculture and animal husbandry are likely to result directly or otherwise in a fundamental shift in the structure of the Tibetan economy, with many herders left with little option but to move off the land. The short-term need to import qualified personnel both dilutes the Tibetan character of the population of the TAR and detracts from the very real need to invest in education, that would be the best means to ensure that local Tibetans would stand a chance of helping to define the nature of, and sharing in wealth created by, local economic development. ■

## KEY DOCUMENTS

## Extracts from the TAR Tenth Five-Year Plan

Sections 2 and 3 of the first chapter, *The Objectives and Tasks of Economic and Social Development*, summarise the major objects of the Plan.

## Section 2 Major Objectives of Struggle

The gross regional product will grow 12 per cent each year on the average during the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the adjustment of the economic structure will achieve remarkable successes, and there will be steady gains in economic returns as well as the quality of economic growth. The status of agriculture and animal husbandry industry as the foundation will be made solid and strengthened. There will be a major breakthrough in infrastructural development. Substantive progress will be made in the drive by state enterprises to develop a modern enterprise system. The social security system will become more and more perfect over time. The basic role of the market as the allocator of resources will be further enhanced. The investment climate will have improved notably. Tibet will be open wider and wider to the outside world, its economic competitiveness appreciably on the rise. The strategy of vitalizing Tibet through science and education will make substantive headway. All social undertakings will develop in a coordinated manner and the quality of the population will improve steadily. Ecological and environmental protection and development will intensify. The development of small towns will accelerate significantly and the incomes of both urban and rural residents will increase without interruption. The building of a socialist spiritual civilization, democracy, and legal system will achieve great success. The anti-separatism struggle will deepen further and the social and political situation will become even more stable.

We expect to meet the following major targets for economic regulation and control during the Tenth Five-Year Plan: The economy will grow more than 12 per cent each year on the average, reaching 20.8bn yuan by 2005 based on 2000 prices, or 7,470 yuan on a per capita basis. Every effort will be made to increase local government revenue to 1bn yuan (not including central government revenue refunded to the localities). During those Five-Years, urban employment will increase by 20,000 jobs while 60,000 people will be relocated to agricultural and pastoral areas. The urban registered unemployment rate will be kept below 3 per cent or so. The overall level of consumer prices will remain largely stable.

As far as the adjustment of the economic structure is concerned, we expect to meet the following major targets: The industrial structure will be optimized and upgraded even as development accelerates. By the year 2005, the primary industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry will account for the increase in value in the following proportion: 23:25:52, while their respective shares of employment will be 63:10:27. Local comparative advantage will be put to effective use. The pace of small-town development will quicken, with urbanisation reaching 19 per cent or so. The drive to aid the poor and develop impoverished areas will speed up in accordance with local conditions.

- The structure of agriculture will become largely balanced, as will that of animal husbandry. The output of grain, edible oils, and pork will rise steadily even as the quality of these products effectively gets better and better. The industrial management of agriculture and animal husbandry will take a bold step forward. Marked progress will be made in the adjustment of the mix of township and town enterprises and institutional innovation. There will be new breakthroughs in the overall level and economic returns of diversified operations. Township and town enterprises and diversified operations are expected to grow about 16 per cent annually on the average. The economic structure of agricultural and pastoral areas will become more and more balanced, with the secondary and tertiary industries accounting for a larger share of the total economy.
- Infrastructural conditions, including transportation, energy, communications, and irrigation works, will see major breakthroughs. Every effort will be made to complete the construction of Qinghai-Tibet Railway and open it to traffic. Roads above the Class 3 grade will total 3,240km in length, with highways and secondary roads accounting for a combined 12.5 per cent. We will go all out to open Mutuo Highway to traffic and make over 90 per cent of all townships and over 70 per cent of all administrative villages accessible by highway or simply-built highway. We will make major progress in the construction of feeder airports. Nine key irrigation projects will be built. Dyke building will be expedited to meet the following flood prevention standards: Lhasa will be flooded just once in 100 years while the seats of the six prefectural governments will be flooded once in fifty years. Power installed capacity will reach 500,000kW. We will work hard to make electricity available to more than 80 per cent of the peasants and herders. By and large every county will be linked by optic fibre cables, every township will be connected by telephone and postal services.
- The average annual growth rates of the following industries will see significant increases compared with the Ninth Five-Year Plan: tourism, Tibetan medicine, the bio-industry with plateau characteristics, green food and beverage industries, agricultural and livestock products and processing industries, native handicraft industry, mining industry, and building materials industry.
- The level of informatization in society and the economy will rise notably. The operations of a majority of administrative and institutional units as well as enterprises in the region will be automated. Local computer networks at the regional, prefectural, and county levels will largely have taken shape. The information service industry will grow 20 per cent annually on the average. Radio and television broadcasting will reach 95 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively, of the population. Practically every village can receive radio and TV broadcasting.

We expect to meet the following major targets in the development of science, technology, and education. Research and development (R&D) spending by all society will amount to at least 1.5 per cent of the gross regional product each year and will top 2 per cent by 2005. S&T innovation capability will increase markedly and S&T advances will accelerate sharply. The appropriate technology will be widely used and popularized. S&T progress will contribute to economic growth at a rapidly rising rate. Over 95 per cent of school-age children will be enrolled



in elementary schools, a number that is expected to hold steady. Six-year compulsory education will become largely universal throughout the region. The illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rates among young and middle-aged people will drop below 30 per cent. By 2005, over 60 per cent of junior-high-school age children will be enrolled in such schools and everything will be done to achieve enrolment rates of 25 per cent and 10 per cent at the senior high school and higher education levels, respectively.

Turning to sustainable development, we have set the following major targets: Control population growth as appropriate and improve the quality of the population, limiting the natural population growth rate to below 4 per thousand of population. The trend towards worsening ecological and environmental degradation will be checked. By 2005 the tree cover rate will have risen steadily. The ecological restoration rate (reclamation rate) in resource-extraction areas will reach 15 per cent. The waste detoxification rate in urban areas will exceed 70 per cent. Ecological conservation in the middle reaches of "one jiang and two he" [namely Yarbung Zangbo Jiang, Lhasa He, Nianchu He, and Niyang He]; in the basins of the three rivers, namely, Jinsha Jiang (Ch: Yangtse), Nu Jiang (Ch: Salween), and Lancang Jiang (Ch: Mekong), near Qamdo (Tib: Chamdo); and in the basin of Niyang He will begin to pay dividends. Environmental quality in densely-populated areas will be notably improved. Emissions by industrial enterprises, civilian-use furnaces, hospitals, restaurants, and guesthouses must comply with the standards. Natural resources will be utilized in a more intelligent manner.

We expect to reach the following major targets in economic restructuring and opening to the outside world: Institutional innovation will advance across the board and the socialist market economy will improve further. With state aid, Tibet will establish such basic social security systems as an old-age insurance system in the urban areas, an unemployment insurance system, a health care insurance system, as well as a social insurance system for people in the agricultural and pastoral areas. Market conditions will improve sharply and the investment climate will be optimized markedly. Tibet will open wider to the outside world and develop an open economy. It will be open across the board at multiple levels and in broad areas.

We must meet the following targets in order to raise people's living standards. Both the living standard and the quality of life will rise appreciably. Basic public services and community services that are fairly decent will be in place. Per capita disposable incomes among urban residents will increase 8.5 per cent annually on the average, as will per capita net incomes among peasants and herders. Much effort will be made to narrow the urban-rural income gap. By 2005, cash incomes will make up more than 50 per cent of the peasants' and herders' total incomes; 80 per cent of the townships and 70 per cent of peasants and herders will achieve a comfortable standard of living. Public health and sanitation conditions in both urban and rural areas will markedly improve, with 80 per cent of all townships in the region boasting elementary sanitation and health care services while about 90 per cent of the counties will have launched co-operative medicine across the board. There will be effective prevention and control of infectious diseases and local diseases that seriously endanger public health. Cultural and sporting facilities will increase in both urban and rural areas and they will be found in more and more places. Infrastructural development at the grass roots in townships and towns will accelerate. The working and living conditions of the corps of grass-roots cadres will notably improve.

We expect to meet these major targets in opposing separatism and preserving stability: Adhere to the principle of taking the initiative to deal with the problem, conduct the anti-separatism struggle in depth, keep the initiative firmly in our hands in our anti-separatism struggle, and ensure social and political stability. Under no circumstances will we allow the Dalai Lama clique to succeed in its plots to create disturbances with the help of international hostile forces. We must lay a solid foundation for the long-term stability of Tibet.

### Section 3 Major Tasks

The following six major tasks must be accomplished during the Tenth Five-Year Plan:

- First, consolidate and strengthen the status of agriculture and animal husbandry as the foundation. Adjust and optimize the economic structure in the agricultural and pastoral areas. Vigorously develop agriculture and animal husbandry with plateau characteristics. Industrialize the management of agricultural and animal husbandry operations. Never stop improving the quality of agriculture and animal husbandry or increasing the returns on economic growth in the agricultural and pastoral areas. Increase the incomes of peasants and herdsmen.
- Second, establish and perfect a diversified investment system using mainly government investment. Raise funds through multiple avenues. Accelerate the development of transportation, energy, communications, irrigation, and urban and rural public facilities. Build a foundation for opening up Tibet and developing it in a big way.
- Third, pursue a 'catch up and overtake' strategy using Tibet's special features. Vigorously develop the tourist industry, Tibetan medicine, plants (including resources on the forest floor) unique to the plateau, the green food (beverage) industries, agricultural and animal husbandry products industry and their processing industry, native handicrafts industry, mining industry, and building materials industry so as to spearhead and promote the strategic adjustment of Tibet's economic structure.
- Fourth, implement the strategy of vitalizing Tibet through science and education. Develop education as a priority. Intensify the development of qualified personnel resources and S&T resources. Solve the striking problems in economic and social development with innovative S&T. Concentrate our effort on improving the regional economy's overall quality and returns. Stimulate a fundamental change in the mode of economic growth.
- Fifth, adopt the strategy of sustainable development, intensify ecological conservation and environmental protection, promote the balanced development of the environment, resources, population, society and the economy.
- Sixth, with ideological innovation and institutional innovation as the vanguard, we must break down isolation, deepen reform, open Tibet wider, and devote ourselves to improving the environment for economic development and regularizing the order in the market economy." ■



## Infrastructure and urbanisation

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 23 MARCH & 13 JUNE 2001 (EDITED)

### "Mammoth transfer of resources": The Tibet railway and gas pipeline and dramatic transformation of Lhasa planned

The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), outlined at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing, stated that development is to be the 'main theme' of policy in Tibet over the next Five-Years. The Plan focuses on the restructuring of the economy and the 'driving forces' of reform, 'opening up' and scientific and technological advancement. Key aims over the next Five-Years are to intensify exploitation of natural resources to meet domestic demand, to deal with environmental issues and to 'forge ahead aggressively' with the development of the western regions of China, concentrating on 'priority projects'. Other planned reforms will allow for increased population migration throughout of China, to *"ensure an orderly flow of labour forces in urban and rural areas as well as between regions"*. According to the People's Daily, these large-scale infrastructure projects *"demonstrate the heroic spirit of the industrious and valiant Chinese people"* and will bring about an *"unprecedented mammoth transfer of resources"* (People's Daily, 14 March 2001).

According to the budget report for 2001, funding for the Golmud-Lhasa railway, the west to east (Xinjiang-Shanghai) gas pipeline, transmission of electricity from west to east and the north to south water diversion scheme – billed as the four 'major' projects of the Plan – are all listed in the central budget. In 2001, the government issued 50bn yuan (US\$6.1 bn) in bonds to finance infrastructure and resource projects in western China. These projects are similar in concept and design to past state 'prestige' projects in China, including the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River.

The pipeline to transport natural gas from the Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to Shanghai municipality on China's east coast is already in construction. This has been presented as one of the key components of China's plans to develop a 'pipeline transport network'. A second pipeline project to transport natural gas from Sebei in Qinghai province to Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu province may be linked into this network, although at present the aim is understood to be the supply of gas for Xining and Lanzhou cities. Both of these gas pipelines are being built by PetroChina, a subsidiary of the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation. British Petroleum (BP) has a US\$580 million investment in PetroChina and has come under pressure from human rights groups and environmental groups, such as the Free Tibet Campaign in the UK, to withdraw from PetroChina, citing the issue of Tibetan resources being exploited by the Chinese state without the consultation of local people or conducting reliable impact assessments. At the time of writing, it had just been

confirmed that a western consortium led by Shell, involving ExxonMobil and the Russian company Gazprom, has signed a joint-venture framework agreement with PetroChina to build the Xinjiang-Shanghai pipeline, although it is understood that Shell reserves the right to withdraw depending on the results of environmental and social impact assessments being carried out in Xinjiang.

The Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline and the project to transmit electricity from west to east China are designed to meet the energy demands of the relatively wealthy and developed eastern regions of China. They appear to offer little benefit to locals in the western regions, such as Tibet, where the resources are found. According to People's Daily, completion of these two projects will turn the western regions into *"a powerful energy base"*, while the east will be the *"production base"* (14 March 2001).

A third major project involves the diversion of water from the Yangtze into the Yellow River and elsewhere for agricultural and urban uses. There are three possible routes planned at the lower, middle and upper reaches of the rivers. The upstream project involves the diversion of water near the sources of the two rivers on the Tibetan plateau. This would be the most problematic of the three routes to implement due to the mountainous terrain, but if it does go ahead it is likely to pose serious risks to the ecology of the Tibetan plateau. The Beijing Morning Post reported on 8 February 2002 that construction would start *"this year"* on the central route to Beijing from Danjiangkou City in Hubei province, and also on the eastern route to the plains of Shandong and Hebei provinces from Jiangdu in Jiangsu province. No mention was made in the report of the western route from the Tibetan plateau. It is likely the feasibility of this particular route depends on the success of the central and eastern routes.

### Construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway

The fourth major project, the Golmud-Lhasa railway will extend the current Xining-Golmud line in Qinghai province through to Lhasa, linking the TAR's capital to the Chinese rail network. A ceremony to mark the start of construction was held on 29 June 2001 simultaneously in Golmud – attended by Premier Zhu Rongji – and in Lhasa, where Central Committee member Wu Bangguo cut a ribbon in front of the Potala Palace. Completion of the railway to Lhasa will facilitate the transportation of goods to and from the TAR, the exploitation of natural resources, and development of the tourist industry. However, it will probably require

continued and substantial subsidy from the central government. The project will receive 20bn yuan (US\$2.4bn) in funding from the central government during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005), and state investment for construction alone is officially estimated to be 36 billion yuan (US\$4.34bn) (Xinhuanet, 4 April 2002). There has been some criticism within China of the economic and environmental costs of the railway project. CNN Senior China correspondent Willy Wo Lap-Lam quoted the Guangdong newspaper Southern Weekend (*Nanfang Zhoumo*) as saying: "*The short-term economic benefits [of the link] are not commensurate with the tens of billions yuan of investment*" (CNN.com 14 May). Willy Wo Lap-Lam adds that few Chinese academics or government and party officials are known to have expressed concerns about the railway due to the personal interest that President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji have reportedly expressed in its success.

While the project is unlikely to be viable on purely economic grounds, its political significance is underlined by the authorities themselves. According to Lhasa mayor Lobsang Gyaltsen, the railway "*is expected to play an important role in enhancing exchanges between ethnic groups, bolstering the exploitation of resources, reinforcing economic development in western China and consolidating national security*" (China Daily, 9 March 2001). According to the People's Daily, the lack of a transport infrastructure in Tibet and "*especially laggard ideas*" due to "*an isolated life*" have "*partly led to Tibet's backward economy*" (13 March 2001).

An article in the People's Daily on 22 March 2001 outlined the unique geological challenges presented by the construction of the railway – the most challenging being constructing the line on permafrost over which a significant proportion of the route will cross. According to Wu Ziwang, described by the People's Daily as "*a noted expert on frozen earth projects*", the Ministry of Railways has found a way to build railways on such frozen ground, with measures including "*heat-insulated layers, and more elevated sections*". A further difficulty is presented by the altitude. According to the People's Daily, over four-fifths of the railway will be built at an altitude of more than 4,000 metres, a height at which ordinary locomotives can only exert 60 per cent of their full power. The People's Daily does not explain fully how this particular difficulty will be overcome, although locomotive expert Wu Xinmin disclosed that experts will consider electrification of the railway in future, "*as well as taking advantage of local rich sunlight and wind energy as a supplement*". Mike Knutton of the International Railway Journal told TIN that in his opinion, overcoming the technical difficulties of building the railway would be "*challenging but possible*". The Chinese government has sought and received technical advice from engineers in Canada, Russia and Peru – all countries which have faced similar difficulties when putting railways through high, mountainous regions.

Solutions to resolving the problems of oxygen shortage and low air pressure in the high altitude environment are also outlined in the 22 March People's Daily article: one of the Chinese locomotive experts said that they are now thinking of using airtight cars similar to airliners, while other experts have predicted that "*the world's first train with equipment to provide oxygen and plateau-illness doctors will appear on the Qinghai-Tibet railway*".

On 22 March, a State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) official Mou Guangfeng, said that "*the first phase of the railway to Tibet will stretch 138.9km from Golmud to Wangkun*" and that a construction plan for this phase would be drafted by June (Xinhua, 22 March). Official sources now state that the railway will be operational by 2007, although it is thought that following a powerful earthquake in September 2001 in the Kunlun Mountains, the route will change, lengthening planning and construction times.

The Minister of Railways, Sun Yongfu, has said that once construction is completed the railway will be extended to Shigatse (Ch: Rigaze) and Nyingtri (Ch: Linzhi) in the TAR, and then on to Yunnan province (Xinhua, 7 March 2001). A line from Lhasa to Yunnan was one of the four original routes proposed for a railway link to the TAR, but would be far more expensive than the Qinghai route. It would have required total investment of over 63bn yuan (US\$7.7bn) according to 1997 figures and would have taken about ten years to build according to an article in the Tibet Daily on 12 December 2000.

The railway will approach Lhasa from the northwest, first descending from the Qinghai-TAR border to Nagchu (Ch: Naqu) and Damshung (Ch: Dangxiong), then following the Toelung River from Yangpachen through Toelung Dechen (Ch: Duilong Deqing) county and into west Lhasa. The Lhasa terminus will be built in Ne'u (Ch: Liuwu) township in Toelung Dechen county, with a bridge linking the township to central Lhasa on the opposite bank of the Kyichu (Lhasa) river, according to Tibet Daily. Tibet Daily further reported on 21 March that surveying work for construction of the station was being carried out on the shores of the river. The news of the terminus is in line with China's plans to develop the area with 'high-tech' industry into the 'Liuwu New Area'.

A report from Beijing states that the Ne'u township and surrounding areas will "*become the pioneers of economic development of Lhasa and even the whole autonomous region*" (Beijing China Internet Information Centre, 4 June), and reports from Tibet claimed that land prices in the area have been rising, and that Tibetan farmers and local people may have to be resettled in order to make way for the new development. Tibet Daily reported on 21 March that survey work is being carried out on the shore of the river.

Planning maps, published in 1982, show land use in the city as of 1980 as well as official goals for 2000. The maps include locations of rail stations. While the railway's approach

to Lhasa has been changed since the maps were formulated, the location of the main terminus in Ne'u may be consistent with original design, and land set aside for a terminal in Lhasa city remains undeveloped. The plan shows the railway crossing the river into Lhasa, with a smaller passenger terminal on the city side of the river, about 2.5km south of Drepung Monastery. Tibet Daily stated that a bridge would be built between Ne'u and Lhasa in 2001, but gave no details about its traffic handling capacity. Construction of the Ne'u township terminal will entail significant reclamation of land from the river's seasonal flood plain.

Reports from Lhasa indicate that some Tibetan farmers in Toelung Dechen (Ch: Duitong Deding) county may be required to move away from their land and settlements in order to make way for the new development. A former Tibetan official from Lhasa told TIN: *"Some farmers may receive a little compensation for their land, but it is unlikely that it will be enough to fully make up for the loss of their livelihoods. In similar cases of resettlement in Tibetan areas, farmers have had a lot of complaints about the lack of compensation, but it is not possible for them to speak out about this."* The pressure on Tibetans to conform to the Party's policy regarding the construction of the railway is likely to be intense due to the high priority accorded to the project. A Tibetan former official from Qinghai province said: *"If Tibetans oppose the railway station openly, they would be accused of being a 'splittist', as someone who wants to destroy the country."*

Official reports on the construction of the railway to Lhasa present a different perspective: *"All the villagers from the township were overjoyed and ran to tell each other, excitedly planning a beautiful future [when they heard about the new station],"* reported Tibet Daily on 22 March. *"Qiangba Ouzhu [Jampa Ngodrub], a 63-year old man, said: 'I haven't been able to sleep these last few days. When I think about being able to hear the 'whoo-whoo' sound of the whistle with my own ears and see the train flying along with my own eyes, then I am so excited. In the past I could never have dreamed of a day like this!'"*

There has been some criticism within China of the economic and environmental costs of the railway project. CNN Senior China correspondent Willy Wo Lap-Lam quotes the Guangdong newspaper Southern Weekend as saying: *"The short-term economic benefits [of the link] are not commensurate with the tens of billions yuan of investment."* The newspaper also reportedly said that damage to vegetation due to the engineering works *"will be very difficult to recover"*. (CNN.com, 14 March). Willy Wo Lap-Lam adds that few Chinese academics or government members are known to have expressed concerns about the railway due to the personal interest that Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji have reportedly expressed in its success.

Among Tibetans as well as outside China too, concern has been expressed about the long-term ecological and cultural impact of the large-scale project.

## Environmental impact

Most official statements on the planned railway emphasise an awareness of environmental protection along the route of the railway, and at least a stated commitment to make the environmental impact as small as possible. China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) says that Chinese experts have passed a report on the environmental impact of the first phase of the project and that every effort will be made to minimise any damage to the local environment (Xinhua 22 March). On the same day, however, a People's Daily report stated that *"any human activities, including railway building, will have a drastic influence on the [plateau's] earth"* due to the sensitivity of the permafrost to air temperature changes resulting from strong sunshine and frequent earth crust movements on the plateau. Willy Wo Lap-Lam of CNN further quoted Southern Weekend as saying that damage to vegetation due to the engineering works *"will be very difficult to recover"* (CNN.com, 14 March). SEPA official Mou Guangfeng has said that the railway will *"keep away from"* wild animal migration trails in nature reserves along the route. The People's Daily has said that *"more bridges and passages for animals will be built"* along the sections of the railway that fall inside nature reserves and that top soil that is removed for construction will be *"mostly restored"* (People's Daily, 22 March). Mou Guangfeng also said that they will *"strictly limit"* the construction site to protect the *"rare frigid-zone plants"*. No mention is made of the potential environmental impacts of the increased migration and resource exploitation that the railway is likely to bring.

A Western environmentalist who has travelled extensively in Amdo (the traditional Tibetan area now incorporated into Qinghai and Gansu provinces) said that the environmental impact of the railway line itself will depend on what development there is along the route and the extent to which settlements and towns will be established and expand. *"If it's a straight line though with the bare minimum of service facilities the environmental impacts will be limited. But every single building that goes up along the line is a potential threat to the environment of the Qiangtang [the northern plateau], (Tib: Changtang)."* The environmentalist also said that the biggest threat to the environment posed by the railway is resource extraction. *"The railway alters the economics of ore extraction. At the moment extraction is limited due to factors like fractured deposits, permafrost, the difficult environment and the distance from markets. They can't set up processing plants near the mineral deposits because of the constraints of water and temperature, they need the plants near urban centres. With the railway, ore can be more easily and cheaply transported – that is going to happen"*.

## Influx of Chinese population

The railway to Lhasa is expected to bring a further dramatic increase in the number of Chinese labourers and entrepreneurs moving to Tibetan areas. Publicity for the project has already attracted significant numbers of migrant workers. According to the People's Daily on 16 February, rural labourers, with hopes of finding jobs, 'queued up' at Chengdu's long-distance bus station to buy tickets to Tibet when they heard about the construction of the railway. Field survey work on the railway began on 1 March and was scheduled to be completed in October, according to Xinhua. "During the peak period" more than 1,600 surveyors were to be employed along the route (Xinhua, 1 March 2001).

Immigration of ethnic Chinese into Tibet is likely to have a particular momentum in the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Lhasa's population boom began in the 1980s and is set to undergo further acceleration. According to proposals outlined in the Party's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), the population of Lhasa's urban area will have more than doubled in the 15-year period ending 2005. The Lhasa urban area, which was no more than three square km with a population of 20,000-30,000 when China took control of Tibet 50 years ago, reached 53 square km and a population of 230,000 last year, according to official statistics. Meanwhile, the total population of the Lhasa City (county level),<sup>11</sup> which covers 523 square km, has risen to 470,000. The Five-Year Plan states that the short term goal is to expand the urban area to 70 square km by the end of 2005 and to increase the urban population from 230,000 to 'over 300,000' (Beijing China Internet Information Centre, 4 June 2001). This would represent a further increase of 30 per cent in only Five-Years, driven by the expected surge in Chinese influx as well as the urbanisation of existing populated areas. Reports from Tibet indicate that the current population of Lhasa is at least 70 per cent Chinese.

Actual population figures are invariably higher than official statistics. Chinese official regional census data do not include the military or the 'floating population' of economic migrants, who live primarily in the urban area. Lhasa officials acknowledged in 1998 that one third of Lhasa's population was made up of 'temporary residents'. The longer-term aim of expanding the urban area to 272 square km by 2015 would allocate more than half the area of Lhasa City (county level) for urban development.

These official figures represent a forecasted annual increase of about 5.5 per cent for 2000-2005, even faster than the 5.1 per cent rate from 1990-2000, a period when geographic expansion of the urban area was not significant. The rate of population increase for the last decade is about five times the officially claimed national average of 1.07 per cent (China Daily, 28 March). The influx of Chinese people seeking work

and entrepreneurial opportunity is likely to increase dramatically following completion of the railway to Lhasa.

The expected influx of ethnic Chinese into Tibet has become an issue of particular concern in some international circles, especially the exiled Tibetan community. China is already engaging in a process of damage-limitation and information-management in order to counter criticism. Lobsang Gyaltsen, the mayor of Lhasa, was quoted by China Daily as saying: "The railway will bring modern concepts and living styles into Tibet, but this should pose no threat to people's religious beliefs. In Western countries with developed science, technology and transport systems, don't religions still flourish?" (China Daily, 9 March)

However, the attitude often expressed by the Chinese authorities is that Tibetan religious beliefs are an impediment to development – Buddhist religious practices are frequently portrayed in the official media as 'backward' and 'superstitious'. The culture and religion of minority nationalities are viewed by the Chinese state as 'problems' to be dealt with and the Beijing hierarchy has long believed that 'ethnic distinctiveness' can be diluted through development of the economy.

A Tibetan former official from Qinghai, who has also lived in Lhasa, told TIN that the economic development of Toelung Dechen county following the announcement of the new railway station would increase the numbers of Chinese workers in the area and would not necessarily benefit local Tibetans. "Many new hotels and restaurants will be constructed, and many people from China who have lost their jobs will come to find work," the Tibetan told TIN. "There may be some short-term benefit for Tibetans in the construction of shops and restaurants for local people, but the influx of more and more Chinese people with education and skills means that local Tibetans may only be able to hold onto these jobs for a couple of years, and will gradually be marginalized. After the construction of the railway station at Xining [in Qinghai province], local people got jobs as cleaners and ticket sellers and so on, but gradually many of them lost these jobs due to competition from more skilled Chinese migrant workers."

Similarly, the authorities' plans to create a 12.5 square km 'high tech' zone in the vicinity of the planned railway terminus in Lhasa are certain to draw Chinese workers and professionals, but it is unclear whether Tibetans will have the opportunity to receive the training and education that would make them competitive in a more sophisticated job market.


The former official told TIN that the main beneficiaries of the construction of the railway to Lhasa would be Chinese, and not local Tibetans. "When the Chinese are in charge of construction [on projects such as the railway] it is possible that some Tibetans may find work, but the main benefits go to the Chinese private companies and the authorities," he told TIN. ■

11 Lhasa Shi (Lhasa Municipality), at prefectural level, includes Lhasa City (county level) and seven other counties.





Workers on the Qinghai-Lhasa railway, south-west of Golmud



Facilitating the transfer of labour? The Qinghai-Tibet railway

© TIN

### Lhasa Maps and Panoramas

See the TIN website ([www.tibetinfo.net/reports/lhasapano.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/reports/lhasapano.htm)) for newly available panoramas of Lhasa (available as single JPEG image files or to download in PDF format). These panoramas provide information relevant to modern planning and development in Lhasa, especially the construction of a rail terminus near Ne'u township on the south bank of the Kyichu and the possible construction of a passenger terminal in Lhasa itself. The first is a panorama of west Lhasa taken from above Toelung Dechen (in northwest Lhasa) in late 1993. The second is a panorama of west Lhasa taken from above Ne'u township (on the south bank of the Kyichu) in late 1993.

Considerable detail about official intentions for the development of Lhasa in the years 1980-2000, including railroad infrastructure, are revealed in a set of planning maps for the years 1980-2000 published in 1982.

The main diagrams for 1980 and 2000 can be seen at: [www.tibetinfo.net/reports/lhasamaps.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/reports/lhasamaps.htm)

### TESTIMONY

#### 'Side jobs' for impoverished nomads

As noted above in discussion of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, during the 2001-5 period it is envisaged that there will be a decrease in the numbers of persons employed in primary industry (principally agriculture and animal husbandry) and corresponding increases in the numbers in secondary or tertiary industry. There is also an emphasis on encouraging nomads and peasants towards greater participation in a market economy. In fact, this is already happening. For example, 80 per cent of Tibetan nomads in Qinghai are now settled in fixed locations, according to the Tibet Daily. For reasons that may include the unsuitability of some allocated land, environmental degradation leading to a lower capacity to sustain livestock and quite possibly the greater efficiency of local tax collection from settled families, accounts from Tibetans indicate that many nomads are now having to seek out 'side employment' in order to earn money, in addition to keeping animals. Types of side employment of which TIN is aware include work in the construction industry and the collection of medicinal herbs or other plants for sale.

#### Infrastructure construction

With sustained investment by the state as part of the Western Development campaign, the market for construction workers in Tibetan areas is likely to grow. However, Tibetans comment that many of those employed are in fact Chinese workers (who have a common language and culture with the Chinese managers of the projects), and that the opportunities for side work available for Tibetans are decreasing. As a separate issue, it appears that where the state has plans to construct roads or buildings, there is little if any consultation of those whose property is to be destroyed, and the compensation given often seems to be inadequate to purchase new property.

An 18-year old nomad from Chamdo talks about work as a labourer on bridge construction projects.

*"We are nomads, but now we do not have many animals. We work in the construction [industry] and we go to pick caterpillar fungus. The Chinese are constructing many houses and we work there as day labourers. They give us 20 yuan per day. We also go to work on the construction of bridges. It is hard work. Wherever we work, the officers-in-charge of the work are Chinese. This year they constructed two bridges in Chamdo. One bridge was constructed on the way from Chamdo to Tatsag township [Tib: thang] and the other bridge was constructed on the way from Chamdo to Sitog township. They constructed big bridges; about two vehicles can pass through together.*

*The bridge that was constructed on the way to Tatsag township was built over the Dzachu River and the bridge that was constructed on the way to Sitog township was built over Ngomchu River. The leaders of Chamdo prefecture undertake the work of constructing the bridges. All the officers that take charge of the work are Chinese, and most of the workers are Chinese. There are also some Tibetan workers. In total about 500 people work there.*

*Most of the [houses under construction] are government houses. Also some private houses are built and private individuals are building their houses on the hilltops. They build their houses away from the roads because the government demolishes any houses that are found close to the roads. Only government houses are built on the sides of the roads. They start shops in all the ground floors. The government gives a little more money if they demolish old buildings. If they demolish new buildings they do not give much money. In place of your demolished house you can buy a newly constructed house. However, these houses are very expensive. They give very little money for the previous house that was demolished by the government. The Chinese mostly stay in these shops. Most of them have newly arrived. Most of the workers are also recently arrived Chinese."*

The 26-year-old nomad from Yushu prefecture in Qinghai also talked to TIN about infrastructure construction in his area. He talks about the benefits of an improved road system, but expresses the fear that in the long-term it will lead to all the 'good areas' being settled by Chinese.

*"Everywhere they build roads in the nomadic area and in the agricultural area where previously there weren't any roads. They also construct houses. All houses and lands that fall within the maps drawn for roads and buildings have to be destroyed. If your house falls within the map drawn for the roads and houses, there is nothing you can do. They say that the land and the sky belong to communist China. After the demolition of the houses, they rebuild and construct new houses, but these houses they sell to whoever has the money to purchase. They sell a house with a three-room set for 40,000 to 50,000 yuan. The Chinese buy all these houses, they have a lot of money. They open shops and hospitals after buying these houses. However, we Tibetans do not have money. The Chinese have a lot of money. The Chinese buy all these houses and now open shops in these areas where previously they [Chinese] were never seen.*

*It is good if we think in a narrow way, because now they are constructing motorable roads in those places where we previously had to ride horses for many days. We can now buy all the things on our doorstep. So that is good. However, if we think in the long term, then when all these good areas are occupied by the Chinese our Tibet will be in great trouble. In the villages they started to build houses in 1998. In the towns they started to build houses around 1996 to 1997. The Chinese build the houses. One Chinese takes the contract, and he brings many Chinese from his country to work in the construction of the houses. The local Tibetans do not get work, and even if they got work they wouldn't be able to build houses. Construction is undertaken wherever there is a large population and where there are highways.*

*The leaders of the county and the township were called for a meeting by the higher authorities. When the leaders returned from the meeting, they said that the Chinese would be constructing roads and buildings in our area and that you weren't allowed to complain if your house or land fell within the maps drawn for the roads and the buildings. They said that these roads and buildings would be very helpful to Tibet. Then they drew the lines and started the construction projects. They are constructing a huge highway and are saying that it is the second largest road in China. The construction is being carried out from Qinghai Province to Yushu Prefecture and from Yushu Prefecture to Nangchen (Ch: Nangqian). The construction is going on from Nangchen to Riwoche (Ch: Leiwuqi), from Riwoche to Chamdo and from Chamdo to the TAR. From there they will lead the road up to Tsawa Pomda airport. The road construction works were started in 1996. They have constructed big roads where four vehicles can pass simultaneously." ■*

## OFFICIAL NEWS COVERAGE

## Official Press – Policies &amp; Development

All items are summaries of pieces by the Xinhua news agency unless stated otherwise

## 4 January

A major bridge was completed and opened to traffic Monday [1 January] in Yigong Township of Bomi County in the TAR, Xinhua reports. Construction on the bridge started last October after the original bridge and some highways were destroyed by a large landslide in the township last June. [BBC Mon 04/01/01]

## 10 January

According to Xinhua, Lhasa has made remarkable progress in controlling pollution. Facing increasing problems of air pollution, sewage discharge and garbage treatment, Lhasa has invested 4m yuan (US\$480,000) in setting up pollution-control facilities for the city's cement plant and 50m yuan (US\$6m) to set up a sewage treatment plant and a garbage treatment plant. [BBC Mon 10/01/01]

## 12 January

China launches a project to protect the natural forests in the area in Qinghai-Tibet Plateau where the Yangtze [Chang Jiang], Yellow [Huang He] and Lancang rivers originate, Xinhua reports. The project will entail planting trees and grassland as well as improving pasture over the next ten years. [BBC Mon 12/01/01]

## 13 January

Ericsson China donates one million yuan (US\$120,000) to the Hoh Xil National Nature Reserve in Qinghai Province to improve standards in the protection of the Tibetan antelope. [BBC Mon 13/01/01]

## 18 January

The TAR plans to invest 9bn yuan (US\$1.08bn) in fixed assets, up 35 per cent from 2000, into infrastructure to increase mainly the construction of highways, power stations, telecommunication facilities, and water conservancy projects, Xinhua reports. [BBC Mon 18/01/01]

Also on 18 January, after meeting the Chinese ambassador, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announces that the railway traffic on the Kazakh-Chinese section of the Trans-Asian railway will double or triple in the long run to 10m-12m tonnes a year. He says that after delimitation of the border, relations between China and Kazakhstan are developing steadily, in particular in economic cooperation and freight transportation, Russian news agency Interfax reports. [BBC Mon 19/01/01]

## 19 January

According to Xinhua, official statistics show that the per capita income for herdsmen and farmers in the TAR rose by 5.3 per cent to reach 1,325 yuan (US\$160) in 2000. The increase is attributed to the sound economic development in the region's farm and pasture areas, thanks to the readjustment of agricultural structures, and introduction of more science and technology projects. [BBC Mon 19/01/01]

## 23 January

According to government officials, Tibet's economy will grow by 12 per cent over the next Five-Years and attain the middle level of the country in ten years, Xinhua reports. The region invested 6bn yuan (US\$723m) in fixed assets last year, more than 20 per cent higher than the previous year. Construction of 147 new projects covering all aspects of infrastructure commenced. Tourism has become a pillar industry, generating 600m yuan (US\$72.3m) in tourist receipts for 2000. [BBC Mon 23/01/01]

## 31 January

Xinhua reports that Tibet is aiming to become a trading hub in the Himalayan region. The TAR plans to further improve its infrastructures while improving local foreign trade and custom services, boosting border trade, and developing export-oriented industries such as animal products, medicinal herbs as well as mineral and forest products. Overseas investors are encouraged to invest in local industries in various forms. [BBC Mon 31/01/01]

## 5 February

New mining areas are found in the Jinsha, Lancang and Nujiang river valleys in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces and the TAR, Xinhua reports. The current prospecting result shows that the area is larger than originally expected. The reserve of Yangla Copper Mine in Deqen County exceeds one million tonnes. The Yinduo Mine has a prospective reserve of 500,000 tonnes of copper, one million tonnes of lead-zinc, 5,000 tonnes of silver and huge amounts of cobalt. [BBC Mon 05/02/01]

## 9 February

In an interview with Xinhua, TAR Government Chairman Legchog says that the past six years recorded the fastest development in the history of Tibet with a GDP of over 10bn yuan (US\$1.2bn), that is expected to grow 12 per cent in the next Five-Years, a growth rate exceeding the national average. Legchog also claimed a reduction of the number of people living below the poverty line from 480,000 in 1995 to 70,000. [BBC Mon 09/02/01]

Also on 9 February, Xinhua reports that 459 poverty relief projects have been launched in the past six years and that, according to statistics, 77 per cent of school-age children are now studying at schools and 85 per cent of the local population have access to medical treatment. [BBC Mon 15/02/01]

**16 February**

The construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway will not bring 'ecological disasters' to the project area, Xinhua reports. According to a senior Chinese engineer, the project will play a key role in protecting the ecological environment on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, with measures taken to keep a clean environment and protect animals. [BBC Mon 16/02/01]

**19 February**

Xinhua reports that the Australian Health and Aged Care Minister Michael Wooldridge is in Lhasa for an inspection tour of a project founded by the Australian government and aimed at eliminating iodine-deficiency diseases. According to the vice-chair of the People's Government of the TAR, Tsering Drolkar, a Medicare network consisting of more than 1,200 hospitals and staffed by over 10,300 medical professionals has been built in the region. The life expectancy of local people has lengthened to 65 years, from 36 before 'liberation'. [BBC Mon 19/02/01]

**8 March**

Xinhua reports that leprosy in Tibet 'has been basically eradicated', its occurrence rate having dropped to under 0.002 per cent in the past two decades, according to official statistics. Leprosy clinics are established at regional, district and county levels and provide organizational and systematic prevention and treatment. [BBC Mon 08/03/01]

**13 March**

Xinhua reports that the largest nature reserve in northwest China will receive more scientific and technological assistance to improve its environmental protection. The Chinese Academy of Forestry (CAF) signed a cooperation agreement with Qinghai Province, where the reserve covers the sources of Yangtze [Chang Jiang], Yellow [Huang He] and Lancang rivers, with a total area of 31.8 million hectares. [BBC Mon 13/03/01]

**15 March**

Xinhua reports that Tibet has recorded some success in curbing desertification. Tibet which has 20mn hectares of sandy fields, one-sixth of China's total area, has invested 90m yuan (US\$12m) in improving 20,000 ha of sandy fields and covered 53,300 ha of land with trees in three river valleys. [BBC Mon 15/03/01]

It is also reported that Tibet has a total installed capacity of solar power plants exceeding 2,000kW. There currently exist seven large-sized solar power plants in Tibet, of which the one in Amdo county is the largest of its kind in the PRC. Solar energy is increasingly used for appliances such as radio and television. It is reported that the coverage rates for radio and television broadcasts in Tibet have reached 68 and 63 per cent respectively. [BBC Mon 15/03/01]

**16 March**

Xinhua reports that a new air route into Tibet will be opened on 15 April. The route will connect Chengdu, Sichuan Province, and Lhasa via Kunming, Yunnan Province, and its Diqing Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, known as 'Shangri-La'. There will be flights on the route every Sunday and it will take five hours to complete a one-way trip. [BBC Mon 17/03/01]

**19 March**

Xinhua reports that the diet of Tibetans has improved remarkably as increasingly large quantities of vegetables are being produced in the TAR. Statistics reportedly show 66,000 tonnes of vegetables, with a total cultivation acreage of 2,000 ha, were produced last year in Lhasa. [BBC Mon 19/03/01]

**21 March**

Xinhua reports that, according to figures released by the regional statistical bureau, the disposable income of people in Lhasa increased at an annual rate of 15.7 per cent in the nine years ending 1999. Salaries of Tibetan workers increased by 17 per cent a year. The per capita disposable income of a middle-income family exceeds 6,000 yuan (US\$723) annually. It is also reported that the salaries of government workers in the TAR will soon be increased 2.5 times, according to a decision made by the regional government. [BBC Mon 21/03/01]

**29 March**

There are 110 passenger transport routes within the TAR, and another 13 leading to other provinces and cities, Xinhua reports. In the TAR there are now 12 large terminals and more than 10,000 vehicles engaged in passenger transport, which can handle more than 120,000 passengers a year in. [BBC Mon 29/03/01]

**30 March**

The Chinese State Meteorological Administration and the local Tibetan authorities have approved a plan to install a sensing system in the TAR to monitor the region's environment, Xinhua reports. With an estimated investment of 20m yuan (US\$2.4m), the system is designed to collect observation data from Chinese and foreign satellites about the land, rivers, forests and grassland in Tibet. [BBC Mon 30/03/01]

**29 April**

State Councillor Ismail Amat inspects Kangding and Yajiang counties in Sichuan Province, the two areas worst-affected by a strong earthquake in February this year, Xinhua reports. He calls on the local government to work hard to resume agricultural production as soon as possible and to step up unity between people from different ethnic groups. [BBC Mon 29/04/01]



**3 May**

Xinhua reports that for the first quarter of the year the TAR's exports jumped by 42.8 per cent to US\$25.97m and imports grew by 28.4 per cent to US\$2.85m, according to the regional statistics bureau. Tourism grew to 29.8 per cent. [BBC Mon 03/05/01]

**15 May**

Xinhua reports Danba Qoida, director of the Lhasa City Urban Planning Committee, as announcing that city will expand its urban district from the present 51 ha to 72 ha by 2015. Reportedly the height of buildings around the Potala Palace and major lamaseries will be limited. [BBC Mon 15/05/01]. The TAR is to invest 99bn yuan (US\$12m) in building 494 key projects in the next Five-Years, according to the Regional Development Planning Commission, including agriculture, husbandry, forestry, water conservation, communication, power, and education projects. [BBC Mon 15/05/01]

**16 May**

According to deputy director of the tourism administration of the TAR, Tibet is expected to receive 5.64m tourists in the next Five-Years, Xinhua reports. Statistics show that over the past Five-Years, Tibet received two million domestic and overseas tourists, up 20.5 per cent annually, and earned 1.96bn yuan (US\$236m) in revenues. [BBC Mon 17/05/01]

**17 May**

According to Bai Tao, deputy head of the Tibet Regional Office for Poverty Alleviation and Development, the TAR has 70,000 residents living in abject poverty, no more than 2.7 per cent of its total population, Xinhua reports. The poverty line in Tibet is an annual income of 600 yuan (US\$72) for an individual Tibetan. On average, the annual per capita income in Tibet is 1,300 yuan (US\$157). [BBC Mon 17/05/01]

**23 May**

Talks were held between China and India about the reopening of Tibet's largest land port in Yadong which has remained closed since the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the Indian news agency PTI reports. According to officials, if the opening of the port is resumed, the border trade in Tibet will increase by 15 per cent annually. [BBC Mon 23/05/01]

**23 May**

According to a news report carried by Asiaport Daily News, China will invest 650m yuan (US\$78.3m) on the Lhaze-Zhangmu road as part of China's 'thoroughfares project'. China is constructing a total of six thoroughfares connecting the TAR with India, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal. Zhangmu, on the Nepalese border, is expected to double its annual border trade volume after completion of the road. Last year, the government of Nepal collected 1.28bn rupees in revenues from the trade route. [BBC Mon 23/05/01]

It is also reported that the TAR is building its first telerph (overhead transport system) at Zhangmu in an effort to facilitate border trade. The cableway is 2,208 metres long and it is expected to transport 400 people or 30 tonnes of cargo an hour, and will shorten the journey from one hour to 10 minutes. [BBC Mon 01/06/01]

**25 May**

According to Xinhua, Chinese ministries and provinces have given free assistance to the TAR in the form of 62 key projects, covering agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, communications, energy resources, postal services and telecommunications. The total industrial value of the region amounted to 1.365bn yuan (US\$164m) in 2000, from 200m yuan (US\$24.09m) in the early 1980s. Last year, the region's GDP was 8.855bn yuan (US\$1.066bn) generating revenue of 360m yuan (US\$43.37m). [BBC Mon 25/05/01]

**26 May**

Xinhua reports reconnaissance work has started on a 2,000km oil pipeline project linking Kunming, Yunnan Province, to Maoming, one of China's largest oil refining bases in Guangdong Province. It is expected to become the country's longest pipeline for refined oil. [BBC Mon 26/05/01]

**6 June**

Xinhua reports that Yunnan Province has built a province-wide water quality monitoring system, with 185 water quality monitoring stations checking levels of arsenic, mercury, lead, and phosphorus in Yunnan's major rivers and lakes. [BBC Mon 06/06/01]

**8 June**

The Lhasa-Gyangze highway is to be rebuilt and construction works have started. Xinhua reports that the highway is 90.11 km long and will cost 250m yuan (US\$30.12m) to complete. [BBC Mon 08/06/01]

**10 June**

According to a report by Xinhua, because of global warming, glaciers at Mount Qilian on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau are shrinking at an annual rate of between two and 16 metres. As a result, there are less sources of water for over 40 rivers originating from Mount Qilian, affecting production of industry and agriculture. [BBC Mon 10/06/01]

**11 June**

According to a government report, Tibetan farmlands are well protected with little pollution thanks to sparing use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural plastic sheeting. Tibet accounts for one eighth of China's land territory, but has only 231,000 ha of farmland. [BBC Mon 11/06/01]

**13 June**

Chinese railway experts recently approved a feasibility study on construction of the railway section between Lhasa and Golmud. Work on the 846km section between Xining, Qinghai, and Golmud was completed in 1984. [BBC Mon 13/06/01] According to a report by Xinhua, the Nagchu railway station will be the highest of its kind in the world with an elevation of 4,500m. Construction of the Nagchu section is considered the most difficult one of the whole project as the region lacks oxygen. [BBC Mon 13/06/01]

**17 June**

Xinhua reports that the construction project of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is scheduled to begin on 29 June, when inauguration ceremonies will be held simultaneously in Beijing, Lhasa and Golmud in Qinghai. The railway linking Xining, the capital city of Qinghai Province, and Lhasa, will be 1,956km in length and upon its completion in six years, it will be the highest railway in the world. [BBC Mon 18/06/01]

**20 June**

According to a report by Xinhua, geologists have verified mineral resources worth 650bn yuan (US\$78bn) at 1,800 sites in the TAR. 17 minerals found in the TAR are reported to form some of the largest deposits in the PRC. The TAR will speed up the exploitation of mineral resources to make it a pillar industry in coming Five-Years, reports Xinhua. [BBC Mon 20/06/01]

**22 June**

According to Legchog, TAR government chairman, Qinghai-Tibet Railway construction and the policy to develop the western areas will greatly promote tourism. In the next Five-Years, China will invest some 100bn yuan (US\$12bn) to build railways in the western areas. [BBC Mon 22/06/01]

**25 June**

Xinhua reports that the first temporary bridge on the Qinghai-Tibet Railway has been completed and will be put into operation in the near future. With a load-bearing capacity of 60 tonnes, the bridge was designed to transport machines for digging a tunnel 4,210m above sea-level. [BBC Mon 25/06/01]

**28 June**

China Southwest Airlines will open a direct flight service from Hong Kong to Lhasa on 21 July, according to a report by the People's Daily. According to the report tourists to Tibet via Hong Kong will no longer need to go through complicated visa procedures. [People's Daily, 28/06/01]

**3 July**

Xinhua reports that the Chinese central government has decided to invest 31.2bn yuan (US\$3.76bn) in 117 projects in the TAR over the coming Five-Years. Over the past Five-Years, with similar economic assistance, the TAR has recorded an annual economic growth rate of 10.7 per cent, higher than the nation's average. [BBC Mon 06/07/01]

**5 August**

In an interview with Hong Kong reporters in Lhasa, TAR Party executive deputy secretary Ragdi said that by 2005, farmers and herdsmen in Tibet will gain an average annual net income of over 2,000 yuan (US\$242) and most people in the region will be living a 'comfortable life', Xinhua reports. According to Ragdi last year Tibet's gross domestic product (GDP) hit 11.74bn yuan (US\$1.42bn), up 10.7 per cent year on year; and grain output reached 962,000 tonnes. The central government has decided to invest about 70bn yuan (US\$8.5bn) over Five-Years to promote development in the TAR. [BBC Mon 05/08/01]

**6 August**

The Hong Kong-based news agency *Zhongguo Tongxun She* carries a feature about Tibet's foreign trade with neighbouring countries. According to Suolang Duoji, director of the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Department of the TAR, Tibet will develop border trade of small volumes, invest funds in the construction of facilities in border ports, improve border trade services and negotiate with neighbouring countries to increase imports. In 2000, the TAR's border trade with neighbouring countries, India, Nepal and Bhutan, exceeded US\$100m for the first time, of which export accounted for over US\$102m, an increase of 43 per cent. [BBC Mon 07/08/01]

**9 August**

According to Legchog, the central government's Fourth Tibet Work Forum decided that the original 15 provinces and municipalities that pledged support for counterpart departments in the TAR will extend the assistance period for ten years to 2014. Legchog, interviewed by Hong Kong journalists, said that Tibet is expected to receive a total of 700m yuan (US\$84m) in funding for development from China's central government and other provinces and municipalities during the 2001-2005 Five-Year Plan. Legchog said preferential policies include taxes and finance, investment and inter-bank loans, as well as prices and wages. According to Legchog, the central government adopted a preferential salary policy especially designed for the TAR, whereby civil service employees can expect salaries 2.5 times higher than the country's average. Legchog also stressed that Tibet will gradually open more areas, including the border areas, to overseas tourists and businessmen and introduce more overseas investment. [BBC Mon 09/08/01]

### 10 September

The Sixth TAR Party Congress is held in Lhasa. Xinhua carries a review of Tibet's economy given by Guo Jinlong, secretary of the TAR CCP Committee. Guo said the TAR has seen the fastest development since its 'peaceful liberation', with the support and assistance of the central government and other provinces. The TAR has been able to build key projects in agriculture, technology and the environment; it has developed preferential economic and financial policies; and has implemented the strategy of "making Tibet flourish through science and education". Since July 1995, more than 1,950 cadres have been sent to Tibet to work from other provinces and municipalities, reported Xinhua.

[BBC Mon 10/09/01]

### 24 September

Xinhua reports that the Chinese government will invest 1.92bn yuan (US\$231m) to protect the environment and forest resources in the TAR in the coming Five-Years, with priority being given to afforestation projects in Lhasa and nearby areas. [BBC Mon 24/09/01]

### October 2

China is to build roads into remote Tibetan regions of Sichuan within three years. The three prefectures to be connected by the highways are rich in water and mineral resources and are major tourist attractions, Xinhua reported. [BBC Mon 2/10/01]

### October 4

Xinhua reports that foreign trade is booming in the TAR thanks to more local emphasis on expanding trade, attracting investment and enhancing economic cooperation with overseas partners. [BBC Mon 04/10/01]

### October 7

Disappearing lakes are causing drinking water shortages in Qinghai Province, reported Xinhua. 70 per cent of some 10,000 herdsmen in Madoi will have to rent rangelands elsewhere to feed their flocks and herds. [BBC Mon 7/10/01]

**Also on 7 October,** a Nepalese business team of over 100 members leaves for Lhasa to take part in the Nepal-Tibet Trade Fair starting on 11 October and continuing for five days. The fair aims at promoting cross-border trade and investment. Statistics released show that trade volume between Nepal and China stood at around US\$160m in 2000. [BBC Mon 07/10/01]

### October 11

Xinhua reports that a delegation of more than 30 ethnic minority religious figures and intellectuals from Tibet left Beijing for an inspection tour of inland provinces.

[BBC Mon 11/10/01]

### October 15

Xinhua reports Tibet-Nepal trade is up 18-fold over 1995. Trade with Nepal makes up 95 per cent of the total foreign trade volume. [BBC Mon 15/10/01]

### October 16

It is reported that a new terminal is planned for Gonggar Airport in the TAR. The report claims that the terminal's annual throughput will be 1.1m people by 2010.

[BBC Mon 16/10/01]

### October 29

A report quotes environmental scientists as saying China's largest salt lake in Qinghai is becoming basified, indicating environmental deterioration.

[BBC Mon 28/10/01]

### October 31

The TAR plans to spend more than US\$2.4bn on highway construction over the next 5 years. A Xinhua report states "under-developed roading is one of the major factors that impede local economic development". [BBC Mon 31/10/01]

**Also on 31 October** Yunnan Province has banned all commercial logging and reforested an area of nearly 930,000 ha over the past three years. In the 1990s the province suffered from severe flooding resulting from a constantly deteriorating natural environment and inefficient efforts in forestation. [BBC Mon 31/10/01]

### November 5

Construction on a brick factory costing 23m yuan to be funded by Jilin Province started recently in Lhasa. The project was nominated at the 4th Tibet Work Forum in June. [BBC Mon 04/11/01]

**Also on 5 November,** a scientist from the Chinese Academy of Sciences says that the descent in the water-level of Lake Qinghai has been caused mainly by dry weather and greater evaporation rather than man-made damage. He admits that excessive land reclamation led to deterioration of the environment around the lake. [BBC Mon 04/11/01]

### November 6

Construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway will have a significant impact on India's military and economic security, reports India's PTI News Agency. It will significantly improve the Chinese People's Liberation Army's logistics capability and enable easier and cheaper transportation of supplies. China may consider deploying mobile missile launchers concealed in tunnels once construction is complete, claims the report. [BBC Mon 06/11/01]

### November 7

According to the Tenth Five-Year Plan, five provinces and autonomous regions in western China will turn over four million ha of farmland to grassland and forests.

[BBC Mon 07/11/01]

### 8 November

China issues a white paper on Tibet's modernisation. The paper is aimed at enhancing the international community's understanding of the 'history and reality of Tibet'. It says that 'feudal serfdom under theocracy' stifled modernisation and social progress to the point where Tibet was verging on extreme poverty and total collapse, while 'liberation' brought regional autonomy, large-scale modernisation, reform and opening-up.

[BBC Mon 08/11/01]

### November 9

China plans to divert water from rivers on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to the Yellow River valley, reports Xinhua. Li Guoying, director of the Yellow River Water Resources Committee, said that the project aiming to ease water shortages in northern China will be completed in the coming ten years. [BBC Mon 09/11/01]

### November 12

The TAR government announces plans to curb desertification during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005). Afforestation is to be encouraged along the upper reaches of Yangze River. [BBC Mon 12/11/01]

Also reported on this date, economic growth in the TAR from January to September was up by 7.5 per cent. Construction began on 30 of the 70 listed projects to be built with aid from other provinces and municipalities. The average rate of expenditure on communication, recreation, education and culture by each household in the TAR rose by 20 per cent. [BBC Mon 11/11/01]

### November 20

According to a report by Xinhua, the TAR government has adopted a preferential policy to encourage farmers and herdsmen to relocate to towns, providing housing and business venues and a support allowance. The report stated 18.9 per cent of the total population in the TAR live in urban areas. [BBC Mon 17/12/01]

### 30 November

The Qinghai-Tibet railway will bring tangible benefits to the Tibetan residents and improve their living conditions, according to Xie Jisheng, a Tibetologist from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is reported as saying that the construction and management of the Qinghai-Tibet railway could be fully dependent on local Tibetans, for whom special classes in railway management have been organized. According to Xie, the railway will reduce road toll fees and help bring a heavy inflow of tourists. [BBC Mon 30/12/01]

### 1 December

According to Xinhua, five newly-built highways in Gansu opened to traffic simultaneously following total investment of over 5bn yuan (US\$602m). [BBC Mon 01/12/01]

### 4 December

The People's Daily carries an article on social development in poorer regions. The commentator stresses that poorer regions do not have to repeat mistakes already made by developed areas. Rather, the paper argued, underdeveloped areas should "focus on their realities" while referring to an advanced culture, namely socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, which includes 'advanced ideological theory and modern science and technology'. [BBC Mon 04/12/01]

### 12 December

According to Xinhua, 53 cases of wildlife smuggling were discovered in the TAR during a crack down. The report claims over 100 species of wild animal inhabit the Qomolangma Nature reserve alone, one of 17 reserves in the TAR. [BBC Mon 12/12/01]

### 15 December

Xinhua reports that according to statistics, alternative energy such as solar power replaces the consumption of 127,000 tonnes of coal per year in the TAR. [BBC Mon 17/12/01]

### 24 December

Xinhua reports that the TAR's GDP in 2001 is expected to grow by 12.2 per cent, amounting to 13.79bn yuan (US\$1.66bn). Tibet's GDP grew at an annual rate of 11 per cent for six successive years, stated the report, and claimed that the TAR became self-sufficient in grain, edible oil and meat in 2000. The average disposable income of city dwellers is expected to reach 7,090 yuan (US\$854), higher than the national average rate, and that for farmers, 1,410 yuan (US\$170). [BBC Mon 24/12/01]

### 25 December

Xinhua reports that the first group of 948 Tibetans have been resettled 'to protect forests' in the upper reaches of the Yangtze river. According to Xinhua, local forests, now covering 60,791 ha, have shrunk due to logging by local people. The regional government plans to relocate 10,000 people for the same purpose within three years. [BBC Mon 25/12/01]

### 28 December

Xinhua reports that Qinghai attracted US\$198m of foreign investment in 2001, the highest foreign investment ever. The fields of investment have expanded from the service sector to agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, power, mining, the building industry and real estate. [BBC Mon 28/12/01]

Also on 28 December, Xinhua reports that the TAR's tax revenue was expected to reach 885m yuan in 2001, an increase of 70m yuan over 2000. [BBC Mon 28/12/01]



Roadworks on East Dekyi Road, 2001 © TIN



## 2 Cadres

On 19 July, during Chinese vice-president Hu Jintao's visit to the TAR to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement, he addressed a meeting of high level cadres<sup>1</sup> in Lhasa specifically on the subject of building a high-quality contingent of cadres for Tibet, and set out five principles by which he said Tibet-based cadres should work. These principles included the 'sacred and unshirkable duty' of 'safeguarding the motherland's unity and opposing national division', 'strengthening unity among cadres, working hard' and 'living a plain life'.

Reports received by TIN in 2001 indicated that increasing numbers of Chinese cadres are learning Tibetan at the University of Tibet in Lhasa. This will prepare them for future leadership roles in Tibet at village and county level. In July, a further batch of almost 700 Chinese cadres was dispatched to work in the TAR, as part of a central policy

of assigning cadres to work in Tibet. There was little change in the top-level government and Party personnel during 2001. A notable exception was Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin, who was removed from the post that he had held since 1985 and sent to Beijing to occupy a senior post at the China Writers' Association.

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 13 SEPTEMBER 2001

### Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin moved to Beijing

One of the most senior Tibetans in the Communist Party in Tibet, Tenzin, has been removed from his post as deputy Party secretary and sent from Lhasa to Beijing to occupy a senior position at the China Writers' Association. 54 year old Tenzin (Chinese: Danzeng), who has been a member of the Party for 36 years, was summoned to Beijing in August and informed that he had been transferred to the position, which is effectively a down-grading of his status, according to TIN sources – the post is not a leading political appointment and does not involve governance and policy-making in Tibet. Tenzin reportedly requested to stay in Lhasa but this was refused by Party chiefs. His departure from Lhasa was marked by a farewell party that was 'unusually small and cold', according to a Tibetan source.

Tenzin, who is known for his fluency in both Tibetan and Chinese, was regarded by many Tibetan intellectuals as one of the best educated and most eloquent of the Tibetan Communist leaders. Tenzin, who joined the Communist Party in 1965, maintained his senior position in the Party throughout the tenure of the hardliner Chen Kuyuan as Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary from 1992 to 2000, when Guo Jinlong took over this most senior post in the TAR. Tenzin is known in particular for his statements regarding the importance of Tibetan language and culture in the process of modernisation, and for his concern over the excesses of the

gambling and prostitution trade in Lhasa that he has said are an unacceptable consequence of economic development.

Tenzin, who was born in Nagchu in central Tibet and educated at Fudan University in Shanghai, began his political career as deputy director in the office of the editor-in-chief of Tibet Daily. In 1983 he was made Director of the Tibet Regional Bureau of Culture and occupied positions as Vice-Chairman of the Tibet Federation of Literary and Art circles and member of the Standing Committee of the TAR Party Committee; he was promoted in 1985 to Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee. ■



'Social Evils' – Poster wording states: "The People's Police would like to point out to you: Gambling, prostitution, making use of prostitutes and illicit cohabitation are strictly prohibited."

© TIN

<sup>1</sup> The term is applied to government and Party officials. Not all government cadres are also Party members, but in practice leading personnel in the TAR government are almost always Party members, with the exception of religious figures (atheism being a basic requirement of Party membership).

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 11 JANUARY 2001 (EDITED)

## Grass roots rural control stepped up with education of Chinese and Tibetan cadres

At least 70 Chinese cadres are learning Tibetan at the University of Tibet in Lhasa as part of a programme to prepare them for future leadership roles in Tibet at village and county level. This is one of a number of measures being taken by the Chinese authorities to step up their control of rural areas in Tibet, including a continued emphasis on intensive ideological training for Tibetan cadres.

The 70 Chinese cadres currently being trained at the University of Tibet in Tibetan language and nationalities policy are tipped to be appointed to various administrative positions in farming and nomadic areas of the TAR following completion of the three-year course. Tibet University officials publicly welcomed the students with formal speeches, stating that it is the first time that so many Chinese have been admitted to the Tibetan language department since it was established. University officials also reportedly said that the policy of enrolling Chinese to the Tibetan language department at the University would be continued and strengthened in future, and that in the context of the current campaign to develop the western regions of China, Chinese graduates of the department would be able to make a significant contribution. The University reportedly told students that these Chinese graduates "would be particularly instrumental in consolidating and defending social stability and peace in Tibet."

The training of Tibetan cadres in China has been focused on political and ideological education rather than on practical skills appropriate for the development of local economies at a grass roots level. Another Tibetan source said: "Tibetans who have been deputed to undergo specialist training in different parts of China have undergone political indoctrination rather than focusing on the realities of local situations prevailing in the Tibetan areas where they are to work. These Tibetans do learn about scientific and technical means of raising [industrial] economic productivity but these are based on Chinese policies of development, and are aimed at pushing forward the campaign to popularise 'scientific' means of improving economic productivity, replacing the traditional methods of production practised among the farming and nomadic communities of Tibet. These policies are frequently incompatible with either the current economic realities [in Tibet] or the cultural life of the Tibetan people. Upon their return to Tibet at the end of their training, these Tibetan cadres find that they cannot apply what they had learned during their couple of years training in China. The regional and local authorities show greater respect and preference to those cadres who have acquired thorough ideological grounding in Communism than to those who have acquired specialist experience and technical skills."

Tibetan leaders and cadres who are deemed to be politically trustworthy are allowed to retain their positions and undergo training through further workshops alongside Chinese appointees. Those who are suspected to be politically disloyal, however, are removed or transferred to posts that have the same status, but less importance and power. The authorities frequently use the pretexts of "poor understanding of administration and management" or "poor educational level and inefficiency" when a cadre is removed from his or her post due to concerns over political unreliability.



University of Tibet campus, banner reads "Profoundly expose and criticise the Dalai splittist elements", 2000

© Tufty Images/TIN

The need for skilled and educated workers is a theme of the current campaign to develop China's western regions, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas in Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan. There is concern among Tibetans in Lhasa, however, that the regional and local authorities give more weight to ideological soundness than to technical expertise, and that the skills acquired by Tibetan cadres during training in China have little practical application to the current socio-economic realities in Tibet. Tibetans are also concerned about the continuing replacement of Tibetan cadres with Chinese at the grass roots level of the administration. ■

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

**'Summer grass, winter worm':  
Chinese cadres in Tibet**

*Yartsa gunbu*, literally meaning 'summer grass, winter worm' is a rare fungus found on the Tibetan plateau (*Cordyceps sinensis*). It is a parasite which invades the body of caterpillars and eats the soft tissue (therefore it is also called caterpillar fungus). The 'grass' part is the fruiting body of the fungus. Tibetans have been using this term to refer to Chinese cadres in Tibet for some years now – and the official press has also used the phrase. It is referring to the fact that most Chinese cadres do not like to spend their winters on the Tibetan plateau, preferring to return to either Beijing or their hometowns. Some Tibetans have commented to TIN that the primary interest of many of these officials is to come to Tibet to make as much money as possible and to then get out as quickly as they can.

This behaviour is now being officially condemned, as the authorities seek to promote the old image of honest cadres aiding Tibet and aiding the people. Xinhuanet reported: "It is understood that this year, not one provincial level leader has taken or requested a holiday over the winter, and provincial level leaders are in the pastoral areas now, forging warm links with the grateful people [...]." (Xinhuanet, Tibet, 11 January 2002 on tibetinfo.com, Chinese language)

Guo Jinlong made a speech at a TAR Party Committee meeting in November about the need for high standards in Tibet work. He said that corruption and "cadres not having the best interests of the people at heart" were prominent problems, as well as the region's position on the "front-line of the struggle against splittism". "Cadres", he added, "whether from Tibetan or from other places working in Tibet, have to love the Tibetan people".

Guo Tianlin, head of the TAR Party Propaganda Department, told cadres at the third Lhasa Aid Tibet Cadre's Forum that they must study the 'Old Tibet spirit' and "treat Tibet as their home from home and unite with the cadre masses of Tibet" (30 November 2001).



'Summer exercises' – PLA troops' in Amdo, August 2001

© TIN

## KEY DOCUMENTS

**Examination Questionnaire for  
Specialist Technical Personnel**

(extracts; translated by TIN – see page 42 & 43)

The following extracts are taken from an examination paper from a work unit in the Tibet Autonomous Region. 'Specialist Technical Personnel' (skilled workers) had to take the exam as part of their political education in autumn 2001. The original 10-page document was in the Chinese language. The first section of the questionnaire (questions one to eight) is concerned with personal details: age, sex, nationality (Han, Tibetan or 'other minority nationality'), education, political affiliation, period of service, the level of specialist technical duties currently undertaken, and the level of jurisdiction of the candidate's research (for example, state or provincial). The second section is reproduced below. The nature of some of the questions in this section, and the balance between the alternatives provided, reveals the authorities' concerns about the political attitudes held by skilled workers.

Please select one answer for the following questions (place a ✓ in the brackets by selected answer).

1. You think that the Dalai's true face is:

- (1) *a religious leader*
- (2) *the head of the splittist clique*
- (3) *don't know*

2. When you witness incidents that are not beneficial to social stability, your actions will be:

- (1) *to firmly stop them and make a report to the relevant departments*
- (2) *to crowd round to watch*
- (3) *to pretend not to see*
- (4) *Don't care*

3. You think that the 'Falun Gong' organisation is:

- (1) *an evil cult*
- (2) *a religious organisation*
- (3) *don't know*

4. When you hear a discussion that is not beneficial to the unity of the nationalities, you:

- (1) *firmly stop it and criticise it*
- (2) *let it go unchecked*
- (3) *actively participate in it*
- (4) *don't know what to do*

5. From the great changes in East Europe to the splitting up of the Soviet Union, in relation to the cause of communism, you:

- (1) *have full confidence*
- (2) *lack confidence*
- (3) *have no confidence*
- (4) *don't care*

6. How do you view the circumstances of the current anti-corruption struggle?

- (1) *It has made great achievements*
- (2) *It has so far made interim [jieduanxing] achievements*
- (3) *It has yielded only slight results*
- (4) *Corruption is growing in severity*

7. Education in the 'three representations' has concluded. Do you think the current work-style of leaders and cadres has or has not changed?

- (1) *There has been a clear improvement*
- (2) *There have been certain improvements*
- (3) *There has not been much change*
- (4) *Can't say*

8. If a young person sacrifices his life in order to save an eighty-year-old person, do you think his action is meritorious [zhide]?

- (1) *Yes*
- (2) *Not very meritorious*
- (3) *Not meritorious*
- (4) *Can't say*

9. If your work unit assigned you a task without pay, bearing in mind the 'Labour Law', your attitude would be:

- (1) *although not very willing, you would comply with the organisation's arrangements*
- (2) *you would be happy to accept*
- (3) *to look for all kinds of excuses to refuse*
- (4) *to refuse to undertake it*

10. [What is] your currently hoped-for work:

- (1) *Work in Party or government organs*
- (2) *Work in enterprise management*
- (3) *Specialist technical work*
- (4) *To be employed by a foreign-funded or private enterprise*
- (5) *Individual or self-employment*

11. The social issue which ordinarily you, your family, colleagues, fellow students and friends discuss most, is:

- (1) *environmental protection*
- (2) *employment*
- (3) *inequality of distribution*
- (4) *anti-corruption*
- (5) *social order*
- (6) *reduction of taxes and increase in income for peasants and nomads*
- (7) *social guarantees [shehui baozhang]*
- (8) *other*

12. What do you like to do in your spare time?:

- (1) *Sing, dance*
- (2) *Play cards or mahjong*
- (3) *Watch TV, films or videos*
- (4) *Read books and newspapers*
- (5) *Travel*
- (6) *Participate in specialist technical study or training*
- (7) *Go shopping or do housework*
- (8) *Meet up with friends to eat and chat*
- (9) *Other*

Please select multiple answers for the questions below (place a ✓ in the brackets by selected answers).

13. Your outlook:

- (1) *Struggle with all your being for the cause of communism*
- (2) *Realise the four modernisations and the vigorous development of China*
- (3) *Love the country and love the people, protect the unity of the Motherland*
- (4) *Respect the truth and uphold justice*
- (5) *Play games with people, sneer at ideals*



14. Your outlook on values:

- (1) *To serve the people with all your heart and mind*
- (2) *To realise your own true worth*
- (3) *To get to the top*
- (4) *To seek fame and fortune*
- (5) *To offer much and to demand much*
- (6) *To place money above everything else*

15. Your outlook on morality:

- (1) *To sacrifice your own interests for the sake of others*
- (2) *To love and respect one's position and trade*
- (3) *To fight for what is right*
- (4) *Benefit oneself with no harm to others*
- (5) *Harm others to benefit oneself*

16. You think the 'four outlooks' [si guan] of Marxism are:

- (1) *Outlook on culture*
- (2) *Outlook on life*
- (3) *Outlook on religion*
- (4) *Outlook on the world*
- (5) *Outlook on values*
- (6) *Outlook on the Motherland*
- (7) *Outlook on morals*
- (8) *Outlook on the nationalities*

17. You think the nature of the Chinese Communist Party is:

- (1) *the vanguard of the Chinese working class*
- (2) *the leading core of China's socialist undertaking*
- (3) *always to represent the developmental requirements of advanced productive forces in society*
- (4) *always to represent the progressive direction of advanced culture*
- (5) *always to represent the fundamental interests of the broad masses*

18. You think the achievements our country will make during the 'Tenth Five-Year Plan' will be:

- (1) *our country's international competitiveness will become stronger*
- (2) *we will become more closely tied to world economic trends*
- (3) *the success of the government in managing the economy will be greater*
- (4) *people's lives will be better*

19. The advanced topic you are most keen to study, is:

- (1) *fundamental theories in your specialist field*
- (2) *new knowledge, new technology*
- (3) *foreign languages*
- (4) *computer technology*
- (5) *management studies*
- (6) *other*

20. Your main difficulty in life is:

- (1) *cramped living conditions*
- (2) *difficulties of children's advancements in study or finding employment*
- (3) *weight of economic burdens*
- (4) *poor health*
- (5) *a noisy household*
- (6) *other*

21. You think that the main reason for the drop-out of specialist technical personnel is:

- (1) *poor prospects at work units*
- (2) *individual requirements are not satisfied*
- (3) *the specialism is not geared to the needs of the job*
- (4) *difficulties in bringing the role of the individual into play*
- (5) *low level of economic income*
- (6) *leadership does not place importance on the work*
- (7) *people leave for higher positions*

22. Your situation as regards to training and further education for your professional work since 1993:

- (1) *Released from work to carry out training/ study*
- (2) *Maintained part-time study*
- (3) *Participated in study activities organised at the local or prefectural level and above*
- (4) *Had no opportunity for external training*

23. Your situation with regard to study or training outside the region or abroad since 1993:

- (1) *Studied abroad*
- (2) *Gave lectures or carried out observation/ study*
- (3) *Participated in either technological co-operation or academic meetings abroad or outside the region*
- (4) *Have not gone abroad or outside the region to study*

24. What factors are stopping you from going abroad to further your studies?

- (1) *Too busy at work to find the time*
- (2) *Economic difficulties at work unit*
- (3) *Family or personal reasons*
- (4) *Work unit does not regard it as important*

## KEY SPEECHES

## Address by Zeng Qinghong to Chinese cadres selected to work in Tibet, 4 July 2001

On 4 July, Zeng Qinghong, director of the Party Central Committee's Organisation Department, addressed a group of cadres selected to serve in the TAR. Xinhua news agency reported that the group is made up of 685 cadres, 549 of them selected by 15 provinces and municipalities, and 136 selected by 53 central party and government organs. Those selected by the provinces and municipalities had already departed for Tibet and Zeng addressed only those selected by party and government organs. Zeng urged the cadres to study Chinese President Jiang Zemin's speech on the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the thinking on the 'Three Representations', and to use these to guide their work. The following is an extract from Xinhua's report:



'Planning for the future' – a new Lhasa taking shape

© TIN

*"[Zeng Qinghong] said: First, I hope that after arriving in Tibet, you would vigorously study and consciously practice the important thinking of 'three representations,' make the study, understanding, and implementation of Comrade Jiang Zemin's important speech on 1 July one of your important tasks, and truly bring your thinking in line with the spirit of the speech. Second, I hope that under the leadership of Tibet's regional party committee and government, you would conscientiously implement the spirit of the Fourth Forum on Work in Tibet, actively carry out the assigned work, become models and examples in implementing the central spirit and plans, and cultivate and safeguard the good image of our cadres of the central and government organs. Third, I hope you would learn with an open mind from Tibetan cadres and masses and interior cadres who have worked in Tibet for a long period; foster the 'old Tibetan spirit' of 'being especially capable of enduring hardships, fighting, exercising forbearance, uniting with others, and dedicating oneself'; join local cadres and the masses in fighting together in unity; and temper yourself and acquire better skills under difficult conditions and a complicated environment. Fourth, I hope you would master the laws in living in a high-altitude environment, adapt yourselves to Tibet's working environment, and accomplish various missions with good health and strong vigour. Zeng Qinghong also asked all central party and government organs to show warm concern about cadres on the aid mission to Tibet, provide them with good logistic support, do more concrete work, overcome difficulties and anxiety for them, and enable them to concentrate on their work without worrying about their families back home.*

*In line with the principle laid down by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council for selecting cadres to assist Tibet, which requires 'each responsible department to assign cadres to offer coordinated assistance and rotate them periodically' and through the organization of the Central Organization Department and the Ministry of Personnel, 15 provinces and municipalities as well as 40 central party and government organs selected and sent two groups of cadres to work in Tibet, totalling 1,200. After arriving in Tibet, these cadres overcame all the difficulties and worked diligently. They made contributions to Tibet's economic and social development and stability and, at the same time, tempered their will and stood the test of difficult conditions and harsh environment. A large number of Kong Fansen-type outstanding cadres have since emerged. With the term of the second group of cadres on the aid mission to Tibet expiring last June, it had become necessary to select and dispatch a third group of cadres to work in Tibet. In light of Tibet's need, the Central Organization Department and the Ministry of Personnel decided to select and dispatch 685 cadres, with 549 of them selected by the 15 provinces and municipalities and 136 selected by the 53 central party and government organs."* ■

## KEY SPEECHES

## Speech by Hu Jintao on building a high-quality contingent of cadres for Tibet, given to a meeting of high-level cadres in Lhasa, 19 July 2001 (extract)

On 19 July, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao addressed a meeting of high-level cadres in Lhasa on the subject of cadre work for the region. He set out five principles by which Tibet-based cadres should work, and emphasised that what was most important was "to resolutely safeguard the unity of the motherland and oppose national division. On this matter of principle, there must be no confused idea, no ambiguous attitude, and no vacillation in action."

The five principles, as included in Xinhua's 19 July report on the speech (published in English by BBC Monitoring on 20 July), are reproduced below.



Vice President Hu Jintao presenting a poster of the leadership triumvirate – past and present to Tibetan people on 22 July 2001 © Tibet Daily

*"Hu Jintao set forth five concrete requirements for the vast number of cadres in Tibet:*

*First, adhere to the correct orientation and hold the position firmly. Tibet is located in the forefront of the anti-separatist struggle. For the vast number of cadres in Tibet, to adhere to the correct political orientation and hold the political position firmly, the most important thing is to resolutely safeguard the unity of the motherland and oppose national division. On this matter of principle, there must be no confused idea, no ambiguous attitude, and no vacillation in action. Cadres of all ethnic groups throughout the region are cadres of the party and the state, and must take the safeguarding of the motherland's unity and opposing national division as their sacred and unshirkable duty.*

*Second, be good at studying and be courageous to make innovations. In the study of Marxist theory, the first thing is to grasp the principle of emancipating minds and seeking truth from facts, which is the living soul of Marxism. Currently, the situation is changing rapidly. In Tibet, people may be facing many new things and new issues either in deepening reforms or quickening development. This requires us to advance with the times, adopt new ideas, broaden new thinking, adopt new mechanisms, and set up new systems, thus giving full play to Tibet's unique advantages and making better use of all conditions favourable to Tibet's development.*

*Third, strengthen unity and form a joint force. The unity of cadres of all ethnic groups in Tibet plays a key and decisive role in enhancing the unity of the masses of all ethnic groups. All cadres, no matter of what ethnic groups, should stand on the position of the party and the people and preserve the interests of the party and the people of all ethnic groups. They should cherish the unity of the leading bodies as caring for their own eyes, and should protect the unity of cadres among all ethnic groups. They should learn from each other, respect each other, and make progress together.*

*Fourth, work hard and live a plain life, and maintain close ties with the masses. The fine tradition of the old cadres in Tibet should be carried forward, and cadres should share weal and woe with the masses. Now, as the conditions are getting better, the fine tradition must still be maintained. Leading cadres at all levels should often go among the masses of all ethnic groups, find out their sentiments, listen to their voice, care about their well-being, strive to help them solve various problems in their day-to-day lives, and try by every possible means to seek more benefits for the masses.*

*Fifth, do down-to-earth work and guarantee the implementation of all established policies and measures. In Tibet, all areas and departments should clearly understand their responsibilities, formulate their work plans according to the instructions of the central leadership and the arrangements of the autonomous region in connection with their own conditions, and guarantee the implementation of the plans and measures. No matter what is being done, attention should be focused on quality, efficiency, and solid results. It is necessary to make careful plans, adopt effective measures, conduct strict inspections, and take rapid and resolute actions. Once a task is decided, action must be taken effectively and thoroughly." ■*

## OFFICIAL NEWS COVERAGE

## Official Press – Cadres

All items are summaries of pieces by the Xinhua news agency unless stated otherwise

## 16 January

Sang Jieja (Tibetan nationality) is elected chairman of the Eighth Qinghai Province CPPCC Committee and Tian Yuan and Zhao Yongzhong are elected vice-chairmen of the Eighth Qinghai Province CPPCC Committee. [BBC Mon 18/01/01]

## 20 January

Legchog, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, attends a Spring Festival and Tibetan New Year Party. At the party he says that in 2000 the people in Tibet have successfully fulfilled the Ninth Five-Year Plan to ensure their self-sufficiency in food, and Tibet now enjoys political stability, economic growth, and unity among all ethnic groups. [BBC Mon 21/01/01]

## 14 February

Lobsang Dondrub, TAR deputy chairman, visits major monasteries in Lhasa and greets monks on Tuesday and Wednesday 13 and 14 February for the coming Tibetan New Year. Xinhua reported that he gave some 100,000 yuan (US\$12,000) to the lamaseries as alms on behalf of the government. [BBC Mon 14/02/01]

## 15 February

Basang, deputy secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region party committee and chairman of the regional reception committee for returned Tibetan countrymen, says at the second plenary session of the TAR Reception Committee for Returned Tibetan Countrymen: *"The struggle between us and the Dalai clique is an issue about safeguarding the motherland's unification and fighting division. It is a struggle between the enemy and us. The struggle on this issue can only be an unequivocal and tit-for-tat struggle. By no means must we waiver, not even the slightest."* [BBC Mon 16/02/01]

## 5 March

NPC deputies from Tibet and Xinjiang listen to Premier Zhu Rongji's Work Report. Xinhua says that what they find most inspiring in the report are a number of topics, such as *"carrying out a large-scale development in the country's western region," "accelerating the development of the country's central and western regions," "concentrating forces on promoting the west-to-east natural gas delivery project, the west-to-east power supply project, and the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway," and "laying stress on the aid-the-poor work in areas inhabited by minority nationalities in the country's central and western regions, in old revolutionary bases, in border areas, and in extremely impoverished areas."* [BBC Mon 06/03/01]

Also on 5 March, in a meeting of the Tibet delegation to the NPC, Vice-President Hu Jintao stresses the importance of 'safeguarding stability' and 'opposing secession'. He says the Tibetan people should be educated 'extensively' to *"help them understand that only socialism can help Tibet develop and only strong solidarity among people of all ethnic groups can ensure Tibet's prosperity"*. He also says that while 'normal religious activities' should be protected, all 'illegal activities carried out in the name of religion' should be 'firmly' stopped and censured.

[BBC Mon 06/03/01]

## 15 March

Tibetan leader Legchog praises the preferential policies of the Chinese government towards Tibet, which have brought about economic and social development in the region. Legchog, in an interview with Xinhua entitled *Promote great-leap-forward development in a innovative spirit*, notes particular success in the 'struggle against separatism'. He says that the regional government aims to improve the pillar industries, placing emphasis on scientific and technological innovations, and states that Tibet must open to the outside world to achieve 'great-leap-forward development'.

[BBC Mon 17/03/01]

## 9 April

Over 70 per cent of all officials in the Tibet Autonomous Region are Tibetans, a white paper issued Monday [9 April] by the Information Office of the State Council says. The white paper, entitled *Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 2000*, mentions this when elaborating equal rights and special protection for ethnic minorities in the country. Tibet now has over 50,000 officials from ethnic minority groups, the report adds.

[BBC Mon 09/04/01]

## 2 May

Xinhua profiles the oldest Tibet township party chief, Rinzin Wanggyai, 67. He says of former times: *"We serfs were just talking animals, being ordered around by the master but treated no better than animals"*. Xinhua notes that when 'the rebellion led by the Dalai Lama in 1959 was suppressed' Rinzin Wanggyai did not flee after his serf owner and the Dalai Lama, but chose to stay. *"I knew PLA soldiers were nice men who would never treat me like animals,"* he said. [BBC Mon 3/05/01]



## 12 May

The Fourth Session of the Seventh People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region opens today. The session is to review a number of work reports, important government decisions and codes, including the social and economic development blueprint of the region during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005), the yearly financial plan and a draft regulation on legislation. Some 380 representatives attend the session which is expected to last 10 days. [BBC Mon 12/05/01]

## 18 May

The fourth session of the Seventh TAR CPPCC concluded its meeting in Lhasa today. [BBC Mon 18/05/01]

## 22 May

Statistics show that at present, Tibetan and other ethnic group officials account for 74.9 per cent of the region's total government officials. Female officials account for more than 30 per cent. The leading officials of the people's congresses, governments, and the committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at all levels in the region are all Tibetans. There are also Tibetan officials in central government departments. Tibetan and other minority officials now account for 68.9 per cent, 59.4 per cent and 61 per cent of all the officials of the regional, prefectural and county level governments. [BBC Mon 22/05/01]

Also on 22 May, the Tibet People's Congress ends its session and unanimously approves the *Outlines of the Tenth Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in Tibet Autonomous Region*. [BBC Mon 22/05/01]

## 24 May

A lengthy article by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, entitled: *A brilliant practice of the party's policy towards ethnic groups*, is published by Xinhua, marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement. [BBC Mon 30/05/01]

## 27 May

Deputies at a CPPCC meeting in Lhasa emphasised that stability is the precondition for development in Tibet and development is the foundation for stability. Party secretary Guo Jinlong reportedly emphasised that three things should not be changed: the important position of maintaining stability in Tibet, the regional party committee's policy and measures on maintaining stability, and the responsibility of party and government organizations at all levels to ensure stability. [BBC Mon 29/05/01]

## 29 May

A book of Mao Zedong's writings on Tibet has been published. [BBC Mon 29/05/01]

## 22 June

Xinhua reports that the percentage rate for women members in the TAR's 7th People's Congress and 7th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference were [sic] 20.1 per cent and 16.5 per cent respectively. Women officials accounted for 33.7 per cent of the total number of officials in Tibet. Women made up 14.3 per cent, 11.3 per cent and 11 per cent of officials at provincial, city, and county levels respectively. The governments of all seven cities under the autonomous region have women officials and 80 per cent of county-level governments have women officials, according to statistics. [BBC Mon 22/06/01]

## 25 June

Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao visited an exhibition in Beijing about nationwide support for Tibet's modernisation drive. [BBC Mon 25/06/01]

## 29 June

The Fourth Tibet Work Forum, a meeting held to discuss the development of Tibet, was held on 25-27 June in Beijing. Xinhua reports that at the meeting, Chinese president Jiang Zemin outlined three key aspects of the party's Tibet policy. He says that the development of Tibet's economy should be speeded up and turned into a

'development by leaps and bounds'. Jiang urges construction of a "socialist spiritual civilization" in order to "create a good ideological and cultural environment for long-term stability". President Jiang also stresses the importance of strengthening party building at all levels in Tibet. He adds that Party organizations need to be turned into "the solid core and fighting force" to lead the Tibetan people in accomplishing economic development and social stability. [BBC Mon 02/08/01]

## 2 July

Chinese vice-premier Wu Bangguo has been on an inspection tour of the TAR between 28 and 30 June. He is quoted as describing the party's policies for Tibet's development as 'correct and effective', and that while the conditions are ripe for Tibet to achieve a faster and better development, "we should also keep in mind that our task is still huge, and we have a long way to go." [BBC Mon 02/07/01]

## 4 July

A group of Chinese cadres selected to serve in the TAR are addressed by senior leader Zeng Qinghong. (See page 44.) [BBC Mon 05/07/01]

## 17 July

A delegation headed by Chinese vice-president Hu Jintao leaves Beijing for Lhasa to participate in activities to mark the 50th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, according to a Xinhua report. The delegation is composed of 50 persons, the deputy heads being Pagbalha Geleg Namgyal, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Wang Zhongyu, state councillor and secretary general of the State Council, Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee and the director of the Party Central Committee United Front Work Department, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee and Xu Caihou, CMC vice-chairman and executive deputy director of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. [BBC Mon 17/07/01]

**18 July**

Chinese vice-president Hu Jintao, visiting Tibet, attends a song and dance performance entitled *Golden Years*, highlighting the great development in Tibet following the region's peaceful liberation. Xinhua reports: *"Through many famous ethnic dances and songs, the performance conveys a thankful voice of the people from all ethnic groups in Tibet to the Chinese Communist Party, which led them to happy life and prosperous development."*

[BBC Mon 18/07/01]

**19 July**

In Lhasa, Hu Jintao is reported as emphasising the importance of building a high-quality contingent of cadres in the TAR, saying this is vital for rapid development and long-term stability. He put forward five principles by which cadres in Tibet should operate (for details, see extract given above).

[BBC Mon 19/07/01]

**Also on 19 July**, Hu Jintao gives a speech in Lhasa to mark the 50th anniversary of Tibet's 'peaceful liberation' by Chinese forces. He remarks that since fifty years ago the overwhelming majority of people in Tibet have been raised out of poverty, notes that religious freedoms are fully respected and the Dalai Lama's influence is being fought, states that Tibetans owe their prosperity to the Party and adds that Tibet-based cadres should fight separatism.

[BBC Mon 20/07/01]

**Also on 19 July**, a *Military World* article cites Legchog, TAR chairman, as giving high praise to the PLA units stationed in Tibet for defending and building the frontier, serving the people, and making contributions to the prosperity, stability, and development of Tibet. He says that these PLA units are worthy of the title of the 'three representations' model, according to the article.

[BBC Mon 20/07/01]

**14 September**

The Sixth Tibet Autonomous Regional Congress of the Chinese Communist Party closes. The congress, which lasted five days, has elected a 65-member committee and a new commission for discipline inspection. Guo Jinlong, secretary of the TAR Party Committee, delivers a work report at the meeting in which he summarises the region's political and economic achievements. The report also expresses determination to maintain political and social stability, enhance the Party's leadership in Tibet and promote the region's economic development.

[BBC Mon 14/09/01]

**15 September**

At the first plenary session of the Sixth TAR Party Committee, Guo Jinlong is elected secretary of the Sixth TAR Party Committee, Ragdi, Legchog and Yang Chuantang are elected executive deputy secretaries, and Basang, Li Ligu, Buchung and Xu Mingyang are elected deputy secretaries. [BBC Mon 16/09/01]

**26 December**

On behalf of the TAR Party committee and government, Guo Jinlong, TAR Party secretary and Legchog, TAR government chairman, sign a responsibility pledge to build clean and honest government and party style. Principal party and government leaders of all prefectures and cities and major units directly under the TAR have also signed the pledge and 22 sets of relevant rules and regulations have been promulgated. The Xinhua report adds: *"This is another important measure taken in Tibet to promote clean and honest government and party style in accordance with the requirements of the 'three representations'."* [BBC Mon 28/12/01]

### 3 Religion


The most significant incidents of 2001 with regard to religious repression in Tibetan areas were the expulsion of nuns and students and the demolition of their homes at two pioneering Tibetan Buddhist institutes in Sichuan province, Serthar (Larung Gar) and Yachen. The crackdown at both of the religious institutes were part of a pattern of increasing official control over religious activity in Tibet in a dramatic shift away from the limited freedoms permitted in the early to mid 1980s.

The Lhasa authorities enforced the ban on Tibetans commemorating the Dalai Lama's birthday on 6 July once more in 2001. Activities to mark the birthday have been banned throughout the 1990s, indicating the authorities' pre-occupation with 'stability' and countering 'splittism' and their concerns over potential political disturbances at such occasions. A public notice published in June 2001 stated that Tibetans were not permitted to 'give prayers and blessings' for the Dalai Lama or 'eulogise his merits and virtue'.

Tibetan schoolchildren were targeted as part of the wide-ranging 'patriotic education' campaign, which is implemented in schools as well as monasteries and nunneries. Reports received by TIN stated that in some schools children have been given detention or forced to pay fines when they failed to observe a ban on wearing traditional Buddhist 'protection cords', and that children in many middle and primary schools are being told that Tibetan Buddhist practice is 'backward behaviour' and an obstacle to progress.



The escape of Ugyen Trinley Dorje, the 17-year old recognised by the Dalai Lama as the 17th Karmapa, into exile in India, continued to be a source of frustration and embarrassment for the Chinese authorities. There was a tightening of security at the Karmapa's traditional seat, Tsurphu monastery in the Tibet Autonomous Region with monks being encouraged to participate in 'patriotic education' sessions rather than studying Buddhism. Pawo Rinpoche, an eight-year old incarnate lama who was recognised by the 17th Karmapa, was moved from his monastery in Toelung Dechen, Lhasa municipality, to Lhasa, where he is reportedly being kept under close surveillance. He is prevented from wearing monastic robes and made to attend a normal primary school.



The religious repression seen at Serthar and Yachen in 2001 reflected the continued crackdown on religion throughout China. In 2001, the authorities continued their campaign against Falun Gong, linking it to the struggle against the 'Dalai clique'. A photographic exhibition was held in Pome (Ch: Bomi) county, Nyingtri/Kongpo (Ch: Lingzhi) prefecture, TAR in October to "expose the evil cult Falun Gong [and] the reactionary nature and treacherous motives of Li Hongzhi and the Dalai clique" (Xinhuanet in Chinese, 24 October 2001). ■

Above: Tsurphu monastery – seat of the Karmapa – TAR © Plumtyji/TIN

Left top: Homes at Yachen Buddhist Institute marked to be destroyed © International Campaign for Tibet

Left bottom: Serthar Institute following the arrival of work teams to carry out demolition © TIN

## Repression at Serthar and Yachen

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 19 AUGUST 2001 (EDITED)

### Expulsions of nuns and students threaten survival of important Tibetan Buddhist institute

Many hundreds of Tibetan nuns, some monks and Chinese Buddhist scholars have been forced to leave the monastic institute and nunnery of Serthar in Kardze (Ch: Ganzi) prefecture in Sichuan, one of the most important centres of Tibetan Buddhism remaining in Tibet, following the arrival of troops of armed police and teams of officials to enforce orders from Beijing. Photographs that have been brought out of China show the huts of nuns at Serthar being torn down in order to prevent them from returning.

The senior Buddhist teacher at Serthar, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, who was already in poor health, has been ill and weak since the expulsions began. While he has been confined to his residential quarters at the institute under close supervision for several months, his current whereabouts are not confirmed – some reports indicate that he may be receiving medical treatment at a clinic outside the valley. According to further reports, many nuns have left without signing a document that requires them to denounce the Dalai Lama, despite pressure from the authorities.

The Serthar Buddhist institute, which was founded by Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog in 1980 for the purpose of reviving Buddhist scholarship and meditation, housed the largest concentration of monks and nuns in Tibetan areas – an estimated 6,000-7,000 monks and nuns including nearly a thousand Chinese students, with an increase in numbers at times of religious festivals and special teachings. There have been previous attempts by the authorities to reduce the numbers of monks and nuns, but this was difficult to enforce due to the sprawling nature of the complex and the fluctuating numbers of scholars, monks and nuns there. In June this year high-level officials from Beijing, including officials from the United Front Work Unit and others from the regional authorities, arrived at the Institute to oversee a reduction of the population to 1,000 monks and 400 nuns and the demolition of residential quarters. Roads leading to the institute were blocked and the site was sealed off before demolition began. It is likely that most of the destruction of residential quarters has taken place on the lower slopes of the remote Larung valley where most of the nuns, who constitute approximately half of Serthar's population, live.

Chinese Buddhist students were targeted first for expulsion, with nearly a thousand Chinese Buddhists reportedly told to leave in the past two months. The second target of the authorities was the strong and cohesive community of Tibetan nuns at Serthar. Although some monks are known to have been expelled and to have returned to their home

areas, the majority of those expelled have been nuns. One report indicated that the majority of the nuns who were at Serthar may now have been forced to leave. Many of the nuns who have been expelled from Serthar in recent weeks and whose homes have been destroyed are likely to face severe hardship. *"Many of them have fled with nowhere to go,"* said one source, who visited Serthar last year and is still in contact with the institute. *"Some of them were so poor that at Serthar they used to do fasting retreats because they had so little food. Now they are likely to be suffering even more."* Some nuns have reportedly experienced mental breakdowns and depression since the expulsions began, and according to one reliable source, medical treatment was denied to some nuns from the institute following orders from local officials.

Officials at the institute reportedly presented monks and nuns who were being expelled with documents to sign containing three points; a denunciation of the Dalai Lama, a commitment not to return, and a commitment to honour the guidelines and policy set by the Chinese authorities. Many nuns reportedly left without signing the document.

A monk from the area who is now in exile told TIN that the authorities had set the deadline of October for the expulsions to take place, and had also stated that students from outside Sichuan province would not be allowed to stay at Serthar in future. The source said: *"The Work Team told monks and nuns that the decision would be implemented in three stages – information, persuasion to leave the institute and the enforcement of decisions by force of the law. They made threats to the effect that if people showed a hostile and uncooperative attitude, they would be arrested or have their [residences] burnt or dismantled. It is unclear how the authorities are going to shortlist the 1,400 student quota because there are far more students from Sichuan than these sanctioned places."* The same source said that many monks and nuns had threatened to commit suicide rather than leave the institute.

### Fears for respected Tibetan Buddhist teacher

During the visit of Chinese officials to Serthar earlier this year, Khenpo Jigme reportedly said that because he had not invited monks or nuns to come to Serthar, it would be inappropriate for him to ask them to leave. A Tibetan source told TIN that during the most recent visit of officials to the institute,



*"Officials kept on pressing Jigme Phuntsog by asking him to take the lead in persuading and encouraging his students to vacate the institute's premises before the deadline [of October]. This caused great mental and physical anguish to [Khenpo Jigme] who soon fell ill."* Khenpo Jigme has not been in good physical health for some years; he has cataracts and is partially blind, and is unable to walk without support.

The orders to enforce the expulsions appear to have originated from high levels of the Chinese Communist Party, with support from the provincial authorities in Sichuan. The full reasons for the authorities' concern over Serthar (known in Chinese as Wumin) are not known. Under the leadership of Khenpo Jigme, who is a charismatic figure revered by both Tibetans and Chinese Buddhists, the Serthar institute is known for its strict focus on the study of Buddhism and the practice of the Dharma, and Khenpo Jigme, by avoiding all political controversy, has reportedly managed to maintain a harmonious relationship with the provincial and local authorities. Even some Chinese officials are said to have acknowledged that Serthar is a 'patriotic' institution. In recent months, Khenpo Jigme is said to have appealed to the authorities to safeguard the people's religious belief in accordance with China's constitution, according to a reliable report.

A Western Buddhist scholar who has visited Serthar told TIN: *"Serthar just isn't a politicised place. It is a place for genuine students of the Dharma and as such attracts scholars from all over China and Tibet."* Another Western student of Buddhism who knows Khenpo Jigme told TIN: *"Khenpo Jigme is one of those rare people who derive strength from a lived moral, rather than political, authority. His mission is clearly to propagate the Dharma. I remember him describing with obvious joy and reverence his trip to Wutai Shan (mountain) in China in 1987 with both Tibetan and Chinese followers."*

## Chinese Buddhists at Serthar

Chinese Buddhist students were the first to be told to leave by the authorities following the arrival of officials in spring. A Chinese student who was studying at Serthar at the time told a Western journalist that instructions to leave were given in the middle of a lecture by officials, who told all the Chinese students that it was time for them to go home. The Chinese student said that they were told that the expulsions were necessary due to 'poor sanitary conditions'.

A Tibetan monk, who has studied at Serthar and who has recently arrived in exile, told TIN that the diverse mix of nationalities present at the institute may have been one of the

reasons for the concern of the authorities. *"There are students at Serthar who are from areas as diverse as Taiwan, Hong Kong, various Chinese provinces, Inner Mongolia and the Tibet Autonomous Region,"* said the source. *"The authorities think that this ethnic mix is a potential source of tension."* A senior Tibetan Buddhist Rinpoche living in the West told TIN: *"The Chinese authorities say they want to promote unity among different groups and to create ethnic harmony. But in reality they don't want Chinese people to learn the truth about Tibetan culture, about Tibetan beliefs and aspirations. Most of the monks studying at Serthar from China were well-educated and from urban rather than rural areas – these are just the sort of people that the authorities would not wish to be influenced by Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan views."*

Khenpo Jigme has always accorded a high priority to teaching Chinese as well as Tibetan students at Serthar, which was certified as a Buddhist academy by the 10th Panchen Lama in 1987, seven years after its foundation. In the same year, Khenpo Jigme gave teachings to Chinese, Tibetan and Mongolian students at Wutai mountain, a Buddhist pilgrimage site in Shaanxi, China, and in 1988, Khenpo Jigme spent two months in Beijing at the Buddhist Higher Academy at the Panchen Lama's invitation. David Germano, an American academic from the University of Virginia who made several visits to Serthar between 1990 and 1992, writes in an essay: *"Not only are there Chinese monks and nuns resident in [Khenpo Jigme's] Golog centre and Chinese lay Buddhists periodically making the long pilgrimage there, I have heard reports of Khenpo literally being mobbed by Chinese Buddhists or simply the curious seeking his blessings or teachings during visits to Chengdu."*


## Nuns expelled and homes destroyed

Nuns at Serthar, who study at a nunnery headed by Khenpo Jigme's niece, 36-year old Jetsun Muntso, are involved in religious studies and meditation at a high level and are allowed to adopt the title of *khenpo*, which is similar to the *geshe* degree in the Gelugpa school of Buddhism and a doctorate in Western universities. Khenpo Jigme reportedly feels that the teaching of nuns at Serthar is particularly important because of the relative lack of religious institutions for women in the region. In 1991, the assembly hall at the institute was constructed so that nuns and monks could receive Khenpo Jigme's teachings simultaneously.


Monks and nuns at Serthar have generally provided for themselves, although limited living expenses were available for some poorer students, and Khenpo Jigme is known to have organised some funding for poor Chinese students who travel a long distance to reach the institute.



Monks searching the rubble, following demolition at the Serthar institute



A community 'in ruins' – the Serthar institute, following the demolition of homes belonging to those residents without official permits



Traditional timber houses that survived demolition at the Serthar institute

© TIN

## A revival of devastated Buddhist practices

Sixty-eight year old Khenpo Jigme was recognised in his teens as the reincarnation of Lerab Lingpa (1856–1926) – an important Nyingma teacher of the 13th Dalai Lama. Although he was singled out as a 'class enemy' during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, he survived by living in remote and isolated areas of Kham – the traditional Tibetan area incorporated into the Chinese province of Sichuan. In 1980, during the liberalisation period following the Cultural Revolution, Khenpo Jigme established a Buddhist centre and nunnery, Larung Gar, in the remote valley of Larung ('Gar' in Tibetan refers to a religious settlement or encampment, but not a formal monastery), which is approximately 15km south of the town of Serthar (Chinese: Seda). The settlement began in an informal and traditional fashion with approximately 100 followers taking up residence near Khenpo Jigme's home. The community grew as word of mouth attracted other religious practitioners, who were free to come and go without any formal membership process as long as they adhered to monastic behaviour. David Germano writes<sup>2</sup> that only people known to have broken major religious vows, such as those who physically abused their teachers during the Cultural Revolution, were refused permission to study and live at Serthar.

The community expanded rapidly and in the late 1980s special local government funding was granted for electricity. Khenpo Jigme developed a close relationship with the district authorities and occasionally performed the traditional lama's role of mediator in some political disputes.

Monks, nuns and scholars generally came to Larung Gar (Serthar) for indefinite periods, without changing their monastic affiliations, and frequently travelled back to their monasteries and nunneries to give teachings. Khenpo Jigme is a Nyingma lama but his teachings are known for their ecumenical approach – he gave teachings and initiation from all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism (Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya and Gelugpa). There is also a rigorous curriculum of traditional academic study for both nuns and monks designed to culminate in the attainment of a 'khenpo' degree. According to Germano, in the first decade of the institute roughly one hundred khenpos graduated from his academies, most of them young men in their twenties or thirties; some returned to their own monasteries to teach, others stayed at the centre to become advanced teachers in their own right or to engage in further studies, while some were sent by Khenpo Jigme to monasteries in particularly urgent need of teaching assistance.

*"The development of rigorous scholastic training programmes at Larung, as well as the other teaching academies in eastern Tibet that he founded during the 1980s, has been a top priority for Khenpo Jigphun," writes Germano. "Khenpo's revival of the devastated Buddhist systems of educational training [...] has been nothing short of remarkable, and his ecumenical emphasis on monastic-centred ethics separated from political activism has offered a powerful Tibetan religious paradigm for survival in the People's Republic of China that contrasts sharply with the political activism of monks and nuns in central Tibet."*

The expulsions currently taking place at Serthar are a threat to the survival of the institute as one of Tibet's leading centres for the study and practice of Buddhism. ■

<sup>2</sup> In 'Re-memorising the Dismembered Body of Tibet', cited above

## TESTIMONY

## Serthar: 'the best institute to go to for nuns'

The following account, given by a nun, from Tsigorthang (Ch: Xinghai) county in Tsoelho (Ch: Hainan) TAP, Qinghai, outlines the limited options for nuns in obtaining a religious education. It is common in Tibet for nuns who do not get admitted to a nunnery to go and study near a monastery, receiving teachings from the resident lama and joining in the religious festivals. This nun had been studying according to this sort of arrangement, but she and other nuns were told that they were only allowed to attend the institute for four months in one year. Her testimony gives an insight into some of the reasons that so many nuns were at Serthar, and the difficulties that will face them now that so many have been forced to leave.

*I became a nun when I was 18 years old. Now I am 45 years old, so that's 27 years. I stayed near my monastery for six to seven years. [There are] 30 – 40 nuns who live near this monastery. We recite scriptures and meditate, there is no teacher. We do self-study. We go to the temple in the monastery when there is a prayer ceremony and for special days. During other times we recite scriptures. We have the same Lama [as the monks]. Nomads give us butter and tsampa and we do pujas sometimes, then families give us some money. But we don't have much money.*

*I wanted to go to Khenpo Jigphun's monastery [Serthar], but then I heard that there were big problems there, and nuns were not allowed to stay there, so I went to Lhasa. Nuns are only allowed to stay [near my monastery] for 4 months in one year, then we have to leave the monastery. This is a new rule that was introduced last year [2000]. [Officials from Tsigorthang] said nuns are allowed to stay at the monastery for the first month, second month, third month and fourth month, then they have to return to their homes. They came to the monastery and said nuns are allowed to stay for four months, then they are not allowed to stay there. They said nuns are only allowed to stay in one area. Nuns are not allowed to stay outside this area. [The nuns] are all from Tsoelho prefecture. Some are from Tsigorthang county, some are from Mangra [Ch: Guinan]. Most are young, 20-30. There is [only] one nun older than me. She is 50 years old.*

*There are few nunneries in Tibet. Khenpo Jigphun's monastery was the best institute to go for nuns, many nuns stayed there. ■*

## INTERVIEW

## Eyewitness accounts of demolitions and expulsions at Serthar

The following two interviews were carried out with a nun and a monk from Serthar who escaped to India. They are unique testimonies of the demolitions at Larung Gar, and their impact on the personal lives of monks and nuns who were forced to leave. The first interview is with a nun in her twenties who had spent many years at Serthar and was told to leave in 2001 after work teams came to Larung Gar. She and more than 20 other nuns went to live in the hills behind Larung Gar for a few weeks after they were told to leave. She later returned to Serthar and witnessed the destruction of nuns' homes before she left and escaped into exile.

Q: Did you build your house when you arrived there?

A: Yes. Before, all monks and nuns had to build their own houses when they arrived at the monastery. But now many of the houses have been destroyed by the Chinese.

Q: Whose houses were they?

A: Nuns' houses.

Q: How many nuns are allowed to stay there?

A: 400 nuns. They are all from Serthar county. If you are not from Serthar county then you are not allowed to stay there. The Chinese said there were too many nuns living at Larung Gar and that the nuns whose native place was not Serthar had to leave.

Q: Does this same rule apply to the 1000 monks who are allowed to stay?

A: No, the 1000 monks are from all different places, not only from Serthar county. I don't know the reason why.

Q: What happened when the Chinese authorities first arrived in Larung Gar?

A: They asked us where we were from. I had to stay with all the other nuns from my county. There was a meeting and officials from my county said we must return to our homes, and that if our families were nomads we had to help them with their work, if our families were farmers we had to help them with their farm work. The Chinese said I was not allowed to stay there and so I left. I went with some other nuns into the hills behind Larung Gar and stayed there for 24 days. After that several of us returned to the monastery and saw that many of the houses had been destroyed. The Chinese were still there and they said we weren't allowed to stay, and so I went to Lhasa with several other nuns.

Q: What did they say you should do if you had a home nunnery?

A: *Even though there are two nunneries in my native place, I was not allowed to join them because I am new and the nunneries have already been told how many nuns can stay in their nunneries there.*

Q: Could other nuns return to nunneries where they had previously been staying, for instance, if they had just come to Serthar for a few years?

A: *If they were allowed to stay at their home nunneries then they could return to them. But there are few nuns at Larung Gar who have home nunneries [to return to]. Most of the nuns stay at Larung Gar because they cannot stay in other nunneries.<sup>3</sup>*

Q: From which office were the officials who came from your county?

A: *They were from my county Religious Affairs Bureau. There were several of them.*

Q: Was the meeting attended by the monks from your county as well?

A: *No, only the nuns, they spoke to the monks separately. Many nuns became ill [after the work teams came to Larung Gar]. They had bad stomachs, headaches, nose-bleeds. In Serthar county, they couldn't stay at the hospital. They were given medicine and injections [while] sitting on the grass outside the hospital.*

Q: Why couldn't they stay at the hospital?

A: *Because they had to pay RMB600 [\$72; £50] to stay there, and nuns don't have much money.*

Q: How many days could they stay in the hospital if they paid RMB600?

A: *It wasn't a question of the number of days. If the nun wanted to stay in the hospital she had to pay RMB600 immediately. But most nuns can't afford this. The Chinese [officials] said they were not sick, and that their condition resulted from not eating. Actually it was because they felt so sad.*

Q: Did you go to this hospital?

A: *Yes. One nun from my same home place was ill. I went with her. She stayed in the hospital for three days and we had to pay RMB600.*

Q: When you left Serthar to go to Lhasa how many nuns were still there?

A: *Most of the nuns had left. They were not allowed to stay there.*

Q: Where had they gone?

A: *Many nuns had gone into the hills around Serthar. They didn't have anywhere else to go and didn't want to return to doing farm work with their family. For young nuns it is difficult, they don't have a nunnery and they don't know what to do. Many are in Lhasa and some have returned to their homes.*

Q: And what happened then?

A: *I left Lhasa with some other nuns from Serthar and we came to India via Nepal. I was separated from my friends and later heard they had been sent back across the border to Tibet.*

The second interview is with a monk in his twenties who has spent many years at Serthar. He was selected as one of 1000 monks who were allowed to stay at Serthar, but he said that he did not want to stay because of the problems there and returned his permit so another monk could stay in his place. He reports that the 1000 monks who were allowed to stay were chosen on the basis of the quality of their studies.

Q: How many years did you spend at your home monastery?

A: *I didn't spend so much time there. When I was young I spent a few years there and sometimes I stayed there in the summer or for festivals, but most of the time I stayed at Serthar. I stayed there for about 10 years.*

Q: Did you build your house when you arrived there?

A: *Yes, I built this with RMB 5000 [\$604; £417] given by my family.*

Q: What happened at Serthar before you left?

A: *The Chinese came to the monastery and told us that there were new rules and that only 1000 monks and 400 nuns were allowed to stay there. I was allowed to stay but I didn't want to stay there. After I saw what the Chinese [authorities] were doing there, I didn't feel happy staying. I also felt I should return to my home monastery. So I returned my permit so another monk could stay in my place.*

<sup>3</sup> TIN has received many reliable reports of nuns being forced to leave Serthar with nowhere to go, including eyewitness reports of Serthar nuns begging for money and food in places including Xining, Chengdu and other areas. Once they have taken vows most of these nuns do not wish to return to lay life, and often they are not permitted to join nunneries in their home areas.



Q: How were the 1000 monks who could stay at Serthar chosen?

A: *The monks who are number one in their studies, number one in their monk's vows and number one in their discipline. The monks whose studies are the best were given permits and are allowed to stay at Serthar, the others had to leave. The 1000 monks were from Qinghai, Sichuan, Lhasa, from all different places. The nuns who were allowed to stay must be from Serthar county, but the monks are from all different places.*

Q: Who made this rule on how the monks were chosen?

A: *The Chinese [officials who implemented the policies at Serthar]. The Kardze prefecture [Chinese: Ganzhi] and Serthar county Religious Affairs Bureau issued permits for monks.*

Q: What is written on this permit?

A: *The monk's name and details, their photo and a stamp from the Religious Affairs Bureau. Monks did not have to sign or thumb-print their permits, and they do not state that the monks are against His Holiness or which prayers and studies they can do. This permit means that monks are allowed to stay at Serthar.*

Q: Before you left Serthar did you see any monks' houses that had been destroyed?

A: *A few Chinese monks' houses were destroyed, but not many. Most of the houses destroyed were nuns' houses. There were many nuns staying there because there are few other nunneries [in the area]. Nuns heard that if they returned to their native places they would have to sign a letter against His Holiness, so many of them went to the hills near to Serthar.*

Q: How many Chinese officials first arrived at Serthar?

A: *First the United Front Work department and Religious Affairs Bureau [officials] arrived from Chengdu [the provincial capital]. They assessed the situation. Then different officials arrived from different counties. We were separated into groups according to the counties we were from. Then the United Front and Religious Affairs Bureau from our county took details of all the monks and told us the new rules. They said only 1000 monks were allowed to stay and that the other monks should leave immediately. There were a few hundred monks from my county at Serthar. A few officials came from my county and many others from prefectures.*

Q: Are the monks who are not allowed to stay at Serthar allowed to return to their home monasteries?

A: *Yes.*

Q: Did the monks who are not allowed to stay have to sign documents about this?

A: *No, they didn't have to write a letter but they had to say to the work team, "I understand 1000 monks are allowed to stay at Serthar and I will return immediately to my native place."*

Q: Where did you go after you left Serthar?

A: *I returned to my home area, then I had to return to Serthar to collect my things, I have books and scriptures there, and I cleaned my house for the new monk.*

Q: When you went back this time how many monks and nuns were there?

A: *Most of them had left. It felt very empty there.*

Q: Were teachings and studies continuing?

A: *Yes, except for Khenpo Jigphun's teachings, all teachings were being given.*

Q: Were there any Chinese monks still there?

A: *A few Chinese monks and students were there, but they are not allowed to stay there, all Chinese monks and nuns were told to leave.<sup>4</sup>*

Q: Have there been any changes to studies made by the Chinese authorities?

A: *No. Monks can study Chinese, English and all cultural studies.*

Q: Do monks have to study Chinese?

A: *No, they don't have to study Chinese, but if they want to they can.*

Q: Where did you go after that?

A: *Then I left Tibet. I travelled to the border areas and managed to get hold of a permit. A small group of us paid a guide to take us to Nepal. But he turned us in to the police when we arrived in Nepal. We were taken to a police station in Nepal and asked if we had any money. One woman in the group had RMB 4000 and so each of us had to pay 1000 RMB to the police, they said if we didn't pay they would return us to the Chinese police. [After we paid the money] the next day a vehicle came and took us to Kathmandu. ■*

<sup>4</sup> Information previously received by TIN indicates that all Chinese monks and students, including overseas Chinese, had been required to leave but it is possible that a few are still there, as indicated by this account. It is unlikely that any overseas Chinese – from Taiwan, for instance – still remain there.

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 8 NOVEMBER 2001

## Serthar teacher now in Chengdu; new information on expulsions of nuns at Buddhist institute

Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, the senior teacher at one of the most important centres of Tibetan Buddhism remaining in Tibet, the Serthar Buddhist institute, has been moved to Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan. Until recently he was being treated for ill-health at the military hospital in Barkham (Ch: Ma'erkang) in Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. New evidence has reached TIN of the demolition of nuns' homes and the impact of the expulsion of nuns and monks at the Serthar institute, which is located in the valley of Larung Gar in Kardze (Ch: Ganzhi) prefecture in Sichuan. Photographs taken in early October indicate the extent of demolition of nuns' homes at the institute. Reports received by TIN describe the suicide of at least one nun and the expulsion of hundreds of nuns from the institute since official work teams moved into Serthar in June. There is concern among Tibetans in smaller and more remote monastic encampments that the crackdown might extend to other religious communities in the region.

The authorities have primarily targeted nuns' homes at the Serthar institute for demolition, although the homes of some Chinese Buddhist students from China and overseas who were living at Serthar were also destroyed in June and July. Reports received by TIN indicate that well over a thousand dwellings have been destroyed since the work teams moved in. The photographs on TIN's website show that many buildings are still standing at the monastic complex – housing those who are currently allowed to stay at Serthar, including monks, nuns from the local area, some elderly nuns, and some laypeople who have taken Buddhist vows.

Chinese labourers brought in by officials to demolish homes at the Serthar institute were paid at least 130 yuan (US\$16) for the destruction of each home, according to TIN sources. A Tibetan who has recently left Serthar told TIN that several *khenpos* (religious teachers<sup>5</sup>) at the institute were told by officials that they should assist the demolition work, but that they were unwilling to do so because each home had an altar, and also because they were unwilling to destroy monks' and nuns' houses. According to one report, officials from two local areas – Ngaba county (Ch: Aba) in Ngaba prefecture in Sichuan province and Chigdril (Ch: Jiuzhi) in Golog (Ch: Guoluo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai – were also told by the authorities that they had to destroy some nuns' homes at Serthar.

A Westerner who has recently returned from Tibet told TIN: "There are many nuns from Serthar begging for food and money in Xining, Chengdu and other areas. The main problem is that if they go home they cannot enter a nunnery

and they have taken vows not to go back to lay life." The same source said he had been told by nuns that physical force was used by officials and police to expel some nuns who objected to the demands of the work team at Larung Gar. "A few of them were dragged away from their dwellings and beaten," said TIN's source. Several reports received by TIN state that many nuns are receiving medical treatment for illness and psychological distress following the trauma of the demolition of their homes and their expulsion from Serthar.

Another Tibetan who has now arrived in exile from Serthar told TIN: "During the meetings held at Larung Gar to announce the expulsions, some nuns fainted with shock. They would be brought round by officials throwing water at them. Many of the nuns recovered after a period in hospital, but many have not recovered." The same source said that a 21-year old nun called Wangmo from Kardze prefecture committed suicide when she was told to leave Larung Gar. TIN's source said: "She was told to leave, but didn't have anywhere to go, because both her parents live at Larung Gar – they are elderly, and depend on her. She told the authorities about her problems, but they didn't accept it, so she was desperately sad. Also, some of her friends had been expelled already from the institute and they had asked her to look after their houses – but eight or nine of these houses were destroyed. She didn't see any way out but to commit suicide. She died by hanging herself with her belt from a tree in a forest near the nunnery, in early July. We saw her body, and monks went to carry out prayers at the place where she died."

There is concern among Tibetan monks and nuns from the Serthar institute for the welfare of the highly respected spiritual teacher Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, who founded the monastic institute in 1980 for the purpose of reviving Buddhist scholarship and meditation. Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog was in poor health before the work teams arrived in spring and his condition has reportedly deteriorated since then. A Tibetan from Serthar who is now in exile suggested that the deterioration in his health was at least partially due to 'anger and anxiety' following the arrival of the work teams to carry out demolition of homes and the expulsion of monks and nuns. Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog had to stop his regular teachings at the institute after the work team arrived at Larung Gar this year. He was taken to a clinic in Barkham run by the military for medical treatment, and he has now been moved to the provincial capital of Chengdu. It is not known whether he is receiving medical treatment in hospital in Chengdu, where medical facilities are more sophisticated than in Barkham.

<sup>5</sup> The title of *khenpo* in the Nyingma tradition indicates a high level of Buddhist scholarship, roughly analogous to the 'geshe' degree in the Gelugpa school of Buddhism

## Implementing the expulsions

Before the work teams arrived to carry out demolition at the institute, the population at the Serthar institute is said to have been around 7,000 – the largest concentration of monks and nuns in Tibetan areas currently administered by China. There were fears as early as 1991 that Serthar would eventually be affected by restrictions that were being introduced in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries throughout Tibetan areas as part of the state's attempt to re-assert its authority over the quickly expanding monasteries. The status of Serthar as an 'academy', rather than a formal monastery, could be a reason why, while the first wave of 'patriotic education' hit Sichuan's Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from 1997 onwards, religious life at Serthar appeared to have carried on with minimal interference from the authorities until spring 1999, when an official work team arrived at the institute. A monk who was studying at Serthar at the time and who is now in exile told TIN: *"The local officials told us that the institute is guilty of following the wrong path and has too many students. They went on to emphasise the need for a 'patriotic education' programme and the necessity of exercising strict control over the number of students."* The movements of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog were increasingly restricted following the work team's visit and on several occasions he was not permitted to travel outside the area to give teachings. According to several reports, the authorities stated in 1999 that they intended to reduce the number of monks to 1000 and the number of nuns to 400, although officials did not begin to enforce mass expulsions until this summer. According to one reliable report, the authorities have an even more ambitious plan to reduce the entire community of monks and nuns still further over a period of time.



A nun amid the ruins at the Serthar institute

© TIN



The extent of the devastation at the Serthar institute after Summer 2001

© TIN

A recent visitor to the area who met nuns expelled from the institute said: *"The Chinese authorities are clearly nervous about the gathering of dedicated people in increasing numbers to devote their lives to Buddhist study and practice. The fact that a significant number of Han Chinese [Buddhist students] were among them and the repressive climate generated by the crushing of the Falun Gong movement may have added to the government's determination to deal with the situation at Serthar."*

The most recent orders to carry out the expulsions and demolitions at the Buddhist institute came from the highest levels of the Party in Beijing, according to reports received by TIN. A senior Party official with links to Tibet was reportedly particularly influential in this year's crackdown. Yin Fatang, who was Party Secretary in Tibet from 1980 to 1985 and who is known to be a hardliner in terms of cultural and religious policy, reportedly advised Party chiefs in Beijing of the 'risks' in terms of possible 'splittist activity' in allowing the number of monks and nuns at the institute to remain unchecked. After visiting the region, he passed on his concerns about the threat of separatist activity at Serthar directly to President Jiang Zemin. The United Front Work Department investigated the situation and reportedly concluded that there was little or no evidence of 'splittist' activity at the Serthar institute. Reports on the institute received by TIN indicate that Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog had maintained a cordial relationship with the local authorities, and Serthar was known for its strict focus on the study of Buddhism. However, due to the continued concern of several Party officials the decision was made to implement the expulsions.

Teams of workers supervised by officials were instructed to carry out the demolition of residences in order to ensure that monks and nuns would not return to the site, and reports indicate that many nuns were required to sign agreements stating that they would not return. The authorities also stated that the institute would be continuously monitored and that particular attention would be paid to any contact with people in India, reflecting a particular sensitivity to connections with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. ■

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

## Demolition at the Yachen Buddhist Institute, Payul county, Kardze

By the end of the year, the authorities were targeting a second Buddhist encampment in the same area of Kham – the Yachen Buddhist Institute in Payul (Ch: Baiyu) county, Kardze TAP. Several months after the destruction of hundreds of nuns' homes at the Serthar monastic institute in Kardze (Ch: Ganzhi) prefecture in Sichuan, official work teams moved in to the major monastic encampment of Yachen in Payul county to carry out demolition and the expulsion of nuns and monks. The International Campaign for Tibet reported that by 10 October 2001, more than 800 homes of monks and nuns had been torn down at Yachen Gar monastery, and monks and nuns who originated from outside Payul county area had been instructed to leave (ICT, 14 November 2001). ICT estimated that of the 2,500 - 3,000 students at Yachen Gar, only 1,500 remained at the end of last year.

A Tibetan monk who spent many years at Yachen Gar before escaping into exile last year told TIN: "*Many nuns [who were forced to leave] are now in retreat in the mountains nearby. Many of them didn't have a nunnery to go back to, so they have nowhere to go. Also they wanted to stay near their religious teacher, Achoe Khenpo [the head of Yachen Gar]. Only monks and nuns from Payul county were allowed to stay.*"

Like Serthar, Yachen Gar attracted hundreds of students from China, Taiwan and Singapore due to its high standards of Buddhist scholarship and its focus on meditation and spiritual discipline. When the official work teams arrived at Serthar in spring 2001, the Chinese Buddhist students present at the institute were the first group to be expelled, followed by Tibetan nuns and monks, divided into groups according to their original area of residence. According to ICT, there were approximately 150 Chinese, Taiwanese and Singaporean Buddhist students at Yachen before work teams arrived in 2001 and they were all ordered to leave the encampment at the beginning of September 2001.

ICT also reported that nuns and monks who were required to leave were told to destroy their own homes, and that if they did not do so, an official work team would carry out the demolition. One nun who had studied at Yachen for five years told ICT: "*They said we had to destroy our homes ourselves and if we didn't, then the police would come and take our belongings. So most of the nuns did wreck their homes by pushing the mud walls in. We were all crying and sobbing but what else are we supposed to do.*"

The Chinese state has used various legal mechanisms to limit the size of monasteries and nunneries in Tibetan areas and to control their activities. In the case of both Serthar and Yachen Buddhist institutes, the focus appears to have

been upon the 'illegality' of construction beyond 'permitted' limits in carrying out the demolition of monks' and nuns' homes. The authorities have also enforced limits on the population of both institutes by expelling nuns and monks who are not from the local area. ■

## KEY DOCUMENTS

## Translation of wall poster (in Tibetan and Chinese) signed by the Payul County's Peoples Government:

## PUBLIC NOTICE

*For the purpose of steady improvement and maintenance of Tromthar Yachen Monastery in Payul County, well-coordinated care, protection, and good work is needed. Following the Payul County Peoples Government's research and scrutiny of Yachen Monastery's management and maintenance, the following actions are being taken:*

*1) During the thorough research and scrutiny for the care and protection of the monastery, the [Payul County] work team's scheme shows those monks and nuns living quarters that are outside the boundary [permissible] must be demolished by the 15th September 2001. If these homes are not destroyed [by their occupants] by the aforementioned date, Payul County People's Government will forcefully demolish the living quarters, and in accordance with the current legal framework, legal action will be taken against those individuals who have not abided by this order.*

*2) Monks and nuns from other counties [other than Payul county], as well as Chinese monks and nuns, must leave and return to their native places and be disconnected from Yachen Monastery. This must take place by the 15th September 2001. Failure to leave the monastery and return to their place of origin will result in strict legal action taken against such individuals by the Pelyul County People's Government in accordance with the Sichuan Province Religious Management Committee and the legal system of Household Registration.*

*This public notice has been issued to the above stated effect.*

Payul County People's Government  
1st September 2001



## Restrictions on religious practice

TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS IN BRIEF, 10 AUGUST 2001

### Lhasa authorities reinforce Dalai Lama birthday celebration ban

The Lhasa authorities issued a public notice in June reinforcing the ban on celebrations of the Dalai Lama's birthday, stating that Tibetans were not permitted to 'give prayers and blessings' for the Dalai Lama or to 'eulogise his merits and virtue'. Activities to mark the Dalai Lama's birthday on 6 July, known as *Trunglha Yarsol* in Tibetan, have been officially banned throughout the 1990s. The notice, published and distributed in Lhasa, highlighted the authorities' aim to prevent Tibetans from gathering to perform the traditional *lha sol* ritual – throwing tsampa (roasted barley flour) in the air and burning incense in celebration of the birthday. It has been translated by TIN and appears below.

In the public notice the authorities focus on the 'consolidation of the achievements' made in banning the 'illegal activities of *Trunglha Yarsol*' – a reference to the security measures that have been implemented over the past two years to crack down on the celebrations. Restrictions on *Trunglha Yarsol* were tightened in 1999 when an incense-burning stove normally used for the birthday celebrations in the eastern suburbs of Lhasa was reportedly destroyed by the authorities and access to the site was blocked. A rally was held following the birthday to commend officials on their handling of *Trunglha Yarsol* rituals (Tibet TV 2 August 1999). Measures to prevent the celebrations were even more stringently enforced in 2000. Tibetan government workers and cadres in Lhasa were reportedly discouraged from burning incense

even in their own homes and security personnel were stationed around incense-burners in the Tibetan area around the Barkor. A circular was issued on 26 June 2000 stating: *"The government will take necessary action towards this illegal occasion and therefore it is expected that people will not participate"*.

The stringent enforcement of the ban in recent years indicates the authorities' preoccupation with 'stability' and countering 'splittism' in Tibet and their concerns over potential political disturbances at such occasions. The circular issued in 2000 stated that the 'Dalai clique' had been *"instigating various disturbances in parts of Tibet, relying on pretexts such as the celebration of Trunglha Yarsol to try to split the motherland"*.

The ban is also an important element of the political campaign to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet. This has included vitriolic attacks in the press, which challenge the Dalai Lama's religious authority as well as his political status and views, widespread ideological campaigns and a ban since 1996 on publication and commercial distribution of his picture. The authorities state that the Dalai Lama and Western 'hostile forces' represent one of the main obstacles to 'progress' in the region; according to Hong Kong news agency Zhongguo Tongxun She, Legchog, Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, said yesterday (9 August): *"The Dalai clique is the greatest obstacle to Tibet's economic development and social progress"*. ■



A banner across a Lhasa street reading "Dalai's crime of splitting the Motherland must be exposed and opposed vehemently, continue the struggle against 'splittism' relentlessly". Inset: photographs of the Dalai Lama in a cave in Tibet, May 2001

## KEY DOCUMENTS

## Public Notice of Lhasa Government regarding the illegal activities of Trunghla Yarsol

The public notice, dated 25 June 2001, originally appeared in both Chinese and Tibetan languages. The following translation is from the Chinese.

Public Notice of Lhasa Municipal People's Government regarding consolidation of the achievements of banning the illegal activities of 'Trunghla Yarsol' in accordance with the law and of safeguarding social stability

*In accordance with the written instructions of the Centre and the arrangements of the TAR Party Committee, Lhasa municipal people's government has already banned, in accordance with the law, the illegal activities of 'Trunghla Yarsol'. In order to continue to consolidate the achievements gained by banning the illegal activities of 'Trunghla Yarsol' according to law, to go one step further in safeguarding social stability, and to ensure the smooth implementation of reform and opening up and modernisation construction, we hereby announce the following relevant items and regulations:*

*1. The people's government and politico-legal, public security and other such functional departments at every level must, in accordance with the law, exercise their administrative powers, protect normal production, life, work, study, transportation [Ch: jiaotong] and public order and severely crack down on all illegal criminal activities that disrupt social stability, disturb public order or disrupt traffic order. The multitudes of cadres, workers and masses of the whole municipality must conscientiously respect and vigorously support the work of the government and functional departments.*

*2. The people's government fully guarantees normal religious activities that are permitted by law and protects the freedom of religious belief of the broad masses of religious believers. [However] it is strictly forbidden for any person or mass organisation, in any form and in any place, to engage in or covertly engage in illegal activities such as congregating, burning incense and throwing tsampa to give prayers and blessings and eulogise his [the Dalai Lama's] merits and virtue in order to celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday.<sup>1</sup>*

*3. Those who breach the "Public Notice of Lhasa Municipal People's Government regarding banning the illegal activities of Trunghla Yarsol in accordance with the law", published on 26 June 2000, and [those who breach] the stipulations made in this Public Notice will be strictly punished by the politico-legal committees and public security departments in accordance with laws and regulations including 'Regulations on public security administration and punishments of the People's Republic of China' and 'Regulations on administration of roads and transportation of the People's Republic of China'. Cases where circumstances are serious and "The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China" is violated will be investigated and responsibility for the crime affixed in accordance with the law.*

*4. To safeguard social stability and to ensure normal public order and traffic order is in the basic interests of the broad masses. The multitudes of cadres, workers, and masses of the whole municipality must conscientiously observe every stipulation of this 'Public Notice' and act to safeguard the dignity of the law, the interests of the people, the unity of the nationalities and the unity of the motherland.*

*Notice is hereby given.*

*Lhasa Municipal People's Government*

*25 June 2001*

Note:

<sup>1</sup> Yan jin ren he ren, ren he qun ti yi ren he xing shi zai ren he di fang cong shi huo bian xiang cong shi wei da lai qing he sheng ri, qi dao zhu fu, ge gong song de de ju ji, shao xiang, sa zan ba deng fei fa huo dong. An alternative translation of this sentence would indicate that the ban on prayers and blessings for the Dalai Lama and on eulogising his merits and virtue is not confined to the specific practice of Trunghla Yarsol activities. However, in this context, the narrower interpretation given here is considered more likely.

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 20 FEBRUARY 2001

## Anti-religion campaign targets Tibetan schoolchildren

Children in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, are being discouraged from expressing religious faith and practising devotional activities as part of a campaign by the authorities in middle schools and some primary schools. According to reports received by TIN, children aged between seven and 13 in schools targeted by the campaign are being told that Tibetan Buddhist practice is 'backward behaviour' and an obstacle to progress. In some schools children have been given detention or forced to pay fines when they failed to observe a ban on wearing traditional Buddhist 'protection cords' (srung mdud or srung skud).

A Tibetan from Lhasa told TIN: *"The [Tibetan] pupils' inclination towards religious belief and their habits of spiritual faith [in the Buddha Dharma] inculcated by their parents, such as going to temples and shrines for religious offerings and prayers, participating in incense-burning rituals, the regular recitation of the morning and evening prayers, and wearing the protection cords of their principal gurus [religious teachers] and other outward manifestations of Tibetan religious faith and practice, have been attacked and banned. Instead, the children are being encouraged to cultivate love for the Chinese government's brand of Communism and socialism, and to develop wholehearted devotion and loyalty to the Motherland."*

In one school, the names of children found wearing a protection cord or in possession of protection sachets containing protective mantras (srung snags), holy verses and holy objects were given to class teachers by the school authorities. Teachers were then told to collect small fines from the children involved. TIN's sources state that in some schools protection cords collected from the children by the school authorities or teachers were cut to pieces or burned in front of the class.

A further report received by TIN indicates that schoolchildren who wear a protection cord – even if their academic record and character have been regarded as excellent – have been threatened with expulsion or penalties such as being 'named and shamed' in front of the whole school. Children in some schools have been warned that anyone found wearing a protection cord will be punished by deduction of marks from examination results.

The Patriotic Education campaign, with an emphasis on undermining Tibetans' loyalty to the Dalai Lama and promoting atheism, has been a central policy of the authorities in Lhasa since 1996. An editorial in Tibet Daily on 4 July 2000 stated that young children should be educated in atheism *"in order to help rid them of the bad influence of religion"*.

## TESTIMONY

## Ban on blessing cords

The following testimony is taken from an interview with a 17-year-old boy from Shigatse who later moved to Burang in Ngari and attended school there. He talks about the rules for students regarding religious activities and mentions the restrictions placed on his own parents who work for the government.

*I went to China's government middle school, in Shigatse city. There are more than 800 students, it is a big school. In each class there are five Chinese students. There are nine classes. Most of the students are Tibetan. There are many teachers, around 100. Thirty teachers are Chinese and the rest are Tibetan. The Chinese teachers teach Chinese language, Maths, English, all different subjects. Tibetan language is the only subject that is taught in Tibetan. Three years ago all subjects were in Tibetan, but then they changed, and now all textbooks and everything is in Chinese. This is the same in the [government] school in Burang, even in the Primary school.*

*During meetings in my school in Shigatse, all the students would gather in the courtyard and the headmaster would speak to us about new information or rules. During the last meeting before I left the school, he said we were not allowed to have pictures of HH, we were not allowed to go to monasteries or make offerings and we were not allowed to wear blessed strings. He said this for the first time in 1999, but also last year. At the school in Burang there were meetings every 2-3 months. Burang's county leader came to these meetings and spoke to the students. He talked about the same things as the headmaster in Shigatse, that we were not allowed to keep HH photos or wear blessed strings and go to the monasteries.*

*Most of the parents of the students at my school in Shigatse work for the government. My father works as an accountant. The government says my parents are not allowed to visit monasteries because they are government staff and they are not allowed to have a picture of HH. My parents don't know that I left Tibet. The Chinese said that if children of government workers go to school in India, then they have to pay a fine of RMB5000.*



'Children's Day' opera in the Norbulingka, Lhasa, June 2001

© TIN

## Holiday school initiated to stop student participation in religious festivals

A 15-year old girl from Gonjo told TIN about the religious restrictions imposed on the staff and students at a private school that she attended in Lhasa. Here, she talks about her teacher's concerns over his students making a circumambulation on the Dalai Lama's birthday and the threat that this could pose to the survival of the school. As a result the teacher now ensures that students will not take part in any religious activities that are banned by holding classes on days of such festivals, even if they fall on a Sunday.

*First I went to a government school [in Lhasa], but it was expensive and I didn't enjoy this school. I had never learnt Chinese before and I found it difficult. The main subjects were all taught in Chinese and the other students had been studying Chinese since they were young. I went to see one Rinpoche for a Mo [fortune telling] and he said that I would die soon if I stayed at this government school, so I decided to change schools. I heard about a [private] school where you could study English so I went there. There are 30-40 students, all of them are Tibetan. Most of the students are from poor families who can't afford to go to government schools [or] are from areas outside Lhasa and they can't join government schools because they don't have Lhasa ration cards [Ch: hukou, Tib: themtho]. Other students couldn't pass the Chinese exam in the government schools so they go to this school. There is only one teacher and one class. We have three to four lessons a day.*

*This is a private school, so the government says it is fine to study only English, but the graduation certificate from this school is not recognised by the government. The textbooks we use are given by the government and the teacher can only use these text books. The lessons are all about Marx and Engels, then about the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. There are no lessons about Tibetan history or about religion and the teacher is not allowed to talk about Buddhism in the lessons. The teacher has to go [to the local PSB station] for meetings sometimes. They tell him that he mustn't talk about religion or Buddhism. The teacher can't choose what he teaches the students. Sometimes police from the PSB suddenly come to the school to check what the teacher is teaching. They say if he teaches the wrong lessons then they will close the school. They [i.e. the police] are suspicious of the school because it is an English language school. They asked me why I wanted to study English, they ask what is the use of speaking English, they think if you want to speak English you want to talk about freedom to foreigners. [Police checks take place] once a month, but sometimes the police pay unexpected visits.*

*[Students at my school] are not allowed to visit monasteries, make offerings, burn incense or go for kora. Last year on His Holiness' birthday me and two friends from school went for kora and burned incense. The next day our teacher asked us where we had been the previous day. I didn't know we weren't allowed to go for kora so I told him the truth. He was very angry, he said this was not a problem only for us, but for the school. The Chinese government says that burning incense is not a Buddhist belief, but it is only what Tibetans do because they are superstitious. The teacher fined us five RMB each and advised us not to go for kora again or to burn incense. After this the teacher made a new rule. He said that all students had to go to school on the 15th day [every 15th day of the Tibetan month is considered to be auspicious by Tibetan Buddhists], His Holiness' birthday and other special days in the Tibetan calendar, even if they fell on Sundays. If they were on Sunday then we had to go to school and then the next day would be a holiday.*

*Sometimes our families have to go for meetings at the school. The teacher tells them about the school rules and what we are not allowed to do in the holidays, like where we are allowed to go. My parents have to write a report after the holidays of where we have been and what we have done. The teacher says we are not allowed to wear [blessed cords] but he doesn't mind if we wear them if they are hidden. It is different at government schools, they check the student's necks to see and if they are wearing them then they have to pay a fine. My brother is at a government school so he doesn't wear his blessed cords. We always have to speak Tibetan at home, if we say a Chinese word, then my father gets very angry. He says we are Tibetan so we must speak Tibetan. Most Tibetan young people now don't understand Tibetan well. They think if you don't speak and write Chinese well then you have no chance of getting a good job in Lhasa. ■*



## The Karmapa and other reincarnations

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 5 JANUARY 2001 (EDITED)

### Anniversary of Karmapa's escape; tension at monastery in Tibet

A year after the escape of the 17th Karmapa to India, conditions at his monastery in Tibet remain tense, with a permanent police presence and intensified restrictions on monks. No new monks are being permitted to enter the monastery.


The 15-year old Karmapa, spiritual head of the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism, arrived in Dharamsala, home of the Dalai Lama and centre of the Tibetan government in exile, on 5 January 2000. Ugyen Trinley Dorje, who is recognised by both the Dalai Lama and by Beijing as the 17th Karmapa, is still unable to travel to his seat in exile at Rumtek in Sikkim or give interviews to journalists. The Tibetan government in exile, however, has stated that it is 'optimistic' that the Karmapa may be allowed to travel to Rumtek monastery in the near future. Tashi Wangdi, Minister of Religious Affairs in the exile government, told TIN that the Karmapa's position in India is now more secure in that he is allowed to stay in the country. He said: *'The government of India has been taking a slightly cautious line so as not to complicate Sino-Indian relations.'*

The Chinese authorities were deeply embarrassed by the Karmapa's escape from Tibet, which highlighted the failure of the Party's attempts to mould Ugyen Trinley Dorje into a 'patriotic' figure loyal to the Communist Party as part of their efforts to legitimise Chinese religious policies in Tibet. The regional authorities launched an investigation into the circumstances of his escape, trying to obtain details of the route he took via Nepal and conducting an urgent review of security at the monastery. Individual monks were questioned regarding suspected involvement and security was strengthened, with a team of police stationed at Tsurphu in addition to the monastery's Democratic Management Committee. Two Tibetans from Tsurphu who were detained for questioning following the Karmapa's escape into exile have not returned to the monastery and may still be in detention, according to reports from Tibet.

There are currently some 320 monks at Tsurphu. Several monks were reportedly expelled recently following the authorities' ruling that government employees and Party cadres should withdraw their children from monasteries and nunneries.

Tourists were unable to visit the monastery early last year although some tourist visits are now permitted. A Westerner who has visited Tsurphu in the past few months told TIN: *"The atmosphere is still tense, with monks often unwilling to talk to foreigners."* Rules posted by the Democratic Management Committee before the Karmapa left and still on display in the monastery contain now obsolete injunctions against speaking to the Karmapa without permission.

The Karmapa's nomad parents, Dondrub and Loga, are reportedly still in their home prefecture of Chamdo (Changdu in Chinese) in the Tibet Autonomous Region after being moved from their Lhasa home. Reports received by TIN indicate that they continue to be under the surveillance of local officials. ■



The Democratic Management Committee Rules still on display at Tsurphu in October 2001, nearly two years after the Karmapa had left the monastery © Plumppji/TIN

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 2 JULY 2001 (EDITED)

## Child lama forced to leave monastery following Karmapa escape

Pawo Rinpoche, an eight-year old incarnate lama who was recognised by the 17th Karmapa, has been moved from his monastery to Lhasa, prevented from wearing monastic robes and made to attend a normal primary school since the Karmapa's escape into exile last year. The young Rinpoche, who is one of the most important Karma Kagyu lamas remaining in Tibet and whose recognition was endorsed by the Chinese authorities, has been kept under close surveillance since his removal to Lhasa last summer and is not permitted to undertake religious studies. Two security personnel accompany him to his primary school each day and visits to his residence, where he is living with his mother, are restricted.

Pawo Rinpoche's traditional seat, Nyenang monastery in Toelung Dechen (Ch: Duilong Deqing) county, Lhasa municipality, is near Tsurphu, the Karmapa's monastery in Tibet, and the two institutions have close religious and social ties. There are important historical links between the incarnations of Pawo Rinpoche and the Karmapa; in previous incarnations, they had a student-teacher relationship. A senior lama at Nyenang monastery, Lama Tsewang Tashi, escaped to India together with Ugyen Trinley Dorje, the 15-year old recognised as the 17th Karmapa, in January 2000. Morale at both Nyenang and Tsurphu monasteries is low following the removal of Pawo Rinpoche to Lhasa and the escape of the Karmapa. The number of monks at both monasteries has declined, partly as a result of patriotic education campaigns at the monasteries leading to expulsions of monks, and also because monks are leaving due to the absence of a senior religious figure.

A monk from the area told TIN: *"Before, many pilgrims and tourists came to Nyenang monastery but now very few come because there is no lama there. It is the same as Tsurphu since the Karmapa left. Several monks have left Nyenang because they did not want to stay there any more without Pawo Rinpoche. Everyone feels sad now."* The same Tibetan source told TIN that monks at Nyenang are not allowed to keep photographs of Pawo Rinpoche.

Tsuglag Mawe Dayang was 15-months old when he was recognized in 1994 by the 17th Karmapa as the 11th incarnation of Pawo (dPa'Bo) Rinpoche. The search party who set out to find him were seeking the incarnation of the 10th Pawo Rinpoche, who had died in India in August 1991. They were assisted by a letter written by the teenage Karmapa, then at Tsurphu, giving details of the location and time of year of the child's birth and clues to the names of his parents and information on the environment. Following his recognition, Tsuglag Mawe Dayang was brought from his home in Nagchu (Ch: Naqu) prefecture to Nyenang and enthroned in 1995. A monk from the area told TIN: *"After Pawo Rinpoche was recognised, he was brought to Tsurphu and the*



Pawo Rinpoche meeting the 17th Karmapa, before the Karmapa fled Tibet and Pawo Rinpoche was taken from his monastery

© The Karmapa Trust, Holland

*Karmapa gave him the possessions belonging to the 10th Pawo Rinpoche."*

The Chinese authorities acknowledged Pawo Rinpoche's status following his recognition by the Karmapa, who is himself recognised by the Dalai Lama and was accepted by Beijing as head of one of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. A second Tibetan monk who is now in exile told TIN that while the authorities had previously accepted Pawo Rinpoche, *"Now [that] the Karmapa has left the Chinese do not like Pawo Rinpoche, they say that he is a fake lama."* The sensitivity of the authorities to the situation at Nyenang was evident when in December 2000 a Western governmental delegation was denied permission to visit the monastery despite a specific request.

Religious activities at Nyenang and at Tsurphu monastery have declined since the Karmapa's departure and the removal of Pawo Rinpoche to Tibet's capital. *"Since the Karmapa left, religious order and discipline as well as the development of Tsurphu monastery have suffered,"* said one of the Tibetan monks from the area. *"The local authorities sent in cadres who, with the help of the Democratic Management Committee of the monastery, started enforcing a strict programme of political and ideological education for the monks. Their traditional religious curriculum and activities were undermined and neglected, and as a result religious studies are not being taken as seriously as before."*

Development projects were in progress at both Tsurphu and Nyenang monasteries before the Karmapa's escape to India. The road from Tsurphu to Lhasa was to be rebuilt with the assistance of funding from Western and Taiwanese Buddhist organisations, and Lama Tsewang Tashi from Nyenang monastery was involved in helping with the development of education and health-care facilities in the area. The authorities have reportedly discontinued work on the road to Tsurphu since the escape of the Karmapa. ■



Pawo Rinpoche at Nyenang monastery, before his removal to Lhasa  
© The Karmapa Trust, Holland



Shardung Rinpoche during the Kalachakra initiation a week before his death, August 2001  
(see obituary page 66)

© TIN

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS IN BRIEF, 12 SEPTEMBER 2001

### Deaths of 13 Tibetans in monastery collapse

Tibetans from three generations of one family and ten other Tibetans were killed when part of a two to three hundred year-old monastery in Kardze (Ch: Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province collapsed during renovation work on 6 September.

Thirteen Tibetans – three monks and ten laypersons – were killed and three seriously injured following the collapse of the meeting hall of Mongyal (sMonrgyal) monastery, a Bon monastery in Dege county, which is part of the traditional Tibetan area of Kham. The Tibetans who died included 78-year old Palo, his 48-year old daughter and 34-year old grandson. Children from three families were orphaned following the deaths of their parents in the collapse.

The Tibetans who died were among hundreds of local people who had been working at different stages on renovation of the old buildings of the monastery. Phuntsog Wangyal, director of the London-based Tibet Foundation, which carries

out relief work in the area, said: "According to information we have received from the region, these villagers were enthusiastically working on the renovation of their local monastery, which had suffered badly from neglect during the Cultural Revolution when it was used as a meeting hall for local work groups. We were told that the villagers were carrying out the work themselves because they could not afford to bring in any technical expertise, such as engineers. While many of them were working inside the building, the entire meeting hall collapsed." Phuntsog Wangyal said that the Tibet Foundation was appealing for funds to support families bereaved by the incident.

The official Chinese news agency Xinhua, which reported the deaths in a statement on 8 September without giving the name of the monastery, stated that the monastery had "been in a dangerous condition owing to chronic lack of maintenance. The main pillars had grown rotten and the roof leaked during the rainy season." ■



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 9 NOVEMBER 2001 (EDITED)

## "A great loss for Tibet's religion, culture and people": Obituary of Shardung Rinpoche

Shardung Rinpoche, a senior lama at Jakhyung monastery in Qinghai province and a widely respected scholar of Tibetan language and culture, died on 12 August 2001 aged 81, two days after giving a Kalachakra initiation (an important Buddhist ceremony closely associated with the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism). The Dalai Lama paid tribute to his scholarship three days after his death, saying: *"Tibetan scholars are gradually dying in Tibet. [Shardung Rinpoche's] death is a great loss for Tibet's religion, culture and its people. He was a holy lama who was highly accomplished in Tibet's religion and culture."*

Shardung Rinpoche was well known for his work at the Qinghai Nationalities University in Xining and at a Tibetan Buddhism academy in Beijing, where he taught at the request of its founder, the 10th Panchen Lama, who died in 1989. A Tibetan lama from Qinghai province (which incorporates part of the traditional Tibetan area of Amdo) who was close to Shardung Rinpoche and now lives in exile told TIN: *"He taught many of the Tibetan and Mongolian lamas the Panchen Lama invited to Beijing in his work to revive Buddhist teachings. His students came from all over China and Tibet. I feel that with his death, one of the pillars of the sky has fallen down."*

Shardung Rinpoche gave his final teachings at a Kalachakra (Wheel of Time) initiation at his monastery, Jakhyung monastery (known as Xiaqiong in Chinese) in Hualong county (Tibetan: Bayan), Haidong prefecture. The exiled Tibetan lama told TIN: *"Shardung Rinpoche called me from Tibet on the last day of the Kalachakra. He said that all his work was finished and now he was ready to go. The next day he died."*

Shardung Lobsang Shadrub Gyatso was born in Gontser village, near Jakhyung monastery. According to his biography in the Tibetan magazine Drangchar (1994), he was recognised while still in the womb as the incarnation of Shardung Rinpoche. He was accepted into the monastery at the age of seven and he is said to have gained the reputation of being an outstanding student. Jakhyung monastery, founded in 1349, is one of the oldest and most important religious institutions in the region. The founder of the Gelugpa school, Tsongkhapa, was ordained there over 600 years ago under the tutelage of its founder Lama Dondrub Rinchen, before leaving for Lhasa when he was 16.

Shardung Rinpoche came under some political pressure following the arrival of Chinese work teams at Jakhyung monastery in 1998 to implement the 'Patriotic Education' Campaign, which requires monks to make statements

denouncing the Dalai Lama. According to TIN sources, Shardung Rinpoche was unable to attend some of the political meetings because he was in hospital.

Shardung Rinpoche began his teaching career at the Qinghai Nationalities University in Xining in 1956, lecturing mainly on the Tibetan language. In the late 1950s and 1960s, during various political campaigns, Shardung Rinpoche was branded a 'counter-revolutionary' and during the Cultural Revolution he was subjected to frequent political 'struggle sessions' (*thamzing*), during which he was criticised for 'spreading Buddhism' rather than Marxist-Leninism. Students of Shardung Rinpoche have testified to the persecution he suffered as a senior religious teacher during years of intensive political campaigns. During the Cultural Revolution, Shardung Rinpoche was forced to carry out hard labour on a number of occasions. During one struggle session, he apparently lost two teeth when he was punched after spitting in the face of a Tibetan woman who told him he must accept that there are no deities.

Shardung Rinpoche was 'rehabilitated' in 1979, three years after the end of the Cultural Revolution. He returned to Qinghai Nationalities University as Professor of the Nationalities Languages Department. He retired in 1985, but resumed teaching in 1987 at the institute for Tibetan Buddhism in Beijing at the request of its founder, the 10th Panchen Lama. The 10th Panchen Lama founded the institute in order to provide education for religious teachers and ordinary Tibetans who had had to discontinue their studies during the Cultural Revolution. Both Shardung Rinpoche and the Panchen Lama shared a deep concern for the level of Buddhist teaching and understanding among Tibetans, and believed that the revival of Buddhist religion following the Cultural Revolution would be served best by focusing attention on the education of ordinary Tibetans in addition to relying on the re-invigoration of monasteries and nunneries.

Some of Shardung Rinpoche's students became specialists in Tibetan education or teachers, while others have gained influential official positions. His work also influenced Chinese Buddhist scholars and many Tibetan and Mongolian lamas and trulkus (reincarnate lamas) who took their teachings back to their home areas. According to a lama from Qinghai, who was one of his students, the Rinpoche also acted as a representative for the 10th Panchen Lama following the Cultural Revolution, travelling in Tibetan areas in order to assess the revival or decline of Buddhist teachings. ■



## OFFICIAL NEWS COVERAGE

## Official Press – Religion

All items are summaries of pieces by the Xinhua news agency unless stated otherwise

## 4 January

Xinhua reports that a history of religion in Qinghai Province has been published. It consists of a compilation of annals covering the history, activities and development of Buddhism, Islam, Christian[ity] and Taoism in Qinghai, as well as the country's policies on religious issues. [BBC Mon 04/01/01]

## 1 February

Xinhua reports that Tibetan Buddhist masters denounced the crimes of the Falun Gong cult at a meeting in the TAR, saying that the cult goes absolutely against the basic doctrine of all religions, including Buddhism. [BBC Mon 02/02/01]

## 10 February

20,000 Tibetans, including local farmers and herdsman, rally in the Potala Palace Square and attend a signing activity rejecting the Falun Gong cult after the news spread that Falun Gong practitioners had set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square, Xinhua reports. [SWB 10/02/01]

## 14 February

Lobsang Dondrub, vice-chairman of the TAR government, stresses that development in Tibet is inseparable from the support of religious circles and talks about the need to "consolidate unity in the new century", during a visit to Bomi Rinpoche. [Xinhua 14 February; BBC Mon 14/02/01]

Also on 14 February, day Xinhua also reports that Lobsang Dondrub donated 100,000 yuan (US\$12,000) to major monasteries in Lhasa on behalf of the government during a series of visits on 13 and 14 February for the coming Tibetan New Year.

[BBC Mon 14/02/01]

## 20 February

In response to the criticism by the UN in its resolution on religion freedom, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman says that it is an undeniable fact that *"religious activities have proceeded normally in all parts of China, Tibet inclusive, and the religious undertaking in China has made progress, thanks to the joint efforts of government at all levels"*.

[Xinhua 20/02/01; BBC Mon 20/02/01]

## 21 February

According to a report by Xinhua, Hebei Province is to invest over 70m yuan (US\$8.4m) in the renovation of Sakya monastery. The Chinese government has reportedly allocated a total of 300m yuan (about US\$36.15m) in funds to renovate and open more than 1,400 Tibetan monasteries and temples in the past 20 years. [BBC Mon 21/02/01]

## 9 March

Xinhua reports on the results of a survey conducted among 100 Buddhist households in Lhasa, stating that the results show a drastic drop in support for the Dalai Lama among Tibetan Buddhists. Ninety per cent of respondents are reported to have said that the happiest moment was the liberation of Tibet fifty years ago when *"the serf-system was smashed and slaves became master of their own house."*

[BBC Mon 09/03/01]

## 15 May

Xinhua carries interviews with several Buddhist lamas who have reportedly condemned the Dalai Lama, saying that he is a betrayer of the motherland and that they don't agree to the Dalai Lama's claim that he is the spokesman for Tibetan Buddhism. [BBC Mon 15/05/01]

## 22 May

Tibet TV in Lhasa broadcasts a commentary on a rally held by Tibetan regional Party and government officials on eradicating the Falun Gong spiritual movement from Tibet. The commentator warned that the Falun Gong were still infiltrating Tibet and stressed that officials should use President Jiang Zemin's 'three representations' party-building ideology and the principle of upholding Marxism and the Party as the basis for eradicating the Falun Gong.

[BBC Mon 23/05/01]

## 24 May

According to Targen [Tib: Tharchin], director of the TAR Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, in addition to 11th Panchen, nearly ten Living Buddhas have been determined and approved in recent years. Stating that the reincarnation of Living Buddhas is an internal religious affair and that the central and Tibet regional governments can legitimately approve the determination of Living Buddhas, Targen notes that the Dalai Lama has no right to determine Living Buddhas: *"Out of his vicious attempt to split China, the Dalai Lama illegally allowed some Living Buddhas to interfere with the normal religious order in Tibet, which has hurt the feelings of Tibetan people and can not be recognized by our government,"* he stressed. [BBC Mon, 24/05/01]

Also on 24 May, in a separate article, Xinhua quotes Targen as saying that Buddhists in Tibet enjoy freedom of religious belief and the freedom to engage in normal religious activities and major religious and folk festival celebrations. He goes on to say that Tibet is home to more than 1,700 monasteries, temples and other sites of religious activity, with over 46,000 Buddhist monks and nuns, accounting for two per cent of its total population.

[BBC Mon, 24/05/01]

### 18 June

Xinhua reports that Tibet has conducted a campaign to enhance patriotic education at lamaseries since 1996, with the purpose of *"promoting the concept of motherland, the awareness of law and the responsibility of a Chinese citizen"*, and adapting Tibetan Buddhism to modern society. Jampa Phuntsog, deputy head of the TAR Office for Patriotic Education for Lamaseries, is reported as saying that *"an overwhelming majority of the lamas have now realized that Dalai Lama is not their spokesman, nor their spiritual leader but the head of the clique which always seeks to split up China and hinder construction of a normal order in Tibetan Buddhism or Lamalism."* [BBC Mon 18/06/01]

### 4 July 2001

Xinhua reports on a 45-day inspection and learning trip taken by the Chinese chosen 11th Panchen Lama to Shanghai and Zhejiang on the east coast of China where he visited places of historical and cultural interest as well as Buddhist venues. He is reported to have become more confident in China's future development and to have gained a deeper understanding of the correctness of the Party's policies towards nationality and religion. [BBC Mon 05/07/01]

### 5 August

At an interview with Hong Kong journalists in Lhasa, TAR Party deputy secretary Ragdi says that, on his death, the reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama will be found in accordance with historical customs and religious rituals including ratification by the central Chinese government. Ragdi emphasized that acts that violate historical customs and religious rituals will be deemed void. [BBC Mon 08/08/01]

Ragdi also reportedly outlined the four principles upon which the selection of the 15th Dalai Lama will be handled: 1) following religious rites; 2) based on a historically set system (sic); 3) drawing lots from the golden urn for the selection; 4) having the procedures approved by the central authorities.

[Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao 06/08/01]

### 31 October

Wang Zhaoguo, head of the United Front Work Department, and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme meet with an observation group of patriotic personages from Tibetan ethnic and religious circles in Beijing, following their 20 day tour of China. Wang Zhaoguo congratulates the group on safeguarding the unification of the motherland and opposing separatist activities and sabotage carried out by the Dalai clique.

[BBC Mon 06/11/01]

### 11 December

Xinhua publishes an article entitled *"A new phase of our country's religious work has emerged"*. The article reports on the standardisation and legalisation of religious activities and says that China has historically respected and protected the rights and customs and practices of the freedom of religious faith of ethnic minorities, but also steadfastly disposes of and combats the use of religion to carry out illegal criminal activities. It states that the steadfast principle of the CCP is *"Unity and cooperation in politics, and mutual respect in beliefs"*. It goes on to talk about the good works that religions have done for society and the role they have played in opposing the Falun Gong.

[Xinhua 11/12/01; BBC Mon 13/12/01]



Picture of Chinese-chosen 11th Panchen Lama  
© Free Tibet Campaign

### 12 December

A three-day meeting to outline religious policy in China for the 21st century ends in Beijing. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing and Li Lanqing took part in the meeting.

Jiang Zemin called for the faithful implementation of the Party's policy of religious freedom and the administering of religious affairs in accordance with the law. He spoke of the necessity of guiding religious beliefs to fit in with China's socialist society and called for the further consolidation and development of the patriotic united front between the Party and religious circles. Jiang said that work concerning religion must serve for the maintenance of stability, the advancement of unity, socialist modernisation, complete reunification of the motherland and world peace and development. He linked work concerning religion to the unity of ethnic groups, social stability and national security and called for the Party's strengthened leadership in religious affairs.

Chinese premier Zhu Rongji vowed to crack down on all forms of evil cults and called for the establishment of management networks pertaining to religions at county, town and village levels.

[Xinhua 12/12/01; BBC Mon 13/12/01]

Also on 12 December, according to a report by Xinhua, most lamaseries are now fully commercialised, with shops set up for extra income. The report says that it is now fashionable in Tibet for Living Buddhas to become managers and lamas are keen to be tour guides. Since 1992, electronic Tibetan scriptures and classics have appeared on the local market.

[BBC Mon 12/12/01]

### 21 December

An anti-Falun Gong exhibition opens in Lhasa. A local official is reported as saying that the exhibition *"will improve people's awareness of the need to fight against evil cults worldwide, including the notorious Falun Gong cult."* [BBC Mon 21/12/01]

## 4 Education and Language

Throughout 2001, official statements have consistently emphasised the need for acceleration towards 'leap-style' development in the TAR. The authorities clearly see the role of education as being to promote and serve the processes of economic construction and social development<sup>1</sup>. With already existing high levels of central investment and involvement in Tibet's economy, together with increased migration of Han Chinese into Tibetan areas, the importance to Tibetans of learning the Chinese language is likely to be enhanced as a result of this drive for ever faster economic development. Tibetans are torn between the need to learn the Chinese language for practical reasons, and the desire to protect and develop their own language.<sup>2</sup>

Amendments made in 2001 to the law on regional national autonomy ('the autonomy law')<sup>3</sup> brought forward the introduction of classes to teach the Chinese language to the first year or the senior grades of primary school; the original law required introduction of Chinese in the senior grades of primary school or in secondary schools. The classes are now to popularise putonghua, the common 'national' speech, and to popularise 'standard Han characters'. Meanwhile, the 10th TAR Five Year Plan states: "*We must... actively promote bilingual education and create the conditions for the full-fledged introduction of English instruction*" – suggesting that some Tibetans could be required to learn three very different languages. A further amendment to the autonomy law requires the state to organise and encourage teachers (evidently from outside the autonomous areas) "*to go to national autonomous areas and engage in educational work, and [to] give them appropriate preferential remuneration.*" The 10th TAR Five

Year Plan also states that it is important for more teachers to be recruited from China to work in Tibet. These changes indicate that the profile of Chinese language education in autonomous areas is set to rise further.

For Tibetans, ability in the Chinese language does help them to compete in the jobs market. However, a less than perfect knowledge of these two very different languages may mean that students cannot compete for jobs requiring very good knowledge of either, for example as a teacher of Tibetan. With growing use of the Chinese language in Tibetan areas, there is also profound concern over the survival of the Tibetan language, considered a very important element of Tibetan identity and culture. Yet for Chinese cadres, the Tibetan language training now available to them will open up opportunities, by allowing them to operate more effectively at the grass roots level (see page 40). ■

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 29 NOVEMBER 2001

### Increase in Chinese medium teaching in Tibetan schools

There have been further indications that Chinese is becoming the main medium of instruction in schools in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) with the use of the Chinese language as a teaching medium being increased in primary schools. The main teaching medium in middle schools is already standard Chinese (putonghua). Reports from Tibet indicate that Chinese is now being used as a teaching medium in a number of primary schools near Lhasa, with plans to increase its use throughout the region. Concerns among Tibetan teachers for the security of their jobs have been reported, as the implementation of these plans is likely to lead to the recruitment of more Chinese nationality teachers. Beijing's Five-Year Plan states that it is important for more teachers to be recruited from China to work in Tibet.

The new changes to education provision in the TAR involve the teaching at primary level of mathematics and Chinese – and English in some schools – through the medium of Chinese. If fully implemented, this would mean that the only subject taught in Tibetan in primary and middle schools would be Tibetan language. This represents a major change, because the majority of primary schools in the TAR currently teach through the Tibetan medium. In 1996, at least 95 per cent of primary schools were said to be Tibetan medium (Xinhua, 20 March 1996). In a small number of primary schools in the TAR, however, teaching in Chinese has been carried out for some years, partly due to a shortage of Tibetan teachers.

<sup>1</sup> See the 10th TAR Five-Year Plan, section on education and science. Note that nationally, development is now seen as of 'overriding importance', and perceived as 'the key to addressing all the problems of our country' (National 10th Five-Year Plan Outline (Draft), published by the Office of the Premier, State Council of the People's Republic of China, in Chinese on 5 March 2001)

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see the TIN report on Tibetan language and identity in the TIN News Review, Reports from Tibet, 2000, pp. 53-66.

<sup>3</sup> For more detail of the 2001 amendments to the Law on Regional National Autonomy, see page 17.



The teaching of both Chinese and English at primary level is welcomed by many Tibetans, as this enables them to acquire proficiency in both languages in order for them to be able to compete with their Chinese peers. It also takes into account the economic realities of the situation in the TAR, where most business is conducted in the Chinese language. However, there is still concern among many Tibetans about the impact of such moves on the survival of the Tibetan language, which is regarded as an important element of Tibetan identity and culture.

Reports from Tibet indicate that there is also concern among teachers and parents that the plans to teach lessons in Chinese rather than Tibetan may lead to under-achievement among Tibetan primary school pupils, as Tibetan is their first language. The changes currently being implemented are despite the fact that over the past few years Tibetan scholars and teachers have been producing a number of updated Tibetan language textbooks on maths and science for primary and middle school pupils.

Some Tibetan teachers who teach subjects such as English and maths through the medium of the Tibetan language are concerned about their future job security and prospects, according to reports received by TIN. The competition they already face from Chinese teachers is likely to increase if Chinese medium teaching becomes the norm in primary schools throughout the region. In one rural school near Lhasa, a number of Chinese nationality teachers were brought in to teach English, but because the pupils were unable to understand the lessons, the Tibetan teachers were again assigned to teach the English classes.

The Chinese authorities stated in their Tenth Five Year Plan for the TAR that teachers should be recruited from China in order to develop education in the region. An excerpt from the Plan, published by Tibet Daily on 9 June, stated: "We must put existing qualified personnel to good use and actively recruit from outside [the TAR] the qualified personnel we urgently need." The same report said: "Outstanding personnel must be attracted to join the teaching profession. At the same time, we must rely on institutions of higher education in the interior to establish training bases for senior-level teaching staff for Tibet in order to speed up the build-up of a teaching corps for Tibet."

Tibetan language policy has been one of the most important issues in education in the TAR since the Chinese authorities gained control of the region in 1949-50 and particularly since the temporary period of liberalisation in the early 1980s. Since the first constitution of the People's Republic of China, China's nationalities have had, in principle, the right to use their own languages in administration and education. In education, the option for 'minority' nationalities to provide teaching in their own languages became part of the 1995 Education Law. Article 12 of the law states that "schools and other educational institutions primarily for 'minority'

nationalities may use the spoken or written language in common use among the ethnic group or in the locality as the language of instruction" (Xinhua, reporting on the Education Law, 20 March 1995).



The 10th Panchen Lama, a vocal advocate of Tibetan language policy in education and public life © Free Tibet Campaign

In 1987, at the instigation of the 10th Panchen Lama (who died two years later) and the senior Tibetan official Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the TAR People's Congress issued the *Provisions on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language* – a detailed document which set out procedures for implementing Tibetan language policy in education and public life. The 10th Panchen Lama said at the time: "In the 30 or more years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the study, use and development of the Tibetan language has followed a tortuous course" (reported on Lhasa Radio, 12 July 1987). The regulations, which stated that Tibetan was to be the first language, stipulated that by 1993 all new junior middle school students should be taught in Tibetan, and that by 1997 most lessons in senior middle schools and technical secondary schools should be in Tibetan. These policies were not thoroughly implemented, however, partly due to apathy or resistance on the part of some local officials, and partly due to a lack of funding. After the Third Work Forum on Tibet in 1994, positive discrimination in favour of Tibetan officials was dropped and closer assimilation with 'the motherland' took priority over the notion of cultural distinctiveness. Three years later, a further shift in emphasis took place with the announcement of plans to introduce Chinese language study from the first year of schooling. Tenzin, the former senior TAR official who has recently been removed from his post and sent to Beijing, said in 1997 that the 1987 policy was "impractical" and "not in conformity with the reality of Tibet...As a result, both Tibetan and Chinese languages are being taught at school in the autonomous region" (17 April 1997, Xinhua). ■

Note: *Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950* by Catriona Bass, published by TIN and Zed Books (1998) provides further information and analysis on the issue of Tibetan and Chinese language medium teaching in the TAR. It is available to order on TIN's website at: [www.tibetinfo.net/publications/bbp/education.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/publications/bbp/education.htm)





A primary school in Central Tibet – posters of Chinese leaders and Chinese flags on the walls  
© TIN

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS IN BRIEF, 13 SEPTEMBER 2001

### Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin moved to Beijing

One of the most senior Tibetans in the Communist Party in Tibet, Tenzin, has been removed from his post as deputy Party secretary and sent from Lhasa to Beijing to occupy a senior position at the China Writers' Association. Fifty-four year old Tenzin (Ch: Danzeng), who has been a member of the Party for 36 years, was summoned to Beijing in August and informed that he had been transferred to the position, which is effectively a down-grading of his status, according to TIN sources – the post is not a leading political appointment and does not involve governance and policy-making in Tibet. Tenzin reportedly requested to stay in Lhasa but this was refused by Party chiefs. His departure from Lhasa was marked by a farewell party that was *"unusually small and cold"*, according to a Tibetan source.

Tenzin, who is known for his fluency in both Tibetan and Chinese, was regarded by many Tibetan intellectuals as one of the best educated and most eloquent of the Tibetan Communist leaders. Tenzin, who joined the Communist Party in 1965, maintained his senior position in the Party

throughout the tenure of the hardliner Chen Kuiyuan as Tibet Autonomous Region Party secretary from 1992 to 2000, when Guo Jinlong took over this most senior post in the TAR.

Tenzin is known in particular for his statements regarding the importance of Tibetan language and culture in the process of modernisation, and for his concern over the excesses of the gambling and prostitution trades in Lhasa that he has said are an unacceptable consequence of economic development.

Tenzin, who was born in Nagchu in central Tibet and educated at Fudan University in Shanghai, began his political career as deputy director in the office of the editor-in-chief of Tibet Daily. In 1983 he was made Director of the Tibet Regional Bureau of Culture and occupied positions as vice-chairman of the Tibet Federation of Literary and Art circles and member of the Standing Committee of the TAR Party Committee; he was promoted in 1985 to deputy secretary of the TAR Party Committee. ■

## TESTIMONY

*"I felt sad because I was a Tibetan, but my school was good"*

The following account was given by a 16-year old Tibetan girl who had attended a Chinese primary school in Lhasa before going on to study at Lhasa's Middle School no.8. She was then awarded a place in the Beijing Middle School in Lhasa where she studied for one year. She explains that she had mixed feelings about her education: on the one hand she appreciated the increased opportunities that she would have as a result of being able to attend the Beijing Middle School, but also acknowledges her sadness as a Tibetan at attending a Chinese medium school.

*There are one thousand students. Most of them are Tibetans from Lhasa, but there are a few from villages and a few Chinese. There are 60 teachers, who are mostly Chinese, there are not many Tibetan teachers. [The headmaster] is Chinese, he is from Sichuan. We studied Tibetan, Chinese, Maths, English, history, politics, physics, chemistry and we had to do self study. There were nine subjects in all. [We had] nine lessons, we had all the subjects in a day. [Each lesson] was 45 minutes. Tibetan was in Tibetan, and all the other classes were taught in Chinese. We studied Chinese history and world history, not Tibetan history.*

*I felt sad because I am Tibetan, but my school was good. It is a new school and is helped by Beijing, it is a real Chinese school. If we don't know Chinese now in Lhasa then we cannot get work. Some small children now go to Chinese schools and they study Chinese, they don't know Tibetan. Their parents want them to get good jobs so they also speak to them in Chinese. In schools with Tibetan and Chinese students, if the Tibetan students do not study very hard, they will be left behind, and will not have the opportunity to get a good job. There are many children like this in Lhasa now. ■*

## TESTIMONY

*"Generally in society Tibetan is not viewed highly"*

A 23-year old teacher from Xunhua (Tib: Yadzi/Dowi) county in Haidong (Tib: Tsoshar) prefecture, Qinghai, talked to TIN about the importance of teaching Tibetan language from a young age. From this account, it appears that the school was consulted over whether to teach Chinese or Tibetan languages from class one. The teacher also speaks about the problems in using textbooks which have been translated from Chinese into Tibetan, as opposed to using text books which are originally written in Tibetan. Not only is the political content unsatisfactory, but there are also problems with the translation of terminology.

*The Education Office (Tib: slob gso cus) told me to become the headmaster of a primary school and discuss [with the teachers] whether we wanted to teach Tibetan from class one or Chinese from class one, or to skip Tibetan from class one to two and then teach from class three onwards. Or skip Chinese from class one and two and teach from class three onwards. I went back to the Education Office and told them that our teachers wished to teach Tibetan from class one. Classes one and two are important, they are very crucial times in terms of education and character building. Then classes three and four are where the foundation is built. Thus if Tibetan is not taught right from class one there won't be any basis for Tibetan and naturally Tibetan language will diminish.*

*In the area where I went to school Chinese is taught from class one and Tibetan is taught from class three. Such students [who learn Chinese from class one] now can join a college. They have a strong foundation in Chinese but they absolutely ignore Tibetan. Generally in society Tibetan is not viewed highly and they treat their own language condescendingly. If they see an article in Tibetan, which is meaningful and written by a high scholar and an article in Chinese written by a common Chinese writer they will consider the Chinese as superior to the Tibetan one. Therefore it is very important to teach Tibetan from class one.*

*This year some of those who graduated from college were given jobs in our school. We had a discussion on whether it would be better to teach with a textbook prepared by oneself or to teach with textbook prepared by the government along with one prepared by oneself. We thought about this because these days most textbooks are translated ones. They are about the foreign occupation of China and then there are many about the liberation and so on. Most textbooks these days are on Chinese history and they are translated into Tibetan. There are different types of people in the translation offices. The textbooks they translated are incomplete in meaning and contents. Some words they translated cannot even be found in dictionaries. The teachers have to explain these textbooks. Teachers also explain according to what they think (their opinions). But only the translators know the real meaning. Thus if someone does not know the meaning completely then they have to refer to the original Chinese text from which the translation was done. The students then make sentences with such words and the sentences turn out very funny indeed. These days it is very difficult to make out the meaning of the articles written by the students who graduated from the college. That is dangerous. ■*

## TESTIMONY

*"I have to encourage my children to study Chinese"*

A 39-year old Tibetan man from Lhasa, who used to work as a primary school teacher in Lhasa, talks about the changes in the education system from when he was teaching and now that his children are at school. He also mentions the dilemma that faces many Tibetan parents now: the need to encourage children to study Chinese in order to ensure that they have better future prospects, while at the same time wanting children to retain their own language and culture.

*I worked for 6 years as a teacher before and since then [late 1980s] I have done different jobs, as a driver, a builder and doing business. When I was a teacher there were six subjects, Tibetan, Chinese, Politics, Geography, Moral thinking [gsam blo kun spyod], Maths, and in addition the students had to do self study. Tibetan and Chinese were taught in the respective languages, the other subjects were taught in Tibetan or Chinese, usually what the teacher decided. Now all subjects must be taught in Chinese. This has been the rule for the last 3 or 4 years for government schools.*

*It is difficult for Tibetans to be a teacher now, there is a lot of competition and stress to do well. It is difficult because the other teachers are from China and have always studied and spoken Chinese. For Tibetans this is a problem now because we have to study Chinese to get a good job and earn money, but we are Tibetans so we should study our own language. When my own children do their homework, they spend more time studying Chinese, because this is not their mother tongue so they have to study harder to understand this well. Then if they want to do well in exams they have to know Chinese very well. This is what I mean that we Tibetans have a problem, because I have to encourage my children to study Chinese, but I am Tibetan and I want them to speak and write Tibetan well. ■*

## TESTIMONY

## Student life: use of the Tibetan language

A 21-year old, also from Xunhua county, gives the following account of his experiences as a student at the Qinghai nationalities college, which is located in Xining city, Qinghai. He talks about language, stating that he felt that by concentrating on Chinese textbooks at college, but having had a Tibetan education previously, he was going to end up with substandard Chinese and Tibetan and that he would not have been able to compete with Tibetans who had a high standard of Tibetan (in teaching jobs), or with Chinese who would clearly have better Chinese.

*I went to the Qinghai Nationalities University. The Tibetans had to sit in the preparatory class at first, so you had to stay in the University for five years. After staying in the preparatory class and in the first level class I came to India. I didn't want to stay at the University. The main thing was that these days even if you graduate from University you won't get a job. In our school they taught us Chinese, Tibetan and English. The number of Tibetan textbooks had reduced. Generally we were in the Tibetan Department and there were many Chinese textbooks in that Department. You had to take exams in all the subjects. If you didn't pass the exam you would not be given the certificate when you graduate. Therefore we left aside the Tibetan textbooks thinking that they were easy and instead devoted our time to studying the Chinese textbooks, so after we graduated we neither knew Chinese nor Tibetan well. Therefore it was said that if the students who graduated from the teacher's school and the students who graduated from the University were compared when they work, then those students who graduated from the teacher's school were more capable.*

*If we graduate we won't get administrative work and won't get a teacher's job either. If you do not have the confidence to teach after becoming a teacher you are just occupying the post and in reality you spoil the students. This year our college got the third position among all the Universities of the nation. We were selected in the third position saying that the standard of Tibetan of our college was good. But these days, since the students know that they don't get a good job after studying Tibetan, they devote their time to studying Chinese and do not concentrate on studying Tibetan. They say that there are no ways to use Tibetan literature. ■*

## OFFICIAL NEWS COVERAGE

## Official Press – Education and Language

All items are summaries of pieces by the Xinhua news agency unless stated otherwise

## 15 January

Henan province and the TAR sign cooperation contracts to protect Tibetan cultural relics. Henan will assist Tibet in renovating ancient architecture, excavate archaeological sites and educate more specialists in the field. [BBC Mon 21/01/01]

## 21 January

Xinhua reports that China's first set of Tibetan textbooks for school students has recently been published in Qinghai province with funds from the Ministry of Education and the United Nations Development Programme. It took six professors two decades to complete the books. [BBC Mon 21/01/01]

## 7 March

The Japanese government is to donate 725,000 yuan (roughly US\$87,600) for the construction of dormitory buildings at Gyantse county's No.1 Middle School, which can accommodate 352 students. [BBC Mon 07/03/01]

## 16 March

According to the TAR regional education commission, 39 of the TAR's 71 counties have met the requirements for six years of compulsory education among children. It also reported that 85.8 per cent of school-aged children are attending school and that by the end of 2000, Tibet had a total of 930 primary and middle schools and 2,700 training centres at all levels where there are 365,000 students. [BBC Mon 16/03/01]

## 30 April

The TAR Academy of Social Sciences (TASS) and Tibet University are intensifying efforts to save the Tibetan folk epic 'King Gesar'. They are recording the epic as told by local folk artists and will compile books in accordance with the recorded materials. Xinhua also states that the Chinese government set up a special organisation to save and record the epic after 1979 and listed the work as a major research program. [BBC Mon 30/04/01]

## 13 May

Shanghai, designated by the government as Yunnan's counterpart supporter in the 1970s, spent 7.61 million yuan (US\$917,000) last year to help over 100 middle and primary schools in Yunnan province, including the training of over 10,000 teachers. [BBC Mon 13/05/01]

## 17 May

In an interview with Xinhua, Gyayang, head of the TAR administration of cultural heritage, states that relics departments have set up files on 120,000 relics in the Potala Palace. Several thousand are exhibited at the TAR Museum, including hand-written sutras including one written during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), Buddha figures and thangka. [BBC Mon 17/05/01]

## 22 May

Construction of Tibet's second largest museum after the TAR Museum in Lhasa is to commence in Shigatse this year, and to cover 4,600 sq m. [BBC Mon 22/05/01]

## 12 June

The third edition of the Catalogue of Chinese Publications in Tibetan Studies from 1996 to 2000 was recently published by the Foreign Languages Press, listing more than 950 books published by over 100 publishing houses in China, excluding those published in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. The books listed in the volume comprise 429 books written in Tibetan, 520 in Chinese and seven in English. [BBC Mon 12/06/01]

## 20 October

There are a total of 380,000 students studying at the primary and secondary schools and universities in the Tibet Autonomous Region, accounting for 15 per cent of its total population, a regional education official said. The Xinhua report added that at present, Tibet has a population of 2.6 million, of which 1 million have received regular education. The rate of illiteracy in the region has dropped from 44.7 per cent in 1991 to 32 per cent at present. [BBC Mon 20/10/01]

## 8 November

The Information Office of the State Council releases a white paper entitled *Tibet's March Towards Modernisation*, which reviews the modernisation drive in Tibet over the past 50 years. [BBC Mon 08/11/01]

## 8 November

Lhasa Middle School, 'the first high school in the history of Tibet', celebrates its 45th anniversary. Xinhua reports that it was the first of its kind to be built by the Chinese Communist Party and the Central People's Government in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It adds that the school now has more than 2,800 students and 48 classes, is the key middle school in Tibet and an experimental school employing modern educational technology designated by the Ministry of Education. It has a TV studio, multi-media electronic teaching classrooms, a gymnasium, library, and laboratory building. [BBC Mon 08/11/01]

## 3 December

Xinhua reports on the enrichment and standardisation of the Tibetan language, stating that "dictionaries keep getting thicker". The Tibetan Language Advisory Committee of the TAR is reported to have recently called on professional translators from different fields to discuss ways to advance the standardisation of new words. [BBC Mon 03/12/01]



# 5 Propaganda

During 2001, the 50th anniversaries of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement and the 'liberation' of Tibet were used as important vehicles for domestic propaganda, while external propaganda took on renewed importance with the conduct of negotiations for China's entry into the World Trade Organisation, the award of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing and a meeting between the Dalai Lama and US President George W. Bush on 23 May. The two main themes of Chinese propaganda about Tibet remain the same: assertion of the legal/historical basis of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet and extolling the 'progress' made in the region under Chinese control. This section examines the nature of Chinese propaganda on Tibet during 2001, and tracks the ways in which propaganda has been changing, due to sustained efforts by the authorities to increase its effectiveness.

Domestic propaganda directed towards Tibetans includes speeches and political education carried out principally by local media and by work team (Tib: *lasdon rukhag*; Ch: *gongzuo dui*) visits to neighbourhoods, work units, schools and monasteries. In addition, the domestic media remains a major tool for reaching both Tibetans and Chinese. Beijing issued a directive late in 2001, emphasising that Party and government units must subscribe to the main Party newspaper, in an evident attempt to maintain Party influence over this sector of the population. The principal aim of domestic propaganda is to ensure political stability, primarily by undermining the influence of the Dalai Lama, affirming official ideology and pushing forward official policy (such as the current campaign to develop China's western regions). For example, in May 2001 Xinhua published a series of interviews featuring 'accomplished lamas' reportedly criticising the Dalai Lama with statements such as: "*Betrayers of the motherland and scum of the nation are not welcome at the temple and the Dalai Lama is one of them*". In the same article, Xinhua attempts to legitimise the current ban on Dalai Lama pictures and long-life prayers for the Dalai Lama by implying that religious leaders in Tibet have rejected these practices of their own accord (Xinhua, 15 May 2001).

Meanwhile, the image of Tibet being presented to the Chinese people has been transformed. At the beginning of the 1990s, most Chinese saw Tibet as a backward and dirty region with a harsh and inhospitable climate; over recent years, these perceptions have been recast. While the portrayal of Tibet as an idealised creation of socialist modernisation remains at the centre of official propaganda, there has also been a growing focus on traditional Tibetan culture and religion, in some cases perhaps achieving a degree of illusion rivaling some western perceptions of Tibet as a 'Shangri-la'. This has been achieved through the media, tourism, fashion and music. These two representations of Tibet are apparent in a series of Xinhua articles to mark the 50th anniversary of the 17-Point Agreement that have focused largely on economic and cultural develop-

ment. Some of the articles focus on socio-economic achievements, such as the wide availability of vegetables and the current boom in the advertising industry in Lhasa, while others look at the lives of individual Tibetans, focusing on their trades, such as a knife-maker, a ferryman, a truck driver and a monk tour-guide. Some of the articles feature the kinds of images of Tibet that have dominated the idealised representation of Tibet and Tibetan people in the West, for example an article on 'The Smile of Tibetans', stating that "*Tibetans are a people who love smiling most in the world*".

In addition to countering critical western reports on the current situation, which are becoming more accessible to a rapidly growing section of the Chinese population via the Internet, domestic propaganda is also aimed at encouraging domestic investment in Tibet. According to Tibetan scholar Tsering Shakya, many Tibetans feel that Lhasa is being made to appear as attractive and vibrant as possible in order to attract professionals and investors as part of the current campaign to develop China's western regions. In a statement to the Chinese press, Ragdi (TAR Party executive deputy secretary) gave the official view of the situation in Tibet: "*There is a smooth administration, all kinds of businesses are thriving, the society is stable, people of various nationalities are united, border defence has been consolidated, and people are living in peace and happiness.*" (Xinhua, 12 May 2001)

As regards external propaganda, there are political and economic reasons for China to attempt to change foreigners' perceptions of Tibet. Politically, the 'Tibet issue', which continues to receive prominence in the international media, remains one of the main obstacles facing China in its attempts to win international acceptance of its claims of progress in human rights. The authorities believe that in the 'struggle for public opinion' on the Tibet issue they are up against an 'organised international anti-China force'; they have accused the US and other western countries of trying

1 Zhao Qizheng, Director of the Information Office of the State Council and also Director of the Foreign Propaganda Office, speaking at a conference on Tibetology and external propaganda work on 12 June 2000

to westernise and split China, and since the Yugoslavia conflict have talked about a 'new culture of interventionism'. At the same time China feels threatened by the activities of the Dalai Lama abroad, by the Dalai Lama's alleged ties with other 'ethnic splittist' and 'anti-China' forces such as the Taiwan and Xinjiang independence movements and Falun Gong, and by the activities of Tibet Support groups such as protests during Chinese official visits and campaigns on economic issues.

On the economic front, the Chinese authorities seek foreign investment of funds and technology in Tibetan areas, particularly with the introduction of the Western Develop-

ment campaign. Therefore, their external propaganda during the year has emphasised progress and development already achieved in Tibetan areas, to enhance perceptions of the viability of investment there. However, Beijing has recognised that its external propaganda efforts relating to Tibet have had limited success, and over the past few years has made efforts to review and refine them. Following a conference on Tibetology and external propaganda work held on 12 June 2000, news of which emerged during 2001, a new approach is being introduced – to co-opt Tibetologists in China to a greater extent in carrying out research that will promote the State's views, in the belief that foreigners will listen more readily to academics. ■

## Domestic propaganda

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 3 MAY 2001 (EDITED)

### *"An important political responsibility": The Anniversary of 17-Point Agreement in Tibet*

The Chinese government has announced that a series of celebrations will take place over the next four months to mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the controversial 17-Point Agreement on 23 May 1951. The terms of the 17-Point Agreement, which promised cultural and political autonomy to the area administered by the Tibetan government in Lhasa at the time, were superseded by China's transformation of the political system following the March 1959 Uprising and the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965. Nonetheless, the People's Republic of China regards the 17-Point Agreement as the legal document by which Tibet has been 'reintegrated' under Beijing's authority.

According to reports from Lhasa, government cultural centres, community groups and schools have already been notified that participation in the celebrations is 'an important political responsibility'. The authorities have emphasised that maintaining security and preventing dissent are their main aims during the commemoration of this sensitive political anniversary, which is part of a wider propaganda campaign by Beijing.

The authorities are using the May anniversary as an opportunity to promote their policies of economic development and to draw attention to the integration of Tibetan areas within the PRC. The official Chinese press has featured a series of articles in recent weeks drawing attention to Tibet's progress over the past half-century following its 'peaceful liberation' by China, and encouraging Tibetans to "persistently expose and criticise the Dalai Lama until we have achieved a complete victory in the battle against separatism" (Tibet Daily, 5 April). The newspaper stated that the anniversary provided a "rare chance" for carrying out "broad and penetrating ideological education" about issues such as patriotism and socialism.

According to reports from Lhasa, government departments in the Tibet Autonomous Region have been emphasising the political importance of the anniversary since the beginning of the year. The commemoration of the anniversary on 23 May is likely to be held in the square in front of the Potala Palace and improved security measures are said to be already in place.

The Tibet Daily drew attention to the role of Chinese People's Liberation Army troops in "peacefully liberating Tibet" as well as "the solid role played by the troops stationed in Tibet, armed police officers and troops, and public security cadres and police during each historical period in building the new Tibet" (5 April). Local Tibetans are generally expected to participate in official celebrations. Before the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1999, Tibetans were told that their pay or pensions would be cut if they failed to participate in the occasion.

The anniversary celebrations are being firmly linked to Beijing's campaign to develop the Western regions of China, including Tibetan areas. The Tibet Daily article on 5 April stated that the anniversary provided an opportunity for cadres and "the masses of each ethnic group" to "further recognize that comprehensive and coordinated social, political, economic and cultural development in Tibet is the great victory that comes from integrating the ethnic policy implemented by the Party with the actual conditions in Tibet." Ethnic identity and culture, particularly religion, are sometimes portrayed by Beijing as obstacles to development, and the focus on the 17-Point Agreement anniversary underscores the official premise that the interests of Tibetans or 'minority nationalities' are the same as those of the Han Chinese. ■

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

## The 17-Point Agreement – A Summary

The official title of the 17-Point Agreement is *The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet*. The reference to the 'local government of Tibet' reveals the central government's insistence, soon after establishing the People's Republic of China, on modernising their interpretation of their relationship with the Lhasa-based government of Tibet. By referring to the Tibetan government as 'local' and China's government as 'central', China was asserting a claim of sovereignty over Tibetan territory. Recognition of this claim to sovereignty is one of China's fundamental conditions whenever there is any discussion of the possibility of negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership on the future of Tibet. China's concept of 'peaceful liberation' indicated the intention of central government policy at the time. This policy was to win over the ruling elite in central Tibet so that they themselves could be manipulated into acting as the proponents of Communist reform, thereby providing greater legitimacy for Communist Party control and reducing the threat of rebellion amongst the general population.

The Agreement, which came into force upon signing on 23 May 1951, set out in its 17 points the basic rights and duties of Tibetans with regard to their relationship with China and dealt in very general terms with the administrative organisation of central Tibet. Tibetans were required to drive out imperialists and "*return to the family of the motherland*", they were to 'actively assist' the PLA in entering Tibet, and Tibetan officials were to sever relations with imperialism and the Guomindang (Nationalist government), and were not to engage in sabotage or resistance if they were to maintain their offices.

The rights granted to Tibetans by the agreement included the right to exercise regional autonomy – a right which has been preserved to the present day in the constitution and law, but which has always been subordinated to the interests of the state as determined by the Party. Freedom of religious belief as set out in the 'Common Programme' was assured by the 17-Point Agreement, as was respect for Tibetans' religious beliefs, customs and habits; monasteries were to be protected and there was to be no change in their income. The agreement also stated that the existing political systems would not be altered; neither would the status, powers and functions of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. 'Local government' officials were to continue to hold their offices. This was one of the key Chinese policy moves in their attempt to win over the ruling elite as a means of gaining control and influence over and amongst the general population.

The Agreement allowed for a much slower pace of development and reform than that taking place in the rest of China during the 1950s, including most of the Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo. Tibetan language and education in central Tibet were to be 'developed step by step' as were agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce and 'the people's livelihood'. The Agreement also stated that when it came to reform, 'there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities'; the 'local government' should carry out reform 'of its own accord'.

In addition to PLA entry into Tibet, one of the other key powers subsumed by the Chinese authorities was the right to total control of Tibet's external affairs, giving the Party control over foreign relations and border trade and commerce. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Tibetan government was no longer permitted to continue independent talks with the US, Britain or India. Under the same terms these foreign powers could not approach the Tibetan government directly. A military and administrative committee and a military headquarters were to be set up in Tibet, incorporating Tibetan personnel, "*to ensure the implementation of this agreement*". Funding for this and also for PLA entry was to be provided by the central government, with a duty on behalf of the 'local government' to "*assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities*". ■

Note: *A Turning Point in Tibet's History: The 17-Point Agreement*, TIN Special Report, 21 May 2001, can be viewed on TIN's website [www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu210501.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu210501.htm) The full text of the 17-Point Agreement is available on TIN's website at [www.tibetinfo.net/publications/docs/spa.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/publications/docs/spa.htm)

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 20 JULY 2001 (REVISED)

## Chinese Vice-President in Lhasa to mark anniversary of 'peaceful liberation'

China's Vice-President Hu Jintao, who is widely tipped as the likely successor to Jiang Zemin as Party leader and President, has been in Lhasa this week to participate in celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Tibet's 'peaceful liberation'. The visit of the Vice-President was not publicised until the day Hu left Beijing (Tuesday 17 July) with senior Beijing officials, and plans for the celebrations in Lhasa were not made public in advance. Residents were instructed to put up flags and banners without being told why, and road and building construction work was stepped up earlier this week prior to Hu's arrival. Security has been intense in Lhasa in the buildup to the visit of the Vice-President, who has close ties to the region. As former Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Hu Jintao presided over the imposition of martial law in March 1989 following a series of pro-independence demonstrations in the Tibetan capital.

In a speech made yesterday (Thursday) in Lhasa Hu Jintao said that it is only under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that Tibet can enjoy "prosperity and progress". He said: "[The peaceful liberation] symbolized that Tibet once and for all cast off the yoke of imperialist aggression and that the great unity of the Chinese nation and its great reunification cause have entered a new period of development. It ushered in a new era in which Tibet would turn from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to affluence and from seclusion to openness" (Xinhua, 19 July). Hu warned that the struggle against the "separatist and disruptive activities of the Dalai clique and anti-China forces" would continue. The Chinese authorities first marked China's 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet in May, focusing on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the controversial 17-Point Agreement on 23 May 1951. The main factors determining the timing of Hu Jintao's visit appear to have been the schedules of the Vice-President and other senior leaders at a time of several major meetings in Beijing, and also on the completion of preparations in Lhasa to receive such an important delegation, including road construction, other building projects and implementation of security measures.

A report received by TIN this week said that work on road construction, including the rebuilding of a stretch of East Dekyi Road (known in Tibetan as Dekyi Shar Lam and in Chinese as Beijing Donglu) as a four-lane highway, and other projects has been intensified. It is likely that Hu Jintao would have travelled along Dekyi Shar Lam from the Potala on his way towards the Jokhang Temple. The same source reported that 'in a single day', work teams of hundreds of people planted trees along Dekyi Road in preparation for the visit.

Security has been stepped up in Lhasa in the last few weeks. When a senior official from Beijing flew into Lhasa to oversee preparations for the anniversary celebrations a month ago, the road from the airport to the city was lined by armed soldiers standing at attention, and, according to one reliable source, more soldiers in full riot gear, faces covered with riot shields and holding automatic rifles. The same source reported that the Potala Square area was being checked regularly with metal detectors for several weeks before Hu Jintao's arrival.

A Westerner who returned from Tibet this week told TIN: "[Before the visit] shops, public buildings and restaurants were given flags and asked to put them up but without being told why. Nobody knew anything and the town was full of rumours. It seemed that the event [to mark the 50th anniversary] was being moved to a time that the government wanted to keep secret."

During his meetings this week in Lhasa, Hu Jintao focused on the central role played by the Party and state in Tibet's development over the last 50 years, and warned that: "It is essential to fight unequivocally against the separatist activities by the Dalai clique and anti-China forces" (Tibet Daily, 19 July). During a visit to the Jokhang temple on 18 July, accompanied by Tibet's Party Secretary Guo Jinlong, Tibet Autonomous Region executive deputy Party secretary Ragdi, and Chairman of the TAR government Legchog, Hu urged monks to adapt Tibetan Buddhism even more to socialism and to make a contribution towards Tibet's development and stability (Tibet Daily, 19 July). In his speech, Hu Jintao stressed the basic principles set out at the recent Fourth Tibet Work Forum of accelerating economic development and moving Tibetan society "from basic stability to lasting peace and stability." The Work Forum, which was aimed at setting Party policy on Tibet "for the new historical era", was held in Beijing on 25-27 June and was attended by all seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

To mark the 50th anniversary, Hu Jintao also presented the Tibetan people with a gift of a three-legged urn described in the English-language Chinese press as a "National Unity Precious Tripod" (the Chinese character, *ding*, means an ancient Chinese vessel) bearing an inscription by Chinese President Jiang Zemin. A presentation ceremony was held outside the Hall of the People on Mirig Lam (Chinese: Minzu Lu). Wang Zhongyu, deputy head of the delegation, said that he hoped the urn, which is five metres tall and weighs 3.5 tons, would further encourage the people of the region to rally round the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (People's Daily, 19 July). ■



Right: The East Dekyi Road, July 2001 — roadworks and other 'civic improvements' stepped up just before Hu Jintao's visit

© TIN 2001



Below: Troops in Lhasa for the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the 17-Point Agreement, 23 May 2001

© Free Tibet Campaign



### 17-Point Agreement celebrations in Lhasa

On 23 May, the anniversary of the signing in 1951 of the 17-Point Agreement, the authorities held two official flag raising ceremonies in Lhasa. According to eyewitnesses, the morning flag raising ceremony lasted less than ten minutes and was attended by approximately two hundred people. TIN's source was told that during the Buddhist festival of Sagadawa, which also took place at that time, female Public Security Bureau officials were instructed to dress in plain clothes and to circumambulate the Barkor in order to listen to Tibetans' conversations. *"They were told to listen out for things that were 'unpatriotic'"* the source was told.



Above: The ceremonial three-legged urn or 'ding' in the grounds of the Tibet Hall of the People, Lhasa — unveiled on 18 July 2001 to mark the 50th Anniversary

© Plumpyji/TIN

Right: Crowds in the outer Jokhang watching monks perform a fire ritual during the Sakadawa Festival, early June 2001

© TIN



## TIN NEWS STORY

**'National Day' commemoration highlights political duties of Tibetans**

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 19 DECEMBER 2001 (EDITED)

The Chinese authorities marked the 52nd anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China ('National Day') in Tibet this year with a flag-raising ceremony in the Potala Square in Lhasa attended by hundreds of army troops and Tibetans including schoolchildren who marched behind a red flag (photographs of the ceremony can be viewed at: [www.tibetinfo.net/reports/trlead/nationalday1.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/reports/trlead/nationalday1.htm)). Reports that have reached TIN recently refer to the continuing frustration and resentment among many Tibetans about the requirement to participate in political ceremonies and meetings.

A Tibetan from Lhasa told TIN: *"The local neighbourhood committees told their local residents to show their love for the motherland and gratitude to the Party on the occasion of the 52nd founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China by buying and displaying the Chinese national flag on 1 October. This was described as a matter of political duty."* The same source said that some Tibetans in the Shol district of Lhasa (below the Potala Palace) who had failed to display the flag were fined amounts of up to several hundred yuan. Families in the same area who had failed to display the flag were also questioned by neighbourhood committees, according to the same Tibetan.

A Tibetan journalist who maintains contact with Tibetans in the region expressed the view that there was some resentment among Tibetan cadres and scholars when the requirement to attend political meetings was intensified from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards, following a period of political liberalisation in the early 1980s. The journalist told TIN: *"These days there is a level of acceptance among Tibetan cadres and scholars about the political meetings they are required to attend; they accept this as a fact of life, as a required ritual they have to go through. It does seem that since Guo Jinlong took over as Party Secretary in Tibet [in autumn 2000], the meetings are less intense politically – but some cadres are concerned about the increasing tendency at the meetings to require comments from each person, on subjects such as the Dalai Lama and 'splittism', rather than just listening to speeches. But in general, I think that Tibetan intellectuals are less concerned about the requirement to attend political meetings than about issues directly affecting their culture and academic studies – for instance, the deteriorating academic standards at Tibet University and the down-grading of the Tibetan language."*



Soldiers march into Potala Square for the flag-raising ceremony. In the foreground, Tibetan police in their new black uniforms

The flag-raising ceremony on National Day, 1 October 2001

© Plumpyji/TIN

© Plumpyji/TIN

There was a particular emphasis on political meetings in the build-up to the visit of Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao to Lhasa in July for the 50th anniversary of the 'peaceful liberation'. Tibetan writers and scholars from institutions such as the Academy of Social Sciences and Tibet University were required to attend a meeting addressed by the current Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Guo Jinlong and senior officials and cadres. When Guo Jinlong's predecessor Chen Kuiyuan published a collection of poetry in September 1999, Tibetan writers were required to attend the launch of the book. *"All the Tibetan writers who attended were required to make a comment about the poems,"* said a Tibetan writer now living in exile. *"They read out prepared texts, which of course praised the poetry."*

Subscribing to Party publications is also described as a 'political duty'. The Beijing authorities recently issued a directive emphasising that Party organisations, government offices and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) must subscribe to the main Party newspaper and theoretical journal. At a conference to discuss the directive, Guo Tianlin, head of the TAR propaganda department, told senior TAR leaders: *"Every level of Party organisation must earnestly put into action the spirit of the central government's directive and carry out well the work of subscribing to the Party's People's Daily newspaper and Qiu Shi [Seeking Truth] magazine"* (Tibet Daily, 28 November).

## 'National Day' in Lhasa

The official ceremony to mark the National Day anniversary in Lhasa was brief and relatively low-key compared to the major celebrations attended by Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao in July to mark the 50th anniversary of the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet. The ceremony, which consisted of a military parade into the square, a rendition of the Chinese national anthem by a military band and the raising of the Chinese flag, was attended by various TAR leaders and hundreds of Tibetans, who filed into the square in groups.

The anniversary of the founding of the PRC also has an important economic aspect: the promotion of tourism. The National Day holiday period is one of the main holidays in China, and China's campaign to promote Tibet not only as a foreign, but also as a domestic tourist destination has been increasingly successful, with thousands of Chinese tourists visiting Lhasa during the National Day holiday period. ■

Below left: Riot squads and fire-trucks with water cannon 'on stand-by' near Potala Square, during the National Day celebrations © Plumyji/TIN

Below right: Troops leaving Potala Square after the official commemoration of the founding of the PRC, National Day 1 October © Plumyji/TIN





## TIN NEWS STORY

## Jamming of foreign broadcasts stepped up in propaganda drive

TIN NEWS UPDATE 28 FEBRUARY 2001

The Chinese authorities have stepped up the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts in Tibet following the allocation of increased resources by Beijing in an attempt to prevent 'infiltration' of the airwaves by 'foreign hostile forces'. Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet, which cover both international news and news of the activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community in exile, have all monitored intensified jamming of their broadcasts into Tibetan areas over the past four to six months. The Chinese broadcast authorities have also announced an expansion of state-run Tibetan language broadcasting, including the training of more Tibetan journalists and new programmes in Kham and Amdo dialects, in order to counter the output of foreign radio broadcasters.

The increased expenditure on sophisticated broadcast equipment to carry out jamming and to increase Tibetan language coverage is a result of the Party's recent emphasis on propaganda work in Tibet, which is an important element of Beijing's campaign to develop the western regions of China. Chinese President Jiang Zemin has reportedly expressed concern about the 'infiltration' into China and Tibet of foreign radio broadcasts. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts in Tibet is illegal and dangerous because it can lead to arrest, but many Tibetans listen to these broadcasts at home or even secretly in monasteries or nunneries in order to hear news about the Dalai Lama, religious teachings and issues of particular interest such as Western governmental dialogue with China about Tibet. Many Tibetans also rely on these radio services to find out about what is happening in other Tibetan areas, as opposed to the officially-sanctioned views presented by the state-run media.

Reports from Tibet indicate that the authorities have targeted Tibet's capital Lhasa for the jamming of broadcasts (blocking of radio transmissions by making alternative broadcasts on the same frequency) by upgrading equipment in at least two locations in the Lhasa area. The Tibet People's Broadcasting Station announced on its website in January that the new Tibetan language programming would "counter the hostile forces which infiltrate our nation's air [waves]". Forty Tibetan journalists from the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai and Sichuan are reportedly being sent to Beijing for training in order to work for the expanded broadcast network.

The term 'hostile forces' refers to Tibetan-language coverage by foreign radio stations – primarily the US-government funded Voice of America and Radio Free Asia (which both broadcast in the Kham and Amdo dialects), but also the Oslo-based station Voice of Tibet and the Chinese service of the BBC, which is frequently listened to by cadres

and leaders in Tibet and China. These radio services offer an invaluable link for Tibetans to the outside world and to the exile community. Pema Choejor, Minister for Security in the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala, India, said: "Tibetans who arrive in India say that Tibetan [language] programmes [broadcast by VOA] have enabled them free access to information despite the strict Communist control. According to them, the radio services kept them in touch with international events, especially on issues concerning our political destiny, and being able to hear His Holiness the Dalai Lama frequently." One group of Tibetan listeners wrote to Voice of Tibet that: "Your radio programmes are our only mental relief."

Jigme Ngabo, head of the Tibetan service of Radio Free Asia, a private corporation established in 1996 and funded by grants from the US Congress, told TIN: "Jamming of our service, which broadcasts on five or six frequencies, has intensified since December [2000]. In some areas and at certain times it has been almost impossible to pick up our signal – Lhasa has been the most badly affected area although rural areas are affected too. Jamming is irregular, although the evening hours in particular are heavily jammed."

Oystein Alme, project manager of the Voice of Tibet, which broadcasts one 30-minute Tibetan language programme each day, said: "The Chinese authorities have been jamming our transmissions more or less ever since we started broadcasting, but in November last year [2000] this jamming reached unprecedented levels. It's quite clear that more resources have been channelled into this division of the Chinese state broadcasting network. In order to avoid being jammed, we change the frequency every so often. Five years ago it would take from eight to ten days for the Chinese authorities to register the changed frequency. Now it's clear that they're monitoring us every day as they appear to be aware of the frequency change a day after it happens."

China denies jamming these broadcasts. In 1994 former US President Bill Clinton said that ending broadcast interference was one of the conditions for extending China's Most Favoured Nation favourable trading terms beyond the year. A US technical team including personnel from Voice of America travelled to China during this period to discuss 'mutual interference problems', and the US State Department subsequently announced that China had agreed to end its jamming of Voice of America broadcasts, which it referred to as "disentangling (radio) frequencies used by both VOA and Chinese state radio." John Buescher, head of the Tibetan language service of Voice of America, told TIN that despite this agreement and following the renewal of MFN, jamming of the service by China continued, and has intensified in Tibetan areas over the past six months. "The



*jamming of the Mandarin service into China appears to continue at a constant level, but we've become increasingly aware that there's been some increased expenditure in order to jam our transmissions in Tibetan areas.*" China generally jams foreign radio broadcasts by transmitting other programmes on the same frequency at exactly the same time, or by simply transmitting a loud sound. A Westerner who has travelled widely in Tibet said: *"They do a lot of noise jamming – sometimes if you switch on the radio to listen to a VOA or RFA programme you just hear a really loud noise like a banging or percussive sound. In the cities this noise can be very loud, while in rural areas the signal is noticeably fainter."* In 1996, China jammed the Voice of Tibet by a rebroadcast of China Radio International's English-language domestic music service Easy FM, a joint venture between China Radio International and AWA Australia Technology. Two years later they used programmes from a Canadian service, Radio Canada International, broadcasting from Xian in China, to block transmission, until the Canadian broadcasting service complained to China.

VOA, which started broadcasting in Tibetan to East Asia in 1991, RFA and the BBC all broadcast into Tibet on five or six different shortwave frequencies simultaneously. To broadcast on the same frequencies in order to block coverage requires major expenditure on equipment, including antennae and transmission stations, infrastructure and a substantial power supply. The most common method of jamming is 'skywave jamming', in which transmitters located far from the target area broadcast the jamming signal upwards into the atmosphere from which it is reflected downwards into the target area. This covers a large area, but can be an inexact operation. China is understood to use existing transmitters in China in cities such as Shanghai, Xian and Urumqi to jam foreign radio broadcasts into Tibet. 'Groundwave jamming' is more effective than skywave jamming but only in a smaller target area. Groundwave jamming utilizes a transmission from a high point such as a hill-top or the top of a building within the target area itself such as a city. This method is known to be used in key Chinese cities, and may also be used in Lhasa, in order to prevent an influential sector of the population being able to listen to foreign radio broadcasts.

The Chinese authorities have been concerned about the influence on Tibetans of foreign radio broadcasts for many years, with frequent references made to these services in political education campaigns. In 1992, officials holding a political meeting in a county town in Lhoka (Chinese: Shannan), southern Tibet, complained that villagers knew the exact time and wavebands of All-India Radio and VOA broadcasts, and said that some villagers know about the activities abroad of the Dalai Lama. "They fold their hands while listening as if someone is going to give them something," one official told the meeting, according to an unofficial report received by TIN.

## "A new phase in propaganda work"

The expansion of the broadcasting network in Tibet is an important element of China's campaign to develop the western regions. State-run radio and television networks are perceived as an essential tool in promoting the Beijing line on policies and implementation and thus in achieving 'stability', a prerequisite for economic growth according to the authorities. An article in Tibet Daily on 19 December 2000 stated: *"We must dare to invest [in the media] in order to firmly protect the Party's propaganda tactics."* On 2 January (2001), Tibet Daily reported that *"At the same time as traditional culture is being promoted, modern scientific, technological and news broadcasting undertakings have also achieved unprecedented development."* The same report gave an ideological context to the new propaganda campaign when it warned that the Dalai Lama 'clique' and 'hostile anti-Chinese Western forces' are *"spreading the most shameless slander"* about the 'dying out' of Tibetan culture. The editorial stated that *"fostering the advanced culture that comes with these great times is a requirement of the age"* and *"is a sacred mission bestowed upon us by history"*.

The Tibet People's Broadcasting Station announced on its website early this year that new programmes in the dialects of Kham and Amdo, the traditional Tibetan areas now incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu, would be broadcast for an hour each from 1 May. From 1 October, the length of these programmes would be increased to two and a half hours. A report on the station's website said: *"These [new initiatives] will help to achieve stability and to improve the climate for development."*

The new propaganda drive was also highlighted at a meeting last autumn of journalists and broadcasters in the TAR. Ragdi, chairman of the TAR National People's Congress Standing Committee, told journalists from Xinhua, the Tibet Daily publishing agency, the Tibet Bureau of Broadcast, Film, and Television and representatives of the Lhasa Municipal News and Propaganda Bureau among others, that: *"All levels of ideology and propaganda departments, as well as the vast number of news workers in the entire autonomous region definitely must conscientiously study, incisively understand, deeply implement, and industriously open up a new phase in propaganda work"* (Tibet Daily website, Lhasa, 8 November 2000).

The new Party Secretary of the TAR, Guo Jinlong, outlined the priorities of journalists in a speech to the meeting: *"First is to uphold stability, and promote development; second, to expose and criticize the Dalai Lama, and oppose separatism; third, to espouse and spread national unity, opposing barriers between nationalities; fourth, to propagate scientific and technical progress, opposing blind backwardness; fifth, to erect an advanced model, inspiring*

the confidence of the people." Guo Jinlong continued: "Historically, our Party has motivated the masses through dissemination of news and public opinion, and through educating the masses. In organising the masses, the Party has scored one after another glorious victories in the proletarian revolution and the socialist development undertaking...The vast number of news workers has shouldered the important historical responsibility in a new century of expanding the totally new appearance of a new Tibet in front of the world."

A speech last month (January 2001) by Legchog, head of the Tibet Autonomous Region government, indicated the primary role of propaganda in Chinese policy on Tibet. "At present, the situation we are faced with is good as a whole, yet there still exist destabilizing factors that will affect state security and social stability," said Legchog in a speech to a police rally in Lhasa on 11 January (Tibet Daily, 12 January). "Hostile forces in the West have stepped up their attempts to westernise and disintegrate China. Particularly, while continuously seeking to internationalise 'the Tibet issue', the 'Dalai clique' has infiltrated, by all possible means, areas inside China where people of the Tibetan nationality live in compact communities; incited defection among personages at the upper strata of the religious circles; illegally enthroned living buddhas [this Chinese term, *huofo*, refers to incarnate lamas]; and contended with us for control over monasteries and religious affairs." The 'incited defection' mentioned by Legchog is a reference to the escape from Tibet last year of the 17th Karmapa.

## Foreign broadcasts run by 'renegades' and 'criminals'

The propaganda strategies of the state-run media are well-known among Tibetans in Tibet. One Tibetan referred to the poor quality of state-run broadcasts in a conversation with a VOA interviewer. He said: "We cannot totally blame the broadcasters and journalists because they themselves are under the control of the Communist regime of China. They cannot broadcast news that is inappropriate and against the Communist regime. Particularly they are not allowed to broadcast any news that is related to Tibetan politics...The domestic television programmes and newspapers provide the news only about the activities of the so-called 'patriotic education' and about the Communist Party. They never provide accurate news about the Tibetan cause. True information that is reliable is never broadcast [on the state-run media]."

A Tibetan former media worker told TIN: "Mostly, the higher levels decide what subjects should be written about. They tell you what to write and what to do. There is some leeway to give suggestions as to what you think you should do. But we came under the TAR Department of Propaganda, and they decide what should be published. They tell the heads



Tibetans in Lhasa gather outside a teahouse to watch TV – a common sight in the city © TIN

of the newspaper and television departments what they have to write about and these heads in turn tell the editors what they have to write about."

An article on propaganda published in the Chinese journal *Zhongliu* on 12 June 1999 singled out the radio services of VOA and RFA for particular criticism and indicated the level of threat they represent to the authorities. "The start of Radio Free Asia broadcasting showed a new escalation in the US radio infiltration of China," stated the article in the monthly journal. "On 23 May 1996, a self-styled 'Voice of Tibet' station started broadcasting to Asia from Norway in Tibetan for 15 minutes a day. This shows that the Northern European nations have joined the ranks of the broadcasters to China....The radio broadcast strategy of the Western nations against China serves the West's anti-Communist and anti-China foreign policy...The broadcast might of Western nations is unprecedentedly strong."

The *Zhongliu* article also criticises the political agenda of foreign radio broadcasts: "They praise 'objectivity' and 'impartiality', stressing so-called 'factual' news, to separate news from commentary...They do this intentionally to create a false image, playing themselves up as 'innocent' information providers, to get people to believe them. The BBC regularly brags about being objective, impartial, and unbiased, which is in fact not the case...Western radio focuses on attacking the Communist Party and socialism." The *Zhongliu* article concludes that journalists working for radio stations including VOA and RFA are "renegades... mainly 'political dissenters', 'traitors', and criminals who have fled socialist countries. The [radio stations] hold that using the powerful tones of such exiles can most effectively achieve their ends." ■

## External propaganda

### TIN NEWS STORY

### Tibet official links China's Olympic bid to struggle against separatism

TIN NEWS IN BRIEFS, 14 MAY & 12 JULY 2001 (EDITED)

A successful Olympic bid for Beijing would help to promote Tibet's image to foreigners and undermine the influence of 'splittists' in Tibet, according to a senior official in Lhasa. Party Committee Secretary of the Tibet Sports Bureau, Shedrub Namgyal (named in Chinese as Xi Zhu Lang Jie), said in an interview published today on a Chinese website that if Beijing was awarded the Games, more foreigners would come to Tibet, with *"no one wanting to listen to those splittists"* ([www.tibetinfar.com](http://www.tibetinfar.com), 12 July). The campaign against splittism – or those who want to 'separate' Tibet from 'the motherland' – is central to Beijing's policy on Tibet and has been emphasised in recent statements by the Chinese authorities. Ragdi, Tibet Autonomous Region deputy Party secretary, said in a speech on 23 May: *"The battle against separatism has changed from a passive, perfunctory approach to positive governing so as to resolutely protect the unification of the motherland and the unity of the people, as well as social and political stability in the region."* (Tibet Daily, 28 May).

Shedrub Namgyal's interview was published on the eve of the announcement in Moscow of the decision on which country will host the Olympics (Friday 13 July). He was quoted as saying: *"Beijing's success would have a positive influence on Tibet...it can encourage more Tibetans to do exercise. Second, it can attract more foreigners to Tibet, which will certainly further the development of [the] travel industry in Tibet. Third, with more and more foreigners coming to Tibet, people will know more about Tibet and there is no one wanting to listen to those splittists."* The official website [www.tibetinfar.com](http://www.tibetinfar.com) also included photographs of Tibetans in Lhasa dancing in front of the Potala *"to support Beijing's bidding for hosting the Olympic Games"* and claimed that 10,000 Tibetans had signed a *khatag* (white ceremonial scarf) supporting Beijing's bid.

Tibetans working for the government are required to endorse Party policy and implementation, whatever their personal feelings. While it is occasionally possible for nuances or expressions of dissent to emerge between the lines of official statements or quotes that feature in the official media, it is unlikely that this would happen with regard to such a straightforward issue as the Olympic bid. Whether they are in favour of China's bid or not, Tibetans are simply expected to express their enthusiastic support.

The Chinese official media has published statements from all over China, including Tibetan areas, in support of Beijing's bid. In March Tibet Daily quoted two Tibetan officials expressing support for the bid during the Ninth Party

Congress. Yungdrung Gawa, Vice Chairman of the Regional People's Congress and Vice President of the Tibetan branch of the China Buddhist Association, told the Party Congress that *"even some herders in remote areas of Tibet have written letters in support of Beijing's Olympic bid"*. Another Tibetan speaking at the Congress, Lobsang, told the Congress that he hoped that Tibet would have athletes competing in the 2008 Olympic Games, and he also expressed the wish that *"people will be able to use the new railway to attend"* (Tibet Daily, 10 March).

China has objected to recent criticism linking its bid for the Games with 'politics' in the form of its human rights record. This is in direct contrast to Beijing's position in 1980, when the former Soviet Union made a bid to host the Games following its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. *"The Soviet authorities have time and again declared that 'politics should not be mixed with sports, in an attempt to confuse the minds of the people of the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world,'"* reported Xinhua on 9 February 1980. *"In their history of 84 years, the Olympic Games were never a sports gathering with emphasis on competition alone. The Olympic charter clearly stipulates the education of young people through sport as its aim, 'thereby helping to build a better and more peaceful world' and 'to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world thereby creating international goodwill'.* The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan flouts the aim of the Olympics and threatens world peace sought by the Olympic movement... It is distasteful even to think that the Soviet social-imperialists who are overrunning the territories of other countries and pursuing expansionism everywhere should host the Olympic Games dedicated to 'the creation of a better and more tranquil world'." ■



'Sports Day' at Tibet University, April 2001 – all departments were required to attend speeches and a flag-raising ceremony



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 23 MAY 2001 (EDITED)

## China to strengthen Tibet policy as Dalai Lama meets US President

The meeting between the Dalai Lama and US President George Bush today (23 May) has a particular political significance for Beijing as the official meeting at the White House is being held on the same day that the Chinese authorities mark the 50th anniversary of their 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet. The meeting in Washington DC between the exiled Tibetan leader and the US President follows a Hong Kong newspaper report that the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, presided over by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, will be held in Beijing in a 'few days' in order to set guidelines for future policy on Tibet (Ming Pao, 19 May). The report by Ming Pao, which has close links to Beijing, said that the Work Forum would *"make arrangements to dispel the Dalai Lama's influence among religious believers so that the Tibetan people will switch their attention to 'Tibet's development and progress'."*


The Chinese government's current concern over international support for the Tibet issue is reflected in the account of the preparations for the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, which have focused on 'coping' with the 'convergence and collaboration of five evil forces', which are named as the separatist movement in Tibet, the separatist movement based in Xinjiang, the independence movement in Taiwan, the Falun Gong spiritual movement and the Chinese 'pro-democracy' movement (Ming Pao, 19 May). The Hong Kong newspaper, which is a principal outlet for Chinese news and views in Hong Kong, reports that the Central Committee of the Party will formally 'redefine' the nature of the Dalai Lama as the *"chief representative of the feudal serfdom, the loyal tool of the western anti-Chinese forces, the chief culprit attempting to split the motherland and betraying the interests of the country and the people."*

The Chinese authorities have intensified their attacks on the Dalai Lama in the build-up to the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement between Tibet and China, which according to Beijing legitimised the incorporation of what is now the Tibet Autonomous Region into China, as well as entry of the People's Liberation Army into the area and the subsequent implementation of policies devised by Beijing over the past 50 years.

The Chinese media coverage reflects Beijing's continued frustration at the loyalty among Tibetans to the Dalai Lama, and in particular the welcome he receives from Western governments and world leaders. Editorials in the Chinese press over the past few days have warned the United States that Tibet *"is a purely internal affair of China's"*.

While former US President Bill Clinton met the exiled Tibetan leader in the context of a brief and relatively informal 'drop-by' encounter, President Bush will be holding an official meeting with the Dalai Lama later today (23 May) in the upstairs private residential area of the White House, accompanied by several of the President's most important advisors, including Vice-President Richard Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, according to reports from Washington.

The visit of Taiwan's President, Chen Shui-bian, to the US during a three-day stopover has been an additional source of tension between China and the US this week, particularly following a meeting of the Taiwanese President in New York with members of Congress on Monday (21 May). ■



The Potala is listed as a world-heritage site. Its front wall collapsed during summer 2001

© Pumpyji/TIN



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN SPECIAL REPORT, 16 JULY 2001 (EDITED)

## Propaganda and the West: China's struggle to sway international opinion on the 'Tibet issue'

### The struggle against an 'international anti-China force'

China's foreign propaganda chief Zhao Qizheng acknowledged in June 2000 that in terms of external propaganda the "enemy is strong and we are weak" and that this position would be "difficult to reverse". China has also recognised that its official statements on Tibet are often not treated as credible. As a result there has been a call for Tibetologists in China to take up arms on the 'battlefield' of propaganda. Cultural delegations are carrying China's political message abroad and foreigners – diplomats, politicians, academics, tourists and journalists – are being invited to visit Tibet to see for themselves the progress Beijing says has been made over the last 50 years, albeit under tightly controlled conditions.

### "Missiles in the battlefield": Tibetan Studies as a propaganda tool

"The so-called 'Tibet issue' [...] was single-handedly cooked up by the imperialists, who are, together with the Dalai clique, carrying out a 'splittist' plot against us. This has caused an acute and complicated political struggle between separatists and anti-separatists in the field of Tibetology". (Tsering Paljor [Ch: Cering Banjue], head of the scientific research department of the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences)

China has been increasing its investment in Tibetology and has made great efforts to publicise the rapid growth of Tibetan Studies in China over the past few years. This partly comes down to national pride: while Tibetan Studies are popular in the West and relatively well established, China views itself as the natural home of Tibetology and wants to be seen as leading the field. However, Beijing also has an overtly political aim in developing China's Tibetan Studies. China sees the development of Tibetan Studies in the West as part of the 'international anti-China force' campaign to westernise and split China. This lies at the heart of China's current efforts to develop this area of studies so that it can use its own academics to counter foreign 'anti-China' reports and influence international public opinion. The basic criterion by which academic (or journalistic) work is judged is whether it is 'anti-China' or 'pro-China'. The greater part of Western academic (and media) work is perceived as 'anti-China' because it does not strictly adhere to the Chinese Communist Party line. Beijing has taken note of the credence given to academic work in the West and sees it as undermining Chinese attempts to legitimise their rule and

policies in Tibet and to promote their own view of Tibetan history and development to the outside world.

Tsering Shakya, a Tibetan historian and research fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, believes that China "grossly exaggerates the influence of *Tibetan Studies in the West* – there is a huge gap between the proliferation of *Tibetan Studies* and the actual impact that it has on foreign policy." However, although the impact of Tibetan Studies may have been minimal in determining the direction of government-to-government relations with China, which are influenced to a far greater extent by trade and domestic security considerations, China is sensitive to criticism and easily embarrassed by perceived challenges to its credibility (resulting in 'loss of face'). Academic works examining the legitimacy of Chinese rule and policy in Tibet – and as a result challenging the official Chinese view – are particularly badly received by the authorities.

On 12 June 2000, a meeting was held with the aim of "exploring how to make better use of *Tibetology in external propaganda work*". The Director of the Information Office of the State Council Zhao Qizheng gave a long speech at the start of the meeting summarising the current situation in the 'struggle' for international opinion over the Tibet issue. He then went on to explain the important role that Tibetology has to play in this struggle and to set out general guidelines for future Tibetology work.

Zhao Qizheng, who also holds the post of Director of China's Foreign Propaganda Office, advocated organising Tibetologists and other intellectuals to participate more in western intellectual activities and to promote China's views in the West. He also stressed the desirability of using western intellectuals as propaganda mouthpieces. Practical methods of implementing this strategy were given: there should be an increase in academic output and more translations into foreign languages; Tibetologists and other intellectuals from China should increase their presence in the West through exchanges and conferences; Tibetologists and other intellectuals from outside China should be encouraged to visit China to tour the country or participate in academic conferences.

A former Tibetan official in the TAR government, now in exile, believes that the June 2001 meeting represents a "major step forward" in external propaganda work. He told TIN that the fact that academics were present at the June meeting indicates that they are now perceived to have an important role in the external propaganda effort. He said: "The status of

*scholars is lower than that of politicians and they would not normally be invited to attend meetings held by a political department as important as the Information Office of the State Council."*

The proposed new role for academics in state propaganda efforts was further emphasised earlier this month, following the Fourth Tibet Work Forum which was held in Beijing from 25 to 27 June. The Fourth Forum, a national level meeting to assess and determine China's Tibet policy, was attended by all seven members of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Wei Jianxing, Li Lanqing). Full details of the forum have still to emerge. However, the Tibet Daily quotes the director of the TAR Party propaganda department, Xiao Huaiyuan, as saying on 6 July that, *"in accordance with Jiang Zemin's request"* – presumably at the Fourth Forum – the TAR's philosophy, social sciences and Tibetology researchers carry a *"weighty responsibility"* to:

*"Strengthen theoretical research, particularly research into nationalities, religion, history, culture, sovereignty and human rights in order to carry out a systematic refutation of the reactionary falsehoods of the Dalai clique and the international anti-China forces, struggle against all kinds of reactionaries, corrupt or backward thinking and ideology and create a good social environment for modernisation."* (Tibet Daily, 9 July 2001)

### **"Non-politicised propaganda"**

At the Tibetology and external propaganda meeting in June 2000, Zhao Qizheng acknowledged that China needs to adapt its propaganda tone if it is to win international support. He talked about the success of the *"non-politicised propaganda of the Dalai Lama"*, who *"portrays himself as a spiritual teacher [...] and pretends to be seeking dialogues and autonomy"*, hoping to win *"greater international sympathy and support"*. Zhao Qizheng argued that while 'official' propaganda has failed to bring foreigners around to China's position, academics are in a prime position to do so, due to their 'non-governmental position'.

*"Succinct and well written works would be 'missiles' in the battlefield of foreign propaganda and could play an irreplaceable role"*, Zhao Qizheng said. *"Of course, these works must truly have weight and be able to strike the target of the harmful foreign language works of our enemies; their arguments should be clear, with a proper foundation; the material must be accurate and reliable, quoted passages should be referenced, and at the end of the book there should be bibliographies and indexes"*. He acknowledged that *"as a rule, the Western public does not really trust government propaganda"*, going on to say *"generally, our foreign friends listen readily to specialist academics, because of their non-official nature and their authority in academic affairs"*.

One example of this kind of work is a recently published report by the Human Rights Society of China, a Chinese non-governmental organisation, accusing the US government of masterminding the Tibetan 'separatist' movement (China Daily, 25 May 2001). The report uses western research publications and media reports as sources of information. In addition to reflecting the current stepping up of rhetoric between the US and Beijing, it is also a sign of the heightened significance China now places on using academic reporting to counter popular western perceptions of Tibetan history and the current situation.

### **Politics v academic credibility: conflicting aims**

*"Without a foundation of sound theoretical research, our external propaganda on Tibet will be like a lake without a source; it will be difficult to make it penetrating and effective."* (Zhao Qizheng speaking at a conference on Tibetology and external propaganda work on 12 June 2000)

*"It is impossible for any Tibetologist to completely ignore the actual political struggle, carrying out 'pure research' in the capacity of a 'pure scholar'. Therefore, it is a matter of some urgency for the Tibetology circle in our country to establish the position of political study courses within Tibetan Studies, and fully bring into play the role of politics research in safeguarding the sovereignty and honour of the state, unity of the motherland and solidarity of the nationalities."* (Tsering Paljor (Ch: Cering Banjue), head of the scientific research department of the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences)

There is an inherent contradiction in a system like China's in which academics are told to produce 'factual' work of a 'high academic standard', but are also given extremely narrow, policy-driven parameters within which to work – everything has to strictly adhere to the Party line.

Zhao Qizheng said that it is crucial to develop, on the basis of thorough research, *"theories on nationality, religion, human rights and culture that can be understood and accepted by international society"*. Among other things, these theories should be used to *"explain the correctness of all the policies we are carrying out in Tibet [...] clearly explain why Tibet is an indivisible part of China, why Tibet had to implement democratic reform, why the nationality area autonomy currently implemented by Tibet is the most beneficial means of guaranteeing nationality equality and nationality autonomous rights [...] and why the Communist Party, which advocates atheism, is able to implement a policy of freedom of religious belief..."*

The former TAR government official told TIN that from a Chinese Communist viewpoint there is no contradiction in 'factual' and 'objective' work being subject to Party interests. According to Marxist ideology the written word is a tool to

serve the 'masses'. There is no place within this ideology for independent voices, which are, according to the ideology, necessarily subjective and no competition for the 'collective wisdom' of the Party. The contradiction lies between Western and Communist Chinese perceptions of 'objectivity' and 'fact'. A correct view, according to Communist ideology, is based on the notion of class struggle; while according to western tradition academic credibility is based in part on independence from political institutions – even though individual academics are inevitably influenced by ideology and politics.

While it is significant that China is even taking into consideration the notion of academic quality as distinct from class struggle and the class nature of the author, there appears to have been a failure to recognise that until genuinely independent voices are allowed to be heard, academic work in China will continue to face a lack of credibility in the West. The current attempt to understand and use Western academic concepts of quality and objectivity inevitably results in conflict with the fixed tenets of Marxist ideology, while continued emphasis on using academic work in China as a tool of the Party means that the research will not be accepted as credible according to Western standards. As historian Tsering Shakya (whose book *Dragon in the Land of Snows* was one of the books singled out by Zhao Qizheng as having made "such a deep impression" on the western perspective of the Tibet issue) says: "At present Tibetologists in China are not seen as independent scholars, they are seen as cultural cadres supporting the Chinese Communist Party".



An information board in the Jokhang announces that "National Culture also belongs to the world" © TIN

## Conclusion: A strategy of engagement and attack

Over the last few years, the volume of China's foreign-language propaganda material on Tibet has been dramatically increased. More broadcasting material, glossy magazines like *China's Tibet* and recently established specialist websites like [tibetinfo.com](http://tibetinfo.com) provide ready-made news stories on economic development and culture that are frequently picked up in the West and that publicise foreign praise of China's policies. China's official foreign language media give Tibet disproportionate coverage when compared with other regions of the PRC. However, as a central strategy in the 'struggle for international public opinion' on the Tibet issue, China has seen a need not only to engage with the West and to increase propaganda output, but also to adapt its propaganda for a foreign audience in an attempt to be taken seriously.

International image, not least in legitimising Chinese Communist Party rule and policies in Tibetan areas, is important to China for reasons of national pride and economic development. The picture that China wants to project in order to obtain the foreign expertise and investment it needs to carry out its development plans is one of social stability and economic potential. In its efforts to persuade the world of the validity of such an image, China has tried to find a strategy to counter the vast amount of information published outside its borders that does not accord with the official Party line.

Official Chinese propaganda on Tibet today maintains a focus on development achievements over the last 50 years and the central role played by the Party and state, with renewed emphasis on depictions of a thriving Tibetan culture and religion. This strategy combines regular attacks on 'anti-China' activities by foreign governments, media and academics with efforts to promote an image of transparency by inviting visitors to Tibet and attempts to win over foreign academics and journalists to bolster China's credibility. The success of these propaganda tactics will depend on how willing the West is to accept the image of Tibet that China is seeking to promote. ■

### Note:

The full text of this TIN Special Report (approx. 6,000 words) is on TIN's website: [www.tibetinfo.co.uk/news-updates/nu160701.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.co.uk/news-updates/nu160701.htm).

The full text of Zhao Qizheng's speech of 12 June 2000 on Tibetology and external propaganda is available on the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) website in English and Chinese: [www.savetibet.org/about/pressreleases/release\\_010409\\_tibet\\_propaganda.html](http://www.savetibet.org/about/pressreleases/release_010409_tibet_propaganda.html)

All quotes taken from this speech and used in this report have been translated by TIN from the Chinese version.



## KEY DOCUMENTS

**"Tibet's March Towards Modernisation"**

Paper by the Information Office of the State Council, 8 November 2001

On 8 November 2001 – the day UN Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson arrived in Beijing to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin – the Information Office of the State Council issued a White Paper entitled *Tibet's March Towards Modernisation*. Apparently timed to counter any criticism from Mary Robinson, and ostensibly to coincide with official celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the 'Peaceful Liberation of Tibet', the introduction to the White Paper states its aim as "...clearing up the various misunderstandings on the 'Tibet Issue' in the international community and promoting overall understanding of the past and present situations in Tibet."

The White Paper argues that modernisation has been the fundamental issue in development in Tibet in modern times. In the first of its three sections, it lays out the Chinese authorities' version of Tibetan history, comparing conditions in 'Old Tibet' to the Middle Ages in Europe, and describes how the revolution of 1949 "...brought hope for the deeply distressed Tibetan people", and how the raft of reforms following 'peaceful liberation' propelled Tibetan society forward in "seven league boots". Actions of the central government are indicated to be the prime motivating force for change, particularly after the 1994 Forum on Work in Tibet. The second section then provides an overview of the changes brought about in the TAR, again "thanks to the leadership of the Central Government." Aspects of the TAR's economic and social development including industry, urbanisation, education and health care are described by means of contrasting depictions of 'Old Tibet' and the contemporary situation. Through selective use of statistical and other information, the White Paper presents a picture of a booming economy and a healthy, stable society with thriving cultural and religious traditions.

The third and final section, entitled *The Historical Inevitability of Tibet's Modernisation*, asserts that the TAR's development is an unavoidable consequence of social forces stemming from the demands of the Tibetan people themselves, and that the TAR has "...cleaned up the filth and mire left over from the old Tibetan society". Furthermore, the emancipation of the

Tibetan people, states the paper, could not have been achieved without the support of central government and without realising the TAR's integral position within the 'motherland'. There then follows the accusation that the 'Dalai clique' and 'hostile foreign forces' denigrate healthy modernisation in the TAR as "the elimination of Tibetan characteristics", and that their reason for wanting Tibetan independence is to re-establish feudal theocratic rule. The paper accuses them of a "vain attempt to utilise the 'Tibet issue' to sabotage the stability of China, split China's territory, and prevent China from developing and prospering."

Overall, the White Paper, touted by Xinhua as containing "lots of facts and the latest statistics", is a reformulation of existing propaganda. Its purpose appears to be to restate the official arguments that change in Tibet has been both vital and entirely positive, and that such change could not have taken place without the leadership of the Communist Party and the integration of Tibet into the 'motherland'. The White Paper makes very selective use of statistics and other information to reinforce its points, without truly addressing the profound economic and cultural issues that exist in Tibet today. It is also notable that throughout, there is little or no mention of Tibetan involvement in choices, decision-making procedures or policy implementation.

On 10 December 2001, the Tibetan Government in Exile's Department of Information and International Relations published a response to the White Paper, entitled 'Height of Darkness: Chinese Colonialism on the World's Roof'. The paper states at the outset that China's modernisation drive is "perhaps... the biggest disaster to confront the Tibetan people" since the Chinese occupation. The paper examines the political rationales underlying China's push for modernisation, and focuses on the areas of health care, education and human rights in composing its assessment of development towards modernity in Tibet. The tone of the paper is almost entirely negative, and its conclusion is not new – in essence, that China's "colonial rule" must be brought to an end and that Beijing must seek to work with the Dalai Lama.

Extracts from the final 2 paragraphs offer a sample of the White Paper's tone and content:

"Facts speak louder than words, and people have a sense of natural justice. It is universally acknowledged that Tibet is a part of China's territory, and the progress made by the Tibetan community is there for all to see. China has conformed to the trend of the times and followed the wishes of the people in its efforts to promote the modernization of Tibet and combat the Dalai Lama clique's separatist activities. It is only right and proper to do so. The history of 50 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet shows that the trend of the times cannot be checked, and the tide of history is irreversible. Tibet's modernization and social progress are part of the general trend and popular feeling. Any lie will certainly be revealed by the objective facts of Tibet's development; any perverse acts to turn the clock back, prevent Tibet's modernization drive and separate Tibet from China are doomed to ignominious failure. [...]

It can be confidently asserted that, on the solid foundation laid over the last 50 years and with energetic support and help from the Central Government and people all over the country, Tibet will ultimately realize vigorous development in the process of its modernisation drive through arduous efforts, and witness a still more brilliant and splendid future."



## 6 Security

During 2001, the authorities continued to implement stringent security measures to prevent expressions of dissent, particularly around the time of sensitive anniversaries. For the key political anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising on 10 March, severe restrictions were put in place around key monasteries in and around Lhasa, and a few days prior to the anniversary, former political prisoners and their relatives were required to attend a meeting in which they were warned not to participate in 'anti-state' activities. During Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao's visit to Tibet in July, at the time of official commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet, security operations appeared to be aimed at intimidating Tibetans and discouraging them from participating in protest activities.

With regard to wider national security concerns, on 29 December 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a third set of amendments to the 1979 PRC Criminal Law, which appear to be a reaction to the events of 11 September. The purpose of the amendments was said to be *"to deal more harshly with criminal acts of terrorists, for the protection of national security, social order and safeguard of safety of people's lives and property"*. While protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan areas has in the main been peaceful, it is quite possible that some of the amended provisions may prove applicable to protest in Tibetan areas, particularly as there is no definition of the term 'terrorist' in the Criminal Law.

A new 'Strike Hard' drive against criminal activity was launched throughout China, after President Jiang Zemin said on 4 April that progress must be made in *"improving*

*the public security situation"*. Reports in the Chinese media indicated that by June, at least six executions had taken place in the TAR as a result of the campaign.

Also as part of the 'Strike Hard' campaign, security personnel on the Chinese side of the Tibet-Nepal border stepped up patrols to detain people crossing the border illegally. The authorities in Shigatse prefecture, through which Tibetans generally travel on their way into exile, have highlighted the importance of border security policies and reported their own success in 'seizing' people who were 'stealing across the border'. Meanwhile, reports towards the end of 2001 indicated that the number of Tibetans arriving in exile had declined appreciably in comparison with previous years. In addition, there was a marked increase in the number of deportations of Tibetan refugees from Nepal. ■



Pilgrims prostrating along the Lingkhör in Lhasa on 10 March 2001  
© TIN



Top: CCTV security camera on the roof of the Potala  
Above: Digging up the pilgrim route – roadworks on the Lingkhör, 10 March 2001

© Plumpyji/TIN

## Domestic security and 'Strike Hard'

TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 23 MARCH 2001 (REVISED)

### Security clampdown for 10th March anniversary

The Lhasa authorities stepped up security and took special measures to prevent expressions of dissent on 10 March, the key political anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, and to control the celebration by Lhasa citizens of significant religious and cultural festivals during the first month of the Tibetan New Year (Losar). Increased numbers of Public Security personnel were reportedly stationed around key monasteries and temples in the city prior to the 10 March anniversary, and the authorities held a meeting for former political prisoners and their relatives several days before the anniversary in order to warn them not to participate in 'anti-state' activities.

Government workers, cadres and schoolchildren in Lhasa were told to stay at home to celebrate Tibetan New Year (which began this year on 24 February), and were not permitted to attend prayer festivals at the monasteries or make financial donations to temples and monasteries. Despite the security clampdown, many pilgrims and other Tibetans still made religious offerings at the main temples in Tibet's capital during this period.

Severe restrictions were in place this year in monasteries in and around Lhasa on the day before the anniversary of the uprising, which coincided with an important Buddhist festival, the 15th day of Tibetan New Year. On 9 March, the day of this festival, which marks the Buddha's peaceful conquest of injustice and ignorance, monks were not allowed to leave their monasteries to travel in and out of the city. Full public celebrations of the Monlam Chenmo (Great Prayer) festival, which is of great importance to Tibetan Buddhists, have not been permitted in recent years following various incidents of resistance by monks during the pro-independence demonstrations in the late 1980s, when many monks and nuns chose to protest at the arrest of political activists by boycotting the festival. A Tibetan from Lhasa told TIN: *"Since the traditional way of celebrating the Monlam Festival has been stopped, the Lhasa Monlam celebration is now just in name only, with so many [rules and regulations] by the government of China that have no relevance to the spirit of the Monlam festival. It has become a kind of charade with little substance."*

The Religious Affairs department of the TAR government sent representatives to the three main Lhasa monasteries of Sera, Ganden and Drepung in order to specify that each monastery should be responsible for organising strictly religious activities within their own institutions and that no one should be allowed to either leave or enter the monasteries during the Monlam Chenmo festival period. This centuries-old Tibetan festival of great religious and political importance marked the submission of the state to the authority of religion and was formerly held in the Jokhang, involving monks and nuns from Ganden, Sera and Drepung as well as other monasteries and nunneries.

This year, no form of religious activity was allowed to take place in the three key monasteries other than that specified by the authorities. According to a Tibetan from Lhasa, in the event of violation of these regulations, *"inquiries will be initiated to find out the culprits and punishment meted out in accordance with the law"*. A second Tibetan from Lhasa now living in the West commented on the 500 yuan (US\$60) reportedly offered by the authorities to Drepung monks. *"Lhasa people are not allowed to give large cash donations to monks and their monasteries, so the Chinese are taking with one hand and giving with another,"* the Tibetan told TIN. *"This [payment of] 500 yuan shows that the authorities are not only carrying a stick [with their policies] but are also offering a carrot where it suits them."*

An article in Tibet Daily on 15 February confirms that cash handouts were given to monks in Drepung, Ganden, Sera and the Jokhang temple, and reports that this payment was 300 yuan (\$36) to each monk and retired monk. Vice-chairman of the TAR Lobsang Dhondrub visited the monasteries on 13 and 14 February, according to an article in the newspaper, and *"gave each person a gift of 300 yuan (US\$36)...during these visits a total of 110,000 yuan (US\$13,305) was given in gifts to more than 1,900 monks and nuns"*.

### Former political prisoners given warnings

The Lhasa authorities, including representatives from the TAR Judicial Department and cadres from prisons in Lhasa, held a meeting five days before the 10 March anniversary that former political prisoners and their relatives were required to attend. Ex-political prisoners face particularly intense surveillance in their daily lives and are frequently targeted by the authorities for questioning or threats before significant political anniversaries in Lhasa.

A formal meeting of political prisoners and their relatives is unusual and is likely to have been a part of the authorities' attempts to prevent dissent on 10 March this year. According to an unofficial report received by TIN, not all former political prisoners invited to the meeting were present. The same source told TIN that the authorities warned former political prisoners not to listen to foreign radio broadcasts and said that their attendance at ideological education [sessions] was not satisfactory. The source said: *"The authorities told former political prisoners that under the Party's good policy and new circumstances, they should make a firm commitment of trying to help society instead of harm it. They were also told that they should fight against anti-state activities."* ■

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 15 MAY 2001 (EDITED)

## Party Secretary emphasises 'stability' during visit of Tashilhunpo



Police 'on guard' in Shigatse © TIN

Monks and tourists at Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Shigatse © Plumppji/TIN

The Office of the Democratic Management Committee, Tashi Lhunpo Monastery © Plumppji/TIN

TAR Party Secretary Guo Jinlong's visit to Shigatse in early April was accompanied by heavy security. According to unofficial reports received by TIN, public security officials were posted throughout Tashilhunpo monastery, private vehicles entering the city were checked by police and brothels were closed in the surrounding area on the day of the visit. The purpose of the Party Secretary's visit appears to have been to underline the importance of 'political stability' and the Party's security policies in the region. The political situation at Tashilhunpo monastery has been of particular concern to the authorities since the unrest that followed the Chinese choice of Panchen Lama in 1995 to replace the boy recognised by the Dalai Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, who remains in custody at an undisclosed location. More than 40 Tashilhunpo monks were jailed in the aftermath of the 12 July 1995 demonstration in which monks shut the monastery down in protest at China's appointment of a Panchen Lama and the detention of Tashilhunpo's abbot, Chadrel Jampa Trinley Rinpoche. Most of the monks were released after a few months, but some were given sentences ranging from six months to two and a half years.

The TAR Party Secretary Guo Jinlong praised Tibetan lamas at Tashilhunpo for removing the "obstructions and disruption caused by the Dalai Lama to the reincarnation of the Panchen" (Tibet Daily, 10 April) during his visit to Tashilhunpo

on 8 April, where he met members of the nationality affairs management committee, some high-ranking lamas, and leading officials from the Shigatse Prefectural Buddhist Association. According to a reliable report from Tibet, Guo Jinlong did not meet most of the monks at the monastery. The same report said: *"The fact that he did not meet most of the monks there is a sign of the doubt in the minds of Party officials about the true feelings of the majority of the Tashilhunpo monks."*

According to the Tibet Daily report on 10 April, Guo Jinlong warned that: *"Safeguarding social stability is in the fundamental interests of all people, including the lamas. The vast numbers of lamas should fully and clearly understand the excellent situation marked by social stability and rapid economic growth in Tibet... If society is unstable, economic development will stagnate, and it will be hard to conduct normal religious activities, much less attract an ever-increasing number of worshippers and pilgrims to lamaseries."* The regional Party Secretary presented the monastery with a horizontal board (Tib. go jang) inscribed by Chinese President Jiang Zemin with the characters *"Safeguarding the Country and Benefiting the People"*. The newspaper reported: *"This [presentation of the board] is an incomparably lofty honour to Tashilhunpo."* ■

1 Presenting horizontal boards (Tib. go jang) to religious institutions, seems to be a custom which originated in China. Many big temples and monasteries in Tibet feature such horizontal boards which hang upon the main entrance gate. Many were presented by Manchu/Qing emperors who thus demonstrated their dedication to religion and presented themselves as benefactors of the institution in question.

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 25 SEPTEMBER 2001 (EDITED)

## Security in Lhasa during Hu Jintao's visit

Further information has reached TIN of the levels of security in Lhasa during Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao's visit to Tibet on 17-23 July (see page 78, *"Chinese Vice-President in Lhasa to mark anniversary of 'peaceful liberation'"*, TIN News Update 20 July 2001).

A reliable report received by TIN said that there had been various detentions during the tense few weeks prior to the arrival of the Vice-President, including the detention of a member of a committee organising the anniversary celebrations. The security operations on the streets of Lhasa appeared to be aimed at intimidating Tibetans and discouraging them from participating in protest activities. Vice-President Hu Jintao has close ties to Tibet; as former Party Secretary of the TAR, he presided over the imposition of martial law in March 1989 following a series of pro-independence demonstrations in the Tibetan capital.

Several thousand Tibetans were required to attend the main anniversary ceremony on 19 July attended by Hu Jintao in the Potala Square, surrounded by armed security personnel, while others, including children, students and monks, were required to form part of various delegations welcoming the official visitors to Lhasa. Some Tibetans who saw the main ceremony either on television or in the Square reported that speeches made during the ceremony by central and regional leaders focused on attacks on the Dalai Lama, rather than emphasising the role of China in Tibet's development over the past 50 years as many onlookers had expected.

Security was stepped up substantially for several weeks before Hu Jintao's visit. In the week prior to the visit and for a few days after Hu Jintao's departure, Lhasa residents would witness the same security procedure taking place each evening: four trucks pulled up in front of the Jokhang – two armed with water-cannons, and the other two carrying riot squads. Security personnel in camouflage uniforms with helmets and riot shields would disembark, run through the Jokhang Square, and reassemble outside the police station. A Western visitor to Lhasa at the time told TIN: *"It seemed that these actions were designed to intimidate the local population."* Others reported that government marksmen were clearly visible on the rooftops of buildings in the Barkor, the traditional Tibetan area of Lhasa. A few weeks before the arrival, on several occasions security personnel visited tourist hotels in the early hours of the morning and checked the identities and documentation of tourists. Lhasa residents were given red flags and other commemorative flags and told to put these up outside their homes and shops; some were warned that they would be fined if they did not do so.

On the evening of Hu Jintao's arrival in the city on 17 July, the Potala Square was cleared of visitors by police. One Western tourist present at the time said: *"This was done mainly by Tibetan policemen, wearing new black uniforms; they intimidated the Tibetans present in the square and some Tibetans were kicked but the police were quite polite to tourists. They moved people several hundred yards away from the entrance to the square and then they installed a police line, held by plainclothes personnel with yellow armbands. Every section of the surrounding streets was covered. Only people with passes were allowed in the square."* Neighbourhood committee members were present in the crowd supporting the actions of the police.

Attendance of the main ceremonial events was strictly controlled. Several thousand Tibetans were selected by their work units to watch celebrations in the square on 19 July, and were required to assemble and take their seats at 5 am. They were not allowed to carry anything with them for security reasons – including umbrellas to protect them from the sun, water-bottles or food. Lhasa citizens who were not required to attend the celebration were instructed by neighbourhood committees and officials to watch the events on television rather than going out onto the streets. Despite this warning, thousands of people gathered near the Potala Square from early in the morning. After the dignitaries left the square at around mid-day, onlookers watched the departure of the military and security personnel. One eyewitness said that the parade included roughly 2,000 troops, contingents of the military police armed with sub-machine guns, five or six trucks armed with water-cannons, trucks with machine-gunner posts, another truck pulling coils of barbed wire, and large foot contingents of riot squads in command gear. Some tourists who were taking photographs on the day had film taken from their cameras by police.

According to reliable reports, rewards were given to some Tibetans in senior positions or to security personnel who had helped to ensure cooperation with the commemorative events. According to one source, the administrative heads of each monastery in Lhasa received a substantial bonus and a day off following the celebrations. The same source said that some officials in local police stations also received bonuses and some received cellphones. ■

For additional information on Hu Jintao's visit see: Page 78 – TIN's reporting of Hu Jintao's visit  
Page 45 – Coverage of Hu Jintao's speech to cadres, 19 July 2002





New national flags 'flying from every rooftop' (issued to residents prior to Hu Jintao's visit) — in the background the new PSB building under construction

© TIN



'The stage is set' — preparations in Potala Square for Hu Jintao's visit © TIN

## KEY DOCUMENTS

### Amendments to the Chinese Criminal Law

On 29 December 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a third set of amendments to the People's Republic of China Criminal Law (1979). The purpose of the amendments is said to be "to deal more harshly with criminal acts of terrorists, for the protection of national security, social order and safeguard of safety of people's lives and property" (Xinhua, 17 December 2001).

This is a national-level law applicable throughout the PRC. However, some of the new provisions can be seen to bear particular relevance to protest activity in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the Chinese government has further intensified the already repressive nature of its regime in the Muslim region, and has hinted at links between Uighur and other opposition to Chinese rule and international 'terrorism'. Overt links to Tibetan areas have not been in evidence, and, with the exception of occasional bombings that have caused small-scale property damage rather than human injury, protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan areas has in the main been peaceful. Nonetheless, particularly as there is no definition of 'terrorist' in the Criminal Law, it is quite possible that some of the amended provisions may prove applicable to instances of protest in Tibetan areas. A brief summary of the changes is therefore given here.

The PRC Criminal Law already contained some provisions relating to 'terrorist' crimes, in the section dealing with 'Crimes Endangering Public Security'. The December 2001 amendments for the most part alter provisions in this section. There is no definition of 'terrorist organisation' in the law, thus it could be interpreted to include religious or peaceful opposition groups.

## Amendments to the Chinese Criminal Law 1979 – A brief summary

**Article 120** The penalties for participation in a 'terrorist' organisation have been amended. Any person who 'organises' or 'leads' such an organisation is now to be sentenced to "*not less than ten years or life imprisonment*" (previously not less than three but not more than ten years). Any person who "*plays an active part*" is to be sentenced to "*not less than three nor more than ten years*" (no change) and "other participants" to "*fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention or public control of not more than three years*" or, which is new, to loss of political rights. Thus, the law continues to make simple membership of an organisation labelled as 'terrorist', without any other illegal act, an offence punishable by up to three years in prison.

A paragraph has been added to Article 120 as follows: "*Any person who funds a terror organisation or an individual carrying out terrorist activities shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or public control of not more than five years or deprivation of political rights and in addition be imposed a fine; where the circumstances are serious, the sentence shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years in addition to a fine or confiscation of property.*"

*Where a unit commits the crime as described in the preceding paragraph, the unit shall be fined and the person directly in charge of the unit and other personnel with direct responsibilities shall be punished in accordance with the provisions in the preceding paragraph."*

Again, where there is no definition in the law of 'terrorist' or 'terrorist organisation', this may have the effect of discouraging funders of religious or peaceful opposition organisations. There is no maximum term of imprisonment given in this article, which presumably could permit a sentence of life imprisonment.

**Article 114** which deals with harm caused to public security by setting fires, breaching dykes, causing explosions or releasing poisonous substances, has been amended to include reference to the release of "*any radioactive substance or contagious disease pathogens*". The penalty, between three and ten years imprisonment, remains the same.

**Article 115**, which deals with similar cases to Article 114 where serious injury or death or major losses to public or private property result, has also been amended to include reference to the release of any "*radioactive substance or contagious disease pathogens*". The penalty remains the same (fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years, life imprisonment or death).

**Article 125**, paragraph 2, which previously referred only to the illegal trade or transportation of nuclear materials, now reads as follows: "*Any person who harms public security by illegally making, buying or selling, transporting, or storing any poisonous substance, radioactive substance, or contagious disease pathogens shall be punished in accordance with the provisions in the preceding paragraph.*" The punishment to be given may include the death penalty "*if the consequences are serious*". However, it is not clear whether 'harm' to public security in itself requires consequences, or could be considered as being met by simply undertaking the actions listed.

**Article 127**, which previously referred to the theft of guns, ammunition or explosives, now also includes reference to "*any poisonous substance, radioactive substance, or contagious disease pathogens*". In addition, the two paragraphs have been rephrased to commence "*Any person who harms public security by...*" although, as in article 125 above, it is not clear whether it is the action itself, or any specific consequences, that comprises 'harm'. As before, the second paragraph provides a harsher penalty (not less than ten years' imprisonment, life imprisonment or the death penalty) for theft of the above items from state organs, military and police personnel or the people's militia.

**Article 191**, which covers criminal actions taken to conceal income obtained from narcotics, smuggling and organised crime, now also includes a reference to that obtained from 'crimes of terror'. The penalties essentially remain the same. ■

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATES, 27 AND 28 JUNE 2001

## Executions in Tibet during Strike Hard campaign

There have been at least six executions in the TAR as a result of a new wave of the 'Strike Hard' campaign in China, which aims to crack down on crime. Reports in the Chinese media refer to three executions of criminal prisoners in Nyingtri (Ch: Linzhi) prefecture and one execution of the "chief culprit of a criminal gang" in Nagchu (Ch: Naqu) prefecture. Reports received by TIN state that there were two executions in Lhasa in May, with an official source stating that the death sentences were handed down for "murder, theft and causing explosions". According to TIN sources, one of these executed prisoners may have been a Tibetan who was detained on 27 March, a day after planting a home-made bomb outside the front gate of the Lhasa municipal Public Security Bureau compound in Lingkor Jang Lam in Lhasa. The bomb reportedly failed to explode.

Five more death sentences were announced in a Xinhua report broadcast on Tibet TV on 27 June. According to Xinhua the death penalty was handed down to five "murderers, armed robbers and explosives criminals" in the TAR. Large-scale public rallies, convened by the local or municipal courts in Lhasa, Shigatse (Ch: Rigaze), Lhoka (Ch: Shannan), Chamdo (Ch: Changdu) and Nagchu (Ch: Naqu), were held on Tuesday (26 June) to announce the death sentences. The report does not say whether the executions have already been carried out.

The latest Strike Hard drive was announced three months ago after Chinese President Jiang Zemin said on 4 April that progress must be made in "improving the public security situation" in China in the next two years (People's Daily, 4 April). While the Strike Hard campaign in China focuses mainly on crimes such as drug smuggling, theft and murder, there is a strong political dimension to the campaign in the "nationality autonomous" areas of Tibet and Xinjiang where Strike Hard is linked to the 'anti-splitlist struggle'.

Wang Lequan, Xinjiang's Party Secretary, was reported as saying: "The Strike Hard campaign is a national campaign and different regions have a different focus depending on their local situations. In Xinjiang, Strike Hard is aimed at burglars, thieves and those participating in violent crimes. But [we also have] the separatists, religious extremists and terrorists. These people are conspiring to jeopardize national security" (South China Morning Post, 30 May). According to Amnesty International, Xinjiang is now the only region of China where people accused of involvement in political offences are known to be executed. An Amnesty International spokesperson said: "There has been a partic-

ular focus on separatists and alleged terrorists in Xinjiang during the Strike Hard campaign. As a consequence people have been executed and in some cases it has been unclear whether they have actually been involved in violent offences. They are unlikely to have had a fair trial and therefore there are likely to be miscarriages of justice." Courts in Tibet have yet to impose the death penalty on any Tibetan initially detained for political protest activity in the period from 1987 onwards. According to TIN records, however, about two per cent of all political detentions (representing at least 39 prisoners, including nine nuns and 18 monks) are known to have resulted in death due to severe maltreatment.<sup>2</sup> An extremely low number of Tibetans accused of 'splitlist' activities have committed violence or have been charged with violence.

The Dalai Lama is frequently blamed by Chinese officials for the incitement of 'criminal activities' in Tibet. An article in the official newspaper Tibet Daily on 19 June said that the rising crime rate in Nagchu (Ch: Naqu) prefecture in the TAR was partly due to "the infiltration of the Dalai clique's splitlist activities into rural and pastoral areas". The Tibet Daily report also appeared to acknowledge the impact of the influx of Chinese migrants into the region when it stated that the rising crime rate was also due to "the increase in the number of temporary residents".

According to Xinhua, during the two months since the launch of the current Strike Hard campaign in the TAR, more than 200 "criminal elements who have seriously endangered social order" have been "swiftly and heavily" sentenced and 47 "public judgement-pronouncement rallies" have been held. In listing the priorities of the 'Strike Hard struggle' in the TAR, Xinhua first mentions "crimes that endanger state security", followed by "crimes by wicked gangsters that seriously endanger social order, serious violent crimes including murder, physical injury and armed robbery, and frequently-occurring crimes that seriously affect the masses' sense of security" (Xinhua report broadcast on Tibet TV 27 June 2001). Tibet Daily highlighted the importance of crimes that endanger state security in a report of a meeting held in Lhasa on 24 April to discuss social order and Strike Hard. The official newspaper reported the views of 'comrades' including Li Guangwen, a member of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Regional Party Committee, as follows: "In times of peace we should prepare for danger, from start to finish place the maintenance of stability at the forefront of work in the whole region and thoroughly expose the Dalai's reactionary political nature and religious hypocrisy" (Tibet Daily, 25 April).

2 The figure as at February 2002 was 41 deaths as the direct consequence of severe maltreatment. See 'In the Interests of the State', p.3, published by Tibet Information Network, June 2002

## A deeper anti-separatist struggle

The Secretary of the Lhasa City Chinese Communist Party Committee Jampa Phuntsog (Ch: Xiangba Pingcui) said that the 'anti-separatist struggle' must be continued in Tibet "at a deeper level", according to a Chinese regional radio report broadcast in Tibet on 30 April. Jampa Phuntsog announced at a meeting in Lhasa on 29 April that arrangements must be made for "immediately launching a Strike Hard campaign" in order to "improve social order" in the city. He said that there should be a renewed crackdown on criminal activities, an 'improvement' of the police "by political means" (a reference to political education of security personnel) and a strengthening of grass roots organisations.

A Tibet Daily report on 19 June on crime in Nagchu prefecture stated that the current "Strike Hard and rectification" campaign was necessary in order to tackle the upward trend in crime in the region. The official newspaper reported that Suoduo [Tib: Samdrub], the "chief culprit of a criminal gang" was executed on 21 May after a public "sentencing rally". "Three serious criminals" were also executed "by shooting" in Nyingtri prefecture, Tibet Daily reported in a separate article on 19 June. The announcements of executions in the official media are meant to serve as a deterrent to the wider society.

A third Tibet Daily article on 19 June about the Strike Hard campaign gave an account of the confiscation by police in Shigatse prefecture of various materials including "8,180kg of dynamite, 1,920 metres of blasting fuse, 600kg of highly toxic pesticide" and "four bombs with steel balls [shrapnel]". The Tibet Daily report does not indicate whether these materials were found in connection with possible 'splittist' or other criminal acts. All of these materials are available on the black market in China. Dynamite and explosives made out of fertilizer and ammonia are frequently used for illegal mining and road construction workers also use dynamite to blow up rockfalls from landslides. It is likely that the reports of the seizure of these materials are aimed at highlighting the achievements of the Shigatse authorities in line with Beijing's Strike Hard policy. 'Explosions' were listed by Jiang Zemin as one of the most serious crimes to be targeted in the nationwide Strike Hard crackdown.

### 'Killing the chicken to scare the monkeys'

A number of major rallies to publicly parade prisoners and announce their sentences have been held in the past three months in Shigatse prefecture in order "to make a big fanfare" to publicise the 'Strike Hard' campaign (Tibet Daily, 19 June). The newspaper reported: "By the end of May, the prefecture had held 13 public arrest and public judgement-

pronouncement meetings, at which 72 suspects and criminals were publicly arrested and sentenced."

These public rallies are commonplace in Tibet and China, with attendance by local people frequently compulsory. Parading the prisoners in trucks, generally with placards around their necks and under armed guard, is intended to make an example of certain individuals. The public display of punishment and humiliation is meant to serve as a strong deterrent to those witnessing it, as demonstrated in the Chinese phrase "killing the chicken to scare the monkeys".

These rallies, which follow the sentencing of the prisoner in court, are particularly prevalent during political campaigns, such as the current 'Strike Hard' campaign. A Western tourist gave TIN the following account of a public sentencing rally in 1998 in Lhasa: "I saw two Chinese blue trucks in a convoy of police vehicles, each truck carrying four prisoners, heading west on East Dekyi Lam. They had one prisoner at the front of the cabin and three over the side facing the street at either side; each prisoner was accompanied by two soldiers who were in full riot gear in camouflage clothes and transparent mask. At the front of each truck there was a mounted machine gun with one soldier standing behind the machine gun. In the procession there were about 20 police motorbikes, some with side-cars, about 14 mini-vans and five land-cruisers, and at least 50 police officers and 50 soldiers. The procession turned right into Nyangdren Lam and stopped in front of the market, blocking the road."

The tourist reported that a desk and microphone were set up in the street with a banner in Chinese that read: *Public Sentencing Rally*. "Six of the prisoners were brought down to ground level and then each of them was brought forward as their sentence was read out," the tourist told TIN. "They were all handcuffed and at least one had ankle shackles. The two who were left on the trucks had a rope on their neck tied to their hands and they weren't handcuffed. An official behind the desk read out the sentences in Chinese. Hundreds of people came to see what was going on but there was no reaction from the crowd. It was too difficult for people to talk to me because the police had already tried to take my camera."

When a death sentence is passed in court, the prisoner is frequently taken to a public area such as a stadium or market square where his sentence is announced, and then shot immediately afterwards. The charges against prisoners at such rallies are frequently unclear to witnesses. A Tibetan who has witnessed several sentencing rallies in Shigatse prefecture said that instructions are often given to government workers to attend the rallies, while a Western tourist who witnessed a sentencing rally in Lhasa in May (2001) said that people were being called off the streets to witness the parade and display of prisoners. ■



## Border security

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 15 MAY 2001 (EDITED)

### Security policies in Shigatse

The authorities in Shigatse have highlighted the importance of security policies in the prefecture, making the unusual announcement in Tibet Daily that 254 people were 'seized' by border security troops when attempting to cross the Tibetan border with Nepal over the winter. The official press also highlighted the success of grass roots security organisations in the prefecture, and TAR Party Secretary Guo Jinlong emphasised the importance of 'stability' during a visit to Shigatse (Ch: Rigaze) in the TAR in early April, where he met officials and management at the Tashilhunpo monastery, seat of the Panchen Lama.

The work of border security units in the Shigatse region during the winter 'Strike Hard' campaign was commended at a meeting of the Tibetan Public Security Border Defence Leading Group Party Committee on 9 March, according to a report in Tibet Daily on 10 March. The report stated that: *"During the 'Strike Hard' struggle, the public security border defence unit hunted down and seized a total of 254 people who were stealing across the border and captured various reactionary propaganda materials."* 'Reactionary propaganda materials' can include books written by the Dalai Lama or leaflets produced in exile Tibetan communities. People entering Tibet who are discovered to be carrying printed materials deemed politically sensitive are treated much more harshly than other Tibetans caught making illegal border crossings and may face prison sentences. The official newspaper stated that the border defence personnel in Shigatse also *"vigorously attacked criminal border activity"*, thus *"frightening the criminals"*.

Tibetans generally have to pass through Shigatse prefecture in order to cross the border into exile, which means that there is a particular focus on border security in the region. The Chinese authorities were embarrassed last year by the escape into exile of the 17th Karmapa, who was being prepared by the authorities to assume a role of national significance as a 'patriotic' Buddhist figure loyal to the Communist Party. This may have increased pressure on local officials in Shigatse over the past year to highlight successes of border defence initiatives and security policies. According to reports received by TIN, the number of Tibetans crossing the national frontier into exile in the winter period of 2000 - 2001 has declined by about 15 per cent compared to the same period a year ago. While this may indicate some success on the part of the Chinese authorities to reduce the number of border crossings, the numbers remain at a level that reveals a high degree of Tibetan resolve to travel between Tibet and Nepal and India despite the risks.



Riot patrol on the streets of Shigatse

© TIN

Tibet Daily reported on 7 March that Shigatse prefecture has formed a *"new path of grass roots activities that suits the whole prefecture"*. Grass roots security policies are part of an overall comprehensive security strategy, the chief aims of which are to eradicate 'separatism', to eliminate support inside Tibet for the Dalai Lama and his exile government, and to prevent illegal border crossings. The Tibet Daily report stated that: *"In recent years, the Shigatse prefectural Party committee and administrative office have seen a stable situation as of great importance... at each level of Party and government [they have] explicitly designated a good person to be responsible for implementing the comprehensive management of social order and also for ensuring safety, with counties, townships and villages forming [a system where] one grade is responsible for another and one grade urges another on, to be implemented [at all levels]."*

Tibetans who are caught in Shigatse trying to leave Tibet or those detained while trying to enter the country from exile are frequently held for short periods at township level jails such as Dram (Ch: Zhangmu) or Dingri and county detention centres such as Nyalam (Ch: Nielamu) before being sent to the prefectural detention centre known as Nyari, a Chinese-built 12-block complex. Tibetans sent to Nyari after being caught crossing the border can be held for several weeks, or in some cases, several months, before being released or sent to detention centres nearer a detainee's place of birth. Political prisoners who complete their sentences and later attempt to cross the border are at particular risk of further imprisonment if they are caught. Former prisoners in Nyari have reported that maltreatment, including beating of prisoners, deprivation of food and water and poor conditions, is common at the prison. ■

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 24 DECEMBER 2001

## New increase in deportations of Tibetans from Nepal



The Chinese border-post at the Friendship Bridge – Tibet/Nepal border October 2001

© Plumppji/TIN

There has been a marked increase in deportations of Tibetan refugees from Nepal, according to reports from the region. The deportations are technically illegal under international law, and contravene an undertaking given from January 1990 onwards by the Nepalese authorities to hand over asylum-seekers to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Kathmandu. The Nepalese police state that the deportees have not claimed asylum and are merely illegal travellers without documents.

Reliable reports received by TIN indicate that since 25 November at least 15 Tibetans have been returned to border guards on the Chinese side by Nepalese police, including several children who were sent out of Tibet by their parents with a guide. These cases are ones where witnesses were able to pass on information; the real figure for deportations is likely to have been higher. In one incident at the end of November, a nine-year old boy was handed back after being found in the back of a truck by Nepalese police. According to one source, he was detected during a vehicle inspection shortly after leaving the border area when Nepalese police heard him crying. In a second incident, a Tibetan man and two children were detained south of the border in Nepal near Barabisa (approximately 30km south of the border) and taken to Tatopani, just a few kilometres from the border, after entering from Tibet. By the time a Tibetan representative from the Kathmandu reception centre for Tibetan refugees arrived in the area two days later, the three Tibetans had been sent back across the border. Local police reportedly said that they had had no instructions as to what to do about the Tibetans, and that they did not have the space to hold people for long. One source reported that police on the Tibetan side of the border gave Nepalese officials a high fee for handing the Tibetans over to them. Last week two Tibetan men and their guide were caught on a bus in the Barabisa area of Nepal by police. Their current whereabouts are not known, but they may have been sent back to Tibet. TIN has also received reliable reports that several guides who take Tibetans across the border have been detained in both Tibet and Nepal in the last few months.

Roland Weil, Protection Officer for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), told TIN: "It has been agreed with the Nepalese authorities that they should allow Tibetans to transit through Nepal and to proceed to a third country, which in this case is India. The agreement took effect after 31 December 1989 [when the Nepalese government stopped granting legal refugee status to Tibetans arriving from Tibet].

As far as the UNHCR is concerned, anyone who would ask for asylum is entitled to have their asylum claim assessed. For Tibetan refugees arriving in Nepal, this effectively means that Tibetans have the right to transit through Nepal to India. We have had some worries about people being sent back from the Kodari border post area [114km by road from Kathmandu through Tatopani and Barabisa] for some time." Roland Weil added that there are still a number of Tibetans using Chinese passports who are able to transit safely.

When the UNHCR is told that Tibetans are being detained in police posts in border regions, it aims to make contact with local police there. Roland Weil said: "We aim to inform police of the understanding we have with the Nepalese authorities to allow these Tibetans to transit through Nepal, and we ask them to send these Tibetans down to Kathmandu. We also ask if there is any impediment to doing so, and whether we can help to resolve this. Often, for instance, they are not aware that UNHCR covers the expenses of local police and those Tibetans they accompany to Kathmandu. In certain areas, some officers may be reluctant to allow their men to accompany Tibetans to Kathmandu due to possible risks from the activities of Nepalese Maoist guerrilla forces, as police have been targets for Maoist violence in rural areas. In this case, it is possible for the UNHCR to send staff to accompany the Tibetans. We also contact the Director of Immigration in Kathmandu and ask him to intervene. The main problem we face is getting through to the police as the lines are frequently down. Sometimes by the time we make contact, it is too late and the Tibetans in question have been sent back." When asked about UNHCR procedure when

phone contact was not possible, Roland Weil said that it was possible to send a member of staff by car to areas easily accessible from Kathmandu by road, but that prior clearance was needed from the authorities and from a senior level at the UNHCR. He also said UNHCR have on at least one occasion used a helicopter to airlift out a group of Tibetans who were stranded in a remote border town. No UNHCR car was sent in any of the recent cases of deportation, even though the phone lines to the border area were not working.

When the Kathmandu-based UNHCR was informed that two young Tibetan men were being held by police in the Barabisa area from 20 December, a letter was sent by the UNHCR to the Director of Immigration requesting his intervention to ensure that the Tibetans were not sent back. The UNHCR then followed up with the Director General of Immigration requesting an investigation into what happened to the Tibetans, but no further information emerged about

their whereabouts as of 24 December. Deportation of refugees detained in that area usually takes place within a day of detention.

Reports from Tibetans who have been sent back across the Chinese border from Nepal, but who have subsequently succeeded in escaping, indicate that Nepalese border guards often have friendly relations with their counterparts on the other side of the border, and that they can earn fees for handing back Tibetan refugees. Tibetans who are handed back to the authorities in border areas are frequently detained by the Chinese authorities, and can be held for several weeks or months in detention centres or prisons as a result. Crossing or attempting to cross a border without official papers is a serious offence under Chinese law. Beating, interrogation and other forms of intimidation and maltreatment are common during these periods of detention. ■



The 'border town' of Dram (Ch: Zhangmu, Nep: Khasa) on the road leading to Nepal from Tibet

© Plumpjiti/TIN

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 2 JANUARY 2002

### Decline in refugee numbers as China and Nepal tighten security on Tibetan border

Border security on both sides of the Tibetan-Nepalese border has been stepped up in the last few weeks, leading to a significant decline in the numbers of Tibetans arriving in exile. More Tibetans usually escape from Tibet during the winter months than at any other time and many are currently attempting to travel to the Kalachakra teachings (a traditional Buddhist ceremony) by the Dalai Lama in Bodh Gaya, northern India, at the end of January. An official Chinese report claimed recently that 2,500 Tibetans have been caught in Tibet in the past eight months trying to cross the border either into or out of Tibet. Security measures have been stepped up on the Nepalese side of the border as a result of China's continuing influence regarding the issue of Tibetans passing through Nepal as well as the current state of emergency in Nepal imposed by the government in order to counter the activities of Maoist guerrilla forces.

The number of Tibetans escaping into exile normally increases in the winter months, particularly in November, December and January. During 2001, however, the number of Tibetans who arrived in exile was approximately half that of the equivalent period over the past five years. Roland Weil, Protection Officer of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, told TIN: "Approximately 2,500 Tibetan refugees arrive in Nepal every year. The total annual figure for 2001 is likely to be well under 2,000. The safety of Tibetans crossing the mountains into Nepal is increasingly uncertain, partly due to the risks they face on arrival in Nepal, and also because many guides have been arrested over the past year." The decline in numbers of Tibetans arriving to transit through Nepal is particularly notable since many Tibetans from Tibet were expected to attend the Kalachakra teachings at the end of January. The Chinese authorities are aware that many Tibetans may be seeking to



leave Tibet to attend this ceremony, which may have led to further restrictions being imposed. TIN reported last week that there has been a marked increase in deportations of Tibetan refugees from Nepal, with at least 15 Tibetans known to have been repatriated from Nepalese border areas since 25 November 2001.

According to Xinhua, security personnel on the Chinese side of the border have stepped up patrols in the Nangpa-la area as part of the 'Strike Hard' campaign (Xinhua, 16 October 2001). The report stated that in the eight months since February, police working in the border areas *"tracked and apprehended more than 2,500 people trying to cross the border"*. This figure could be exaggerated in the interests of local officials and in order to serve Chinese propaganda purposes. It would include Tibetans returning to Tibet from exile and Tibetans detained in border areas without official permits. Xinhua reported: *"During the 'Strike Hard' campaign, officers and men of the Tibetan border patrol units have had to brave freezing conditions and extreme discomfort in order to carry out their duties of preserving stability in the border regions of the Motherland. As a crossing point, Nangpa-la mountain pass has always been a 'golden route' for people trying to steal across the border. Patrolling the mountain pass at Nangpa-la is a duty that has to be carried out every night by the officers and men of the unit and involves a two-hour walk from the unit's temporary station to Nangpa-la. Wearing leather hats and thick padded greatcoats, they have to wade through three waist-deep streams and traverse two mountains that are snow-capped even in summer."*

The Nangpa pass (Tib: Nangpa-la) is one of the four main entry points from Tibet into Nepal – the others are Humla, Mustang, Dram (Khasa in Nepalese and Zhangmu in Chinese). A new check-point was set up on the Nangpa-la pass last year, approximately two kilometres from the border on the Chinese-Tibetan side. A Tibetan who was travelling earlier this year to Nepal through the border county of Tingri (Ch: Dingri) reported that officials financially rewarded local people for providing information on Tibetans suspected of planning to escape across the Nangpa-la.

The Kathmandu Post reported three weeks ago that Chinese security forces were on 'high alert' due to the current state of emergency in Nepal. According to the Nepalese newspaper, an unnamed security official said that Chinese officials have increased security measures along the Nepal-China border because the Nepalese government has officially designated the Maoist groups currently active in Nepal as 'terrorists'. Chinese security personnel are now keeping close watch on Nepalese people who cross the border into Tibet, the official said, also stating that Nepalese and Chinese officials had made an agreement to cooperate in *"containing the terrorism"* in the Tatopani area (12 December 2001).

A Westerner travelling from Tibet to Nepal overland two weeks ago said that the journey from the border areas of Nepal to Kathmandu took twice as long as usual due to extra security check-points resulting from the state of emergency in Nepal. Roland Weil from the UNHCR told TIN: *"Naturally with the imposition of the state of emergency in Nepal there has been an increase in security in border areas, including increased checks on identity of people passing through these regions. So Tibetans travelling without legal papers are therefore at increased risk of being taken into custody and not allowed to proceed to Kathmandu."*

According to the UNHCR, the Nepalese government stopped granting legal refugee status to Tibetans who had arrived from Tibet after December 1989 onwards. The Nepalese government, the UNHCR and the Tibetan government in exile expect Tibetans who have arrived in Nepal to continue through to India after a stay at the UNHCR reception centre in Kathmandu. Nepal's legislation on immigration makes no distinction between foreigners and asylum seekers, nor does it make any specific provision for refugees. Both foreigners and asylum seekers arriving in Nepal are considered illegal immigrants if they fail to comply with Article 3 (1) of the Nepalese Immigration Act (1992), which states: *"No foreigner is allowed to enter or stay in the Kingdom of Nepal without a visa"*. It is rare for Tibetans entering Nepal to have a visa or any legal papers. It has become increasingly difficult for Tibetans from central Tibet, particularly Lhasa, to obtain passports in recent years, although it is still possible for them to do so if they have good connections with well-placed officials or are able to afford bribes to pass onto a 'middleman' who can obtain access to officials. A Tibetan from Lhasa who is now in exile told TIN: *"All applicants for passports and visas are screened for their background and present loyalty to China. Moreover, participation and support for the Tibetan cause is the deciding factor; one family member [with a record] is sufficient to create problems for the entire family."* ■





# 7 Prisoners and prisons

**D**uring 2001, TIN published photographs and further information on three different prison facilities in northern Sichuan.

The senior religious teacher Sonam Phuntsog, whose detention sparked off major demonstrations in Kardze, Sichuan, in October 1999, is reportedly being held in one of these prisons – Ngaba in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture.

TIN also reported the death following maltreatment of a Tibetan farmer, Tsering Wangdrag, at Xinhua Re-education Through Labour centre in Mianyang municipality in northern Sichuan. Tsering Wangdrag was being held at the

labour camp following his participation in the protests against Sonam Phuntsog's arrest. Ngawang Lochoe, a 28-year old Tibetan nun, died in February 2001 a year before the end of her 10-year sentence in Drapchi. TIN also reported the death of Namgyal Tashi, the father of Ngawang Sangdrol, the longest-serving female political prisoner in Tibet. Namgyal Tashi died in September 2001, a former political prisoners himself, he was known for his determination and strong beliefs and had spent a large part of his life in prison or labour camps.

## Chadrel Rinpoche


### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATES, 23 AND 30 AUGUST 2001 (EDITED)

### New information on Chadrel Rinpoche prison term

New information has emerged regarding the whereabouts and sentencing of Chadrel Rinpoche, the senior Tibetan lama who led the search for the Eleventh Panchen Lama. According to a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesperson, Beijing told the UK government during a human rights dialogue session in February that Chadrel Rinpoche had been sentenced to six years imprisonment in 1996 and would not be released until January 2002. According to the spokesperson, Beijing also confirmed that Chadrel Rinpoche is being held in Sichuan province and that he is in 'good health'. This is the first official comment on his condition since Beijing said he was "*ill and in hospital*" in August 1995. Chadrel Rinpoche, the 62-year old former abbot of Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse, had disappeared on 17 May 1995, three days after the Dalai Lama announced that he had identified the Tibetan boy Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.

During a visit to Lhasa from 8-10 August, four Polish Parliamentarians were told by former TAR government chairman Gyaltsen Norbu that Chadrel Rinpoche was "*still serving his term*" in prison because he "*disclosed state secrets by giving out the name of the boy who was supposed to be the Panchen Lama before it was approved by the authorities.*" The Polish delegates were also promised copies of photographs that the authorities allege are of the boy recognised by the Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima. Executive TAR Party Deputy Secretary Ragdi told the delegates that Gendun Choekyi Nyima was 'far away' from Lhasa and so the pictures could not be obtained immediately. According to one of the Polish delegates Gyaltsen Norbu was "visibly annoyed" by the Polish delegation's repeated questioning over the whereabouts of Chadrel Rinpoche and Gendun Choekyi Nyima.



Main building at Tashi Lhunpo monastery



© Plumyji/TIN Chadrel Rinpoche

© TIN

The information given to the UK government about Chadel Rinpoche contradicts earlier official information stating that Chadel Rinpoche was sentenced in 1997, a year later than the date given to the UK FCO, and is inconsistent with other information on Chadel Rinpoche's prison term. Chadel Rinpoche is generally understood to have been due for release in May 2001. The first official announcement that he was being held in custody was made in May 1997, when the official news agency Xinhua reported that he had been sentenced to six years in prison by the Intermediate People's Court in Shigatse on 21 April 1997 for "the crime of splitting the country" and for stealing state secrets (Xinhua, 7 May 1997). The same Xinhua report also stated, without explanation, that "the above verdict went into effect by law on 5 May (1997)". Neither a start date of May 1995 nor of April or May in 1997 would in itself be consistent with Chadel Rinpoche's six-year sentence ending in January 2002.

According to the Chinese Criminal Law (Article 47), the period a person spends in custody prior to formal sentencing to fixed-term imprisonment is counted as part of the

sentence. TIN research into the imprisonment of Tibetan political prisoners since 1987 has found that this legal procedure is generally implemented, with sentences measured from the date of initial detention and inmates rarely detained beyond the end of their sentence. The release date of January 2002 given to the UK government for Chadel Rinpoche implies that the Chinese authorities are dating the six-year sentence back to January 1996 – which does not take into account the seven-month period following Chadel Rinpoche's disappearance in 1995. In addition there is as yet no clear explanation for the two different dates given for the trial; UK officials were informed that this took place in 1996 – a year earlier than Xinhua originally stated in its report on 7 May 1997. ■

Note: According to new information, Chadel Rinpoche was released in January 2002, but his whereabouts on release and state of health remain unknown. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, based in India, reported that he had been held under house arrest since his release. Beijing finally stated that the Rinpoche had been released in early January and that he was "leading a quiet life".

## Deaths related to detention

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 6 FEBRUARY 2001

### Tibetan farmer dies in prison

A Tibetan farmer in his thirties has died in prison in Sichuan province following his participation in demonstrations to protest against the arrest of a respected Buddhist teacher. Tsering Wangdrag, who is survived by his wife and two young children, died last August in prison while serving a sentence of three years and eight months. Reports received by TIN indicate that he was beaten unconscious at least once, suffering blows to his chest and stomach, during his initial period in detention following the demonstrations in Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) county town, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan in October 1999. He reportedly continued to be subjected to beatings when he was transferred to prison and he was said to be suffering from poor health including stomach problems following the maltreatment.

Tsering Wangdrag was one of several Tibetans sentenced for their participation in one of the largest demonstrations in Tibetan areas since the 1980s. The demonstrations followed the arrests of a senior Buddhist teacher, Sonam Phuntsog, who is reportedly still being held in detention, his assistant Sonam and another monk, former political prisoner Agyal Tsering. Several hundred people are said to have joined the protest, and troops reportedly fired guns in the air to break up the demonstration.

Factors such as the town's remote location and the severity of the crackdown have meant that only limited information has emerged about the aftermath of the demonstrations; it is clear, however, that suppression of the demonstration resulted in dozens of brief detentions, several prison sentences and heightened political tension in the area. Eight to ten Tibetans sentenced following the detentions, including Wangdu and 37-year old Pema Phuntsog, who are both serving three years, are reportedly being held in Maowun (Chinese: Maoxian) county prison, in the southern part of Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan prefecture. It is likely that Tsering Wangdrag was also being held in Maowun and that he died there.

The October 1999 protests in Kardze reflected the loyalty among local people to the teacher Sonam Phuntsog, a well-known scholar and Tibetan language teacher in his forties who first studied as a monk at Dargye monastery in Kardze county. Sonam Phuntsog, who is frequently referred to as 'Geshe' or 'Gen' Sonam Phuntsog, although it is not clear whether he has taken the official Geshe monastic exams, reportedly led prayers for the Dalai Lama earlier in 1999.

An unofficial report received by TIN indicates that Sonam Phuntsog may be being blamed by the authorities for a

bombing that took place on 7 October 1999 in a village near Kardze town. The explosion partially destroyed a small building that was in the process of being converted into a medical clinic by a Tibetan doctor who was said to be a devotee of the Shugden deity. The Dalai Lama advised Tibetans not to worship the controversial protector deity in 1996. The motives of the bombing are not known, although there has reportedly been some tension between devotees of Shugden in the area and some Tibetans there who are opposed to worship of the deity. There is no evidence of the involvement of Sonam Phuntsog in the bombing – it is more likely that his arrest on 24 October 1999 was linked to the authorities' concern over his influence in the area and his apparent loyalty to the Dalai Lama. A Tibetan intellectual with knowledge of the case said: *"The Chinese authorities generally assume that any Tibetan who wins the respect and trust of the public is suspected to have nationalist sentiments and splittist ideas or is a sympathiser and supporter of the counter-revolutionary people who attempt to sabotage the unity of the motherland and the friendship of the nationalities. Therefore, such well-known and popular Tibetans [as Sonam Phuntsog] are invariably held in suspicion. The Chinese government uses various pretexts and trumped-up charges to arrest and detain such people."*

Shortly after the detention of Sonam Phuntsog, a crowd of Tibetans gathered outside the local detention centre where he was being held to demand his release. Unofficial reports indicate that Sonam Phuntsog was released temporarily as a result, but was soon taken back into custody and transferred



Inside Kardze Detention Centre (1996)

© TOTAR 1997 – Alliance for Research in Tibet

to the county Public Security Bureau detention centre in Kardze town, one of the most notorious places of incarceration in the region. A larger crowd of several hundred Tibetans reportedly gathered outside the gates of the building on 31 October 1999 in order to protest about his arrest. They were dispersed by security personnel; reports received by TIN indicate that troops fired guns into the air, and tear-gas may also have been used. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Sonam Phuntsog has been sentenced and is currently being held in or near the prefectural capital, Dartsedo (Chinese: Kangding). According to the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, based in Dharamsala, India, both Sonam Phuntsog's attendant Sonam and Agyal Tsering have been released from custody.

Security was intensified in Kardze town following the demonstration, and police continued to detain and question individuals for some time afterwards. Tsering Wangdrag was reportedly taken into custody by Public Security personnel within a few days of the protest. He was held in Kardze County Public Security Bureau detention centre for approximately two months before his transfer to prison. His wife reportedly had to pay 1000 yuan (\$120) to see him for ten minutes during his initial detention. It is likely that this fee was paid when he was being held in Kardze county Public Security Bureau detention centre, before his transfer to prison.

Kardze county town, formerly part of the traditional Tibetan area of Kham, is one of the region's principal centres of religion and trade. The county is also known for its political volatility; it was one of the strongholds of the Khampa resistance to Chinese troops in the 1950s. The authorities maintain a strong security presence in and around the main town of Kardze. ■



Sonam Phuntsog

© TIN

Note: For further details on Sonam Phuntsog, see the Prisons and Protests section from the TIN News Review of 1999, available to order from TIN's website, [www.tibetinfo.net](http://www.tibetinfo.net)



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 10 JULY 2001 (EDITED)

## Two Tibetans die at labour re-education camp

Two Tibetans have died after being forced to carry out hard labour at Xinhua Re-education Through Labour Centre (Ch: Xinhua Laojiaosuo) in Mianyang municipality, northern Sichuan. One of the deaths is likely to have been of Tsering Wangdrag, a Tibetan farmer whose death last summer following maltreatment was reported by TIN in February (see above). The identity of the second Tibetan who died is unknown. A reliable report received by TIN said that the two Tibetans collapsed while being forced to work in hot weather in summer last year. They were not given water or medical treatment and died shortly afterwards.

Tsering Wangdrag, who was in his thirties, was being held at the labour camp following his participation in protests against the arrest of a respected Buddhist teacher, Sonam Phuntsog, in October 1999. Eleven more Tibetans associated with these demonstrations in Kardze (Ch: Ganzi) county town in Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan are currently being held at Mianyang, according to reliable reports. These Tibetan prisoners include Pema Phuntsog, Wangdu, Lobsang Jampa (known as Lok) and Phuntsog, who are all serving three years in Xinhua Re-education Through Labour facility, which is about 220km northeast of Chengdu, the provincial capital. TIN has been unable to confirm the identities of the remainder of the 11 reportedly held at Mianyang following the Kardze protests.

A report received by TIN indicates that Tibetans appear to be more at risk than Chinese at the Xinhua facility due to their lack of acclimatization to the heat and humidity of Sichuan summers, combined with hard labour and poor conditions. Prisoners at Mianyang are chiefly involved in construction work; many labour re-education facilities and prisons in the Sichuan region are involved in producing the materials needed for infrastructure development, which is one of the main economic priorities of the authorities. This linkage between prison labour and local markets helps to support the development of the local economy of the region. Prisoners at Ngaba prison in Ngaba (Ch: Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, also in Sichuan, produce construction materials while in Dartsedo (Ch: Kangding) in Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture there is a prison that utilises forced labour to manufacture cement.



Section of the work area at Ngaba Prison, apparently for making cement based materials  
© Alliance for Research in Tibet 1996



Political Education sign at Tardrom Nunnery, TAR

© TIN

One of the prisoners who died last summer at Mianyang, Tsering Wangdrag, reportedly collapsed while he was working and died two hours later. Tsering Wangdrag, who is survived by his wife and two young children, was serving a sentence of three years. Reports received by TIN indicate that he was beaten unconscious at least once during his initial period of detention in the Kardze County Public Security Bureau Detention Centre, and he continued to suffer from beatings at Mianyang. No details are available about the identity of the second Tibetan who died last summer at the Mianyang facility.

A *laojiao* (meaning re-education through labour) centre such as Xinhua houses detainees who have received administrative sentences, up to a maximum of three years, handed down by the Bureau of Re-education Through Labour without a trial.

Tibetans and Chinese who serve terms in re-education through labour camps may have committed offences such as theft, violent assault or petty crimes, but they can also be sentenced to terms for 'disrupting public order', 'anti-Party' and 'anti-state' activities. The Tibetans at Mianyang who participated in the demonstrations at Kardze, which involved hundreds of Tibetans, following the arrest of senior religious leader Sonam Phuntsog are likely to be included in one of the latter categories. Conditions are harsh in these detention facilities; prisoners who do not meet production quotas or who are accused of attempting to avoid work can be punished by beatings or solitary confinement. ■

Note: An article on re-education through labour and the role of prison labour in developing Tibet's economy by Steven D Marshall, co-author with Dr Susette Cooke of the CD-ROM *Tibet Outside the TAR* and author of TIN publication *Hostile Elements: A Study of Political Imprisonment in Tibet 1987-1998*, is available on TIN's website ([www.tibetinfo.net/publications/docs/laogai.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/publications/docs/laogai.htm)). The *Laogai and Development of Tibet* was originally presented as a paper to the conference: *Voices from the Laogai: 50 Years of Surviving China's Forced Labour Camps* (Washington DC, 17 - 19 September 1999).



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE 18 DECEMBER 2001 (EDITED)

## Death of nun after nine years in prison

New evidence has emerged regarding the death in February of a Tibetan nun, Ngawang Lochoe, a year before the end of her 10-year sentence in Lhasa's Drapchi prison. Twenty-eight year old Ngawang Lochoe had been suffering from a condition known as acute (necrotizing) pancreatitis and had only been hospitalised on the day of her death, according to the official source. Ngawang Lochoe, a nun at Samdrub Dolma Lhakhang (temple) in Toelung Dechen county (Chinese: Duilongdeqing), was sentenced in July 1992 to five years in prison for taking part in a peaceful protest in Lhasa. Her sentence was extended by another five years in 1993 after she and 13 other nuns in Drapchi made a tape recording of songs dedicated to their family and friends, which was smuggled out of prison. The Chinese authorities stated that the reason for Ngawang Lochoe's imprisonment and sentence extension was participation in "activities of counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement".

According to a Chinese official source, Ngawang Lochoe died on 5 February in the hospital of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Tibet Military Command in Lhasa. She had been admitted to the hospital earlier that day, suffering from acute necrotizing pancreatitis, arrhythmia, respiratory and heart failure, and attempts to save her life had been unsuccessful, according to the same source. A Western medical doctor told TIN that given this information, the main factor leading to her death is likely to have been the acute pancreatitis, leading to heart and lung failure. Acute pancreatitis is an inflammation of the pancreas that can cause agonizing pain in the abdomen. "If the patient is in good shape physically, the condition can generally be treated," said Dr John Rundle, of the Medical Foundation for Victims of Torture. "But it is likely that Ngawang Lochoe was severely physically debilitated after maltreatment over a period of several years including physical beatings and lack of food, and this would seriously compromise her chances of survival." Trauma is regarded as one of the causative factors of this condition. Treatment for acute pancreatitis can include intravenous fluids, oxygen, antibiotics or surgery.

Ngawang Lochoe was initially held at Gutsa detention centre in Lhasa, which is notorious for maltreatment of prisoners, and then transferred to Drapchi, where prisoners frequently suffer beatings and lack of food. In 1993, she was one of a group of 13 nuns to be punished severely following the tape-recording of songs referring to the Dalai Lama, their thoughts about freedom and their country and the conditions of their imprisonment. During the 1990s, and particularly from 1995

onwards, Ngawang Lochoe is likely to have been among female political prisoners (most of whom were nuns) who were all required to participate in debilitating military-style exercises at Drapchi supervised by the prison unit of the People's Armed Police. In May 1998, Ngawang Lochoe was also one of many female prisoners at Drapchi to be punished by beatings, following protests at the prison that began when prisoners shouted slogans in support of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence during an official flag raising ceremony. Five nuns, Tsultrim Zangmo (also known as Choekeyl), Khedron Yonten, Tashi Lhamo, Drugkyl Pema (lay name: Dekyi Yangzom) and Lobsang Wangmo, died in prison a month after the May 1998 protests.

A nun who once shared a cell in Drapchi with Ngawang Lochoe (lay name: Dondrub Dolma) and who has now left Tibet recalled seeing her soon after the protests. She told TIN: "That time all the prisoners were beaten very badly. After this we were isolated in our respective cells, and many nuns were taken outside for questioning. I don't know how [Ngawang Lochoe] was beaten or treated around that time. On the day of my release, I made a particular effort to look for her when passing her cell; normally we were not allowed to look into the other cells. That time our eyes met and she waved to me. That is when I [last] saw her."

A member of Ngawang Lochoe's family was prevented from seeing her on a prison visit two weeks before her death, according to testimony given by a Tibetan to the India-based NGO, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD). According to the same source, Ngawang Lochoe's relatives were informed on the day of her death that she was not well and had been transferred to hospital; when they arrived to see her, they were shown her dead body, and were not informed of the causes of her death.

Ngawang Lochoe, who was arrested at the age of 19, was one of the youngest nuns in the group that carried out the protest leading to her detention. The exiled Tibetan nun told TIN: "Ngawang was physically one of the healthiest of the group [of nuns in prison]. She was someone who was very quiet and relaxed, she didn't talk very much. The officials did not seem to be unusually strict towards her; she was not someone whom they particularly singled out for punishment. She was not someone who was easily downcast, and she was usually quite cheerful." According to the official source, Ngawang Lochoe's term in prison was due to expire on 21 March 2002. ■

**Note:** *Rukhag 3: The Nuns of Drapchi Prison*, published by TIN in October 2000, is a comprehensive account of a pattern of resistance and repression over a period of eight years (1992-1999) inside the two sections of Unit (*rukhang*) 3, where all inmates are female and most are political prisoners. The full text of the book, including photographs and the songs of nuns including Ngawang Lochoe recorded in prison, is available on CD-Rom to order from TIN at: [www.tibetinfo.net/publications/bbp/rukhang\\_3.htm](http://www.tibetinfo.net/publications/bbp/rukhang_3.htm)

## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 25 SEPTEMBER 2001 (EDITED)

## Obituary of Namgyal Tashi

Former political prisoner Namgyal Tashi, the father of the imprisoned nun Ngawang Sangdrol, has died at his home in Lhasa, aged 66. According to a reliable report, his sky burial<sup>1</sup> took place this morning (25 September). The exact cause of his death is not yet clear, although his health was poor for several years and he is reported to have suffered from kidney problems and high blood pressure. Namgyal Tashi, who died in the late afternoon of last Thursday, 20 September, has left behind four daughters and three sons.

Namgyal Tashi, a man known for his determination and strong will, spent a large part of his life in prison or reform through labour camps, most recently serving an eight year prison term in Drapchi from 1991 to 1999 for political activity. His daughter, Ngawang Sangdrol, a nun from is currently serving a 21 year sentence – the longest total sentence of any female political prisoner in Tibet.

Namgyal Tashi was born in 1935 in Chideshol township, Gongkar (Ch: Gongga) county, Lhoka (Ch: Shannan) prefecture, in central Tibet. He married Jampa Choezom in 1957 and they had eight children, the eldest of whom died during the Cultural Revolution. He was involved in the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, when thousands of Tibetans took to the streets of Lhasa to protest against Chinese rule, and spent the middle years of his life in detention – mainly in reform through labour camps (*laogai*). During the 1970s he was verbally and physically attacked at numerous *thamzing* (struggle sessions); sometimes he was beaten so badly that he would be brought home unconscious.

During the period of liberalisation in the early to mid-1980s, the situation for Namgyal Tashi and his family improved and they were able to make a living through working in the construction industry. During this period the authorities were offering compensation to those whose properties had been confiscated. As former landowners the family was eligible, but Namgyal Tashi reportedly refused to sign a letter expressing his support for Chinese policies and requesting the return of his property and as a result the family received nothing from the government.

Namgyal Tashi became involved in the Tibetan pro-independence activities of the late 1980s and early 1990s. He was detained in June 1991 together with his son, Tenzin Sherab, following an incident at Samye monastery in which a Tibetan flag was raised. Tenzin Sherab was detained for two years and Namgyal Tashi was sentenced to eight years. At least five other relatives of Namgyal Tashi, including his brother Lobsang Lhundrub, were reportedly arrested on suspicion of involvement in pro-independence protest, including the distribution of letters. Shortly after Namgyal Tashi was arrested in 1991, his wife Jampa Choezom died at the age of 52, reportedly from heart problems.

His daughter, Ngawang Sangdrol, was first detained in 1990 when she was 13. She was released temporarily in late 1991, by which time her mother had died and her father had been arrested. Ngawang Sangdrol was re-arrested in June 1992 after attempting to stage a demonstration in Lhasa together with one other nun and three monks. She was subsequently sentenced to three years imprisonment. Since then her term has been extended three times for involvement in further incidents of dissent inside the prison. She is due for release in 2013.

During their imprisonment in the 1990s, father and daughter were able to visit each other regularly, until these visits were stopped following the May 1998 Drapchi prison protests. After his release from prison in June 1999 and once visiting rights were restored to Drapchi's political prisoners, Namgyal Tashi endeavoured to visit Ngawang Sangdrol regularly and was able to see her during the months preceding his death.

<sup>1</sup> Sky burials involve a ceremony whereby the body is laid on a slab and the skull and skeleton are broken down and the flesh cut into pieces. Then vultures are allowed to feed from the carcass. Sky burial is the traditional form of burial in Central Tibet, while cremation is more widespread in other regions.

## Prisons

### TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS UPDATE, 27 APRIL 2001

### New reports on Ngaba prison

New reports have reached TIN about conditions in Ngaba prison in Sichuan province, highlighting the prison's increasing importance as a place of detention for political prisoners. Fourteen Tibetan political prisoners are currently being held in Ngaba prison in Maowun county (Ch: Maoxian) in Ngaba (Ch: Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. Eleven of the 14 are monks, including three monks from Kirti monastery in the prefecture, five monks from Kardze Gepheling monastery in neighbouring Kardze (Ch: Ganzhi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, one monk from Lithang and a Tibetan lama who was sentenced to six years after expressing his opposition to local government policies linked to gold mining near his monastery. A reliable report indicates that Sonam Phuntsog, the senior religious teacher and scholar whose detention sparked off major demonstrations in Kardze in October 1999, is also being held in Ngaba prison, serving five years.

The Tibetan political prisoners currently held at Ngaba prison were detained at various stages during the 1990s and are serving sentences of between three and ten years for political activities including the distribution of pro-independence leaflets and putting up the Tibetan flag. According to a former prisoner, the Kardze monks imprisoned in Ngaba were detained in 1998 for "putting up Free Tibet posters or shouting for Free Tibet". One of the most well-known political detainees in Ngaba prison, Kabukye Rinpoche, head of Nubzur monastery in Serthar (Ch: Seda) county in Kardze, was arrested on 10 June 1996 after he wrote a letter to the authorities protesting against the exploitation of a gold mine near his monastery and the influx of Chinese migrants that had occurred as a result. Kabukye Rinpoche is highly respected as a scholar and spiritual leader among the Nubzur monks and the local community, and his arrest five years ago caused widespread anger among Tibetans. At the time, Kabukye Rinpoche reportedly

sent a message to the people of Serthar saying that all he had done was to put on paper some of his thoughts, and he urged them to remain calm.

Sonam Phuntsog, a well-known scholar and Tibetan language teacher in his forties, is also believed to be imprisoned in Ngaba. His arrest appears to have been linked to the authorities' concern over his influence in the area and his apparent loyalty to the Dalai Lama. Following Sonam Phuntsog's initial detention on 24 October 1999, hundreds of people took to the streets in Kardze town to demand his release, and the authorities' fears of further unrest may have led them to carry out Sonam Phuntsog's trial and sentencing away from his home county, Kardze. Reports on where he is serving his sentence have differed, but the most substantial account received by TIN so far says that he has been transferred to Ngaba prison. Other reports have suggested that he is held in Dartsedo (Ch: Kangding), the capital of Kardze TAP. It is likely that Sonam Phuntsog would have been held there at some point, either in connection with investigation and court procedures, or in transit to Ngaba prison.

Tibetan political prisoners from neighbouring Kardze county may be being transferred to Ngaba Prison for security reasons. Kardze TAP's main prison complex, at Xinduqiao (Tib: Minyang), is an older facility and may not be considered as high security as Ngaba Prison. The location of the Xinduqiao complex in an area where the majority of the population is Tibetan, and adjacent to a main highway that runs through much of Kardze TAP, would make it easier for family members to visit imprisoned relatives. Maowun county, in contrast, has a Tibetan population comprising fewer than one per cent of the total, and is accessible from Kardze TAP only by undertaking a return journey that would be relatively expensive, potentially arduous, and take several days.



Punishment area and small isolation cells at Ngaba Prison in Maowun County – five guards are visible patrolling the outer wall  
© Alliance for Research in Tibet, 1996

## Conditions at Ngaba prison

A former political prisoner held at Ngaba prison reported that political prisoners were generally treated more severely than criminal prisoners in Ngaba prison. He said that physical abuse, including torture, was commonplace, that cells were overcrowded, and that political prisoners were dispersed among criminal prisoners. The former political prisoner told TIN: *"One of the big problems was that there was not enough food. Our families sent us butter, meat and money, but the police kept these. If two people fought and one was a political prisoner and the other was a thief, then the political prisoner would be beaten, but not the thief. If we were sick there was only one type of medicine given to prisoners, for headaches, but this wasn't given to political prisoners. They said, now you are sick, you can pray to the Dalai Lama and to America to help you."* The former prisoner also claimed that political prisoners were not permitted to receive visits from family members. This may have been less a matter of the prison's policy than the result of obstacles such as long, expensive journeys from remote counties, or high 'fees' demanded by prison officials. The same former political prisoner said that he suffered maltreatment during interrogation sessions, which continued throughout his imprisonment. He also indicated that prisoners were supposed to speak only in Chinese to prison staff, and that there were restrictions on speaking Tibetan. He told TIN that if prison guards found religious materials such as prayer beads, blessing cords or photos of the Dalai Lama, they confiscated them and *"stamped on them"*. When the then US President Bill Clinton visited China in June 1998, prison guards also taunted the political prisoners with comments that they should hope for Bill Clinton to come and help them.

A second former political prisoner who was held in Ngaba prison said that prisoners at Ngaba had to buy prison uniforms themselves, and if they were found without a uniform, they would be beaten and punished. The former prisoner claimed that Chinese prisoners received a special allowance for these uniforms but that Tibetans did not. *"Prices charged for buying anything from the prison store were twice the market price,"* he told TIN. The former detainee also reported that visitors to Tibetan prisoners were charged a fee of a few yuan, which is a normal procedure in Tibetan prisons. The same Tibetan told TIN that many prisoners who are malnourished and suffering from illness are still forced to carry out labour duties. He cites symptoms of malnourishment such as loss of hair pigmentation and pallor of the skin, and says: *"As a consequence their physical health deteriorates rapidly, and often the weaker prisoners fall down unconscious."* While this prisoner experienced forced labour conditions, the other former prisoner reported that he was kept confined to his cell-block and was not made to work.

One former prisoner explained that there were eight cells in his block, each with 18 inmates, a description which accords closely with photographs of the prison. In addition to the four main cell-blocks, there are several other structures within the prison walls. The largest are three factory-style buildings that do not reveal outward signs of their function as cell-blocks.

These photographs show an overview of the entire prison and main outlying buildings, with a close-up of the gate area and one section of the work area, apparently for making cement-based construction materials. One photograph shows the meeting area of the prison, which includes a raised platform and a slogan on the wall: *"Raise the sail of idealism; speed towards the shores of a new life"*. Prison forced-labour enterprises, such as construction companies and factories, often include the term 'new life' in their names. In addition to the main cell-blocks there is also an area of the prison that appears to be designed for punishment, including small isolation cells, with higher security than the rest of the prison. ■



The meeting area in Ngaba prison – the slogans on the wall behind the platform read "raise the sail of idealism; speed towards the shores of a new life"

© Alliance for Research in Tibet



One of four single storey cell blocks in Ngaba prison, Maowun County

© Alliance for Research in Tibet



## TIN NEWS STORY

TIN NEWS IN BRIEF, 31 JULY 2001

## New details on Kardze detention centre and Ngaba prison layout

Former political prisoners from Tibetan areas of Sichuan province have given TIN new details of the layout of the places where they were held. Labelled photographs on this page and on page 112 show the location of cellblocks, solitary confinement cells, places of work and security facilities inside Ngaba Prison and Kardze County Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Centre.

The photograph of the Kardze (Ch: Ganzi) county PSB Detention Centre below shows the road running in front of the detention centre compound, where a large crowd of several hundred Tibetans gathered to call for the release of senior religious figure Sonam Phuntsog in October 1999. The detention centre is located on Liberation (Ch: Jiefang) Street, next to the main Tibetan neighbourhood below Gepheling monastery, and adjacent to one of

Kardze county town's two People's Armed Police (PAP) compounds. Kardze County PSB Detention Centre is one of the most notorious in Kham (the eastern region of Tibet, some of which has been incorporated into Sichuan province). Political prisoners have been detained there; their families have also been interrogated within the detention centre compound. Reports received by TIN indicate that Tsering Wangdrag, one of the Tibetans detained following the October 1999 Kardze protests, was beaten unconscious at least once, suffering blows to his chest and stomach, while he was held at Kardze County PSB detention centre. He was detained there for approximately two months before being transferred to Xinhua Re-education-Through-Labour Centre in Mianyang municipality, where he and another prisoner died last summer.



Detention blocks and interrogation rooms at Kardze County PSB Detention Centre (viewed from the south-west, 1995) overlooked by PAP guard tower

## KEY

- 1 County PSB Offices
- 2 PSB residential block
- 3 short-term detention cells
- 4 detention centre cell block

- 5 inspection portal for cells
- 6 walled cell yards with overhead metal grid
- 7 PAP guard tower
- 8 interrogation rooms
- 9 PAP compound this side of detention centre

Fourteen Tibetan political prisoners are currently held at Ngaba prison, located in Maowun (Chinese: Maoxian) county, Ngaba (Ch: Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, according to TIN data. This includes religious teacher Sonam Phuntsog, who according to one reliable report is serving a five year sentence at the prison. Former political prisoners who have served terms at Ngaba prison

say that conditions for political prisoners are poor: the cells are overcrowded, prisoners suffer from malnutrition and physical abuse is common.

The new information from former political prisoners draws attention to construction work that has taken place at Ngaba prison since the photograph was taken in 1996, including the expansion and renovation of the assembly




Ngaba (Maowun) Prison viewed from the north (1996) with individual buildings identified using information provided by former prisoners

© Alliance for Research in Tibet

## KEY

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1 PAP area (including barracks)                      | 17 work area – manufacturing concrete blocks |
| 2 solitary confinement cells                         | 18 indoor meeting / assembly                 |
| 3 accommodation for aged/infirm inmates              | 19 work area – manufacturing metal stoves    |
| 4 classrooms (upper floor)                           | 20 work area – carpentry                     |
| 5 kitchen (lower floor)                              | 21 work area – possibly cabinet-making       |
| 6 dormitory for kitchen workers                      | 22 buildings now demolished                  |
| 7 Islamic kitchen                                    | 23 work area – vehicle repairs               |
| 8 Rukhag (unit) 4 (as known as in 1999)              | 24 residential blocks – prison staff         |
| 9 mess area (meals), Rukhag 4                        | 25 prison gate                               |
| 10 carving workshop, Rukhag 4                        | 26 residential block – upper level staff     |
| 11 sewage collection point                           | 27 prison administration                     |
| 12 Rukhag (unit) 1 (as of 1999)                      | 28 passage into administration courtyard     |
| 13 Rukhag (unit) 8 (as of 1999)                      | 29 prison-operated guesthouse                |
| 14 Rukhag (unit) 5 (as of 1999)                      | 30 main compound gate                        |
| 15 now improved for assembly / sports / recreation   | 31 PAP security post                         |
| 16 demolished to allow assembly / sports / expansion |  |



**News Review: Reports from Tibet 2001** includes a comprehensive selection of News Updates published during the year by Tibet Information Network, in addition to new TIN analysis and previously unpublished source material, including photographs, translations of official documents and interviews with Tibetans.

The issues covered in this Review include:

- The high-profile visit to Tibet of Hu Jintao (presumed successor to President Jiang Zemin) for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet.
- The construction of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway – an infrastructural endeavour which is likely to put an end to the relative isolation which has been typical for Tibet for centuries and should have a lasting impact on the economy and social life in Tibet.
- The amendments made to the Law on Regional National Autonomy during the year will further the integration of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) into the greater Chinese state.
- The expulsion of monks and nuns from the two pioneering Tibetan Buddhist institutes of Serthar and Yachen in Sichuan province, by far the most massive intervention of the authorities into Tibetan religious life in recent years.
- The Fourth Tibet Work Forum which outlined the development goals and their mode of implementation for the years to come.
- The jamming of foreign broadcasts and the ongoing control of the authorities over the flow of information within and into Tibet, as well as the growing sophistication of its implementation.



Tibet Information Network  
City Cloisters, 188-196 Old Street  
London EC1V 9FR, UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7814 9011  
Fax: +44 (0)20 7814 9015  
Email: [tin@tibetinfo.net](mailto:tin@tibetinfo.net)  
[www.tibetinfo.net](http://www.tibetinfo.net)

Company no: 3226281  
Charity no: 1057648